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II 
To The Reader 
Research in the area of financial accounting tends to reach out to neighboring fields. The 
thesis of Marcus Witzky is no exception. The first study explores standard setting, the second 
the inter-relatedness of enforcement and corporate governance and the last study investigates 
the monitoring behavior of individual investors. Doing so, the first study touches on political 
science, the second project is close to legal studies and the last paper addresses questions of 
behavioral finance. In terms of methodology, all studies are based on carefully collected data. 
While people are generally longing for causal identification these days, Marcus aims for care-
ful descriptive evidence. Given that cases of “establishing causality by arguing” are still 
somewhat common in the literature, personally, I am very sympathetic to this honest and 
humble approach to empirical work.  
One might wonder: How are these studies connected? It is tempting to reverse their order 
to discuss this. The last study documents that individual investors tend to be generally only 
superficial users of financial accounting information and this seems particularly true when 
they are less educated and experienced. While this finding itself is hardly surprising and also 
not new, the project establishes an interesting fact by documenting that less trusting investors 
also are less intensive financial accounting information users. This should be interesting to 
standard setters and links to the first study of the thesis exploring the personal characteristics 
of IASB members and how these characteristics are related to the standards issued by the 
IASB. It can be concluded from Marcus’ interesting data that the IASB is not catering to indi-
vidual investors. Instead, it focuses on professional investors and the financial community in 
general. While this seems sensible in light of the prior findings, ultimately, it is the result of a 
political decision. As we know, political positions are subject to change and the recent reform 
of the German Federal Ministry of Justice as the new Federal Ministry of Justice and Con-
sumer Protection and similar shifts at the European level open the room for speculations about 
the future role of individual investors for the IASB. Besides user-oriented standard setting, 
enforcement and corporate governance mechanisms are alternative means to establish trust in 
financial reporting. This links the prior studies to the second study and closes the circle. 
In combination, financial accounting requires efficient standard setters with a well-
defined user focus and institutions that ensure that the issued standards are consistently and 
rigorously applied. The resulting disclosures should be useful to investors and contribute to 
the efficiency of capital markets. The work of Marcus Witzky contributes to the academic 
debate about these big issues by providing new descriptive insights. I hope that his studies 
will be widely read and used. 
Berlin, November 2015 
Joachim Gassen 
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Abstract 
 
English: This cumulative doctoral thesis consists of three papers within the field of empirical 
financial accounting research. The first paper examines the role of personal characteristics of 
accounting standard setters in the development of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). It documents that the full set of IFRS exhibited a decrease in the im-
portance of principles relative to rules and an increase in its fair value orientation over time. 
Changes in IFRS properties are found to be associated with the professional and cultural 
background of International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) members. The second paper 
investigates determinants and consequences of erroneous financial reporting under the Ger-
man financial reporting enforcement regime. The corporate governance of firms detected with 
erroneous financial reporting is found to differ systematically from that of control firms. Fur-
ther results suggest that error detection might trigger improvements in firm-level accounting 
oversight. The third paper uses large-scale survey evidence from German individual investors 
to explore the determinants of their monitoring behavior. Investors who are less trusting in 
their fellow stakeholders are found to engage in less monitoring. Furthermore, trust and moni-
toring are documented to be associated with the stock market exposure and the educational 
background of investors. 
 
Deutsch: Die vorliegende kumulative Doktorarbeit umfasst drei Arbeiten aus dem Bereich 
der empirischen Rechnungslegungsforschung. Die erste Arbeit untersucht die Rolle persönli-
cher Eigenschaften von Rechnungslegungsstandardsetzern bei der Entwicklung der Internati-
onalen Rechnungslegungsstandards IFRS. Sie dokumentiert, dass in den IFRS insgesamt ein 
Rückgang der Bedeutung von Prinzipien gegenüber Regeln sowie ein Anstieg der Bedeutung 
des beizulegenden Zeitwerts im Zeitablauf zu verzeichnen sind. Zwischen Änderungen von 
IFRS-Eigenschaften sowie beruflichen und kulturellen Eigenschaften von Mitgliedern des 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) wird ein Zusammenhang festgestellt. Die 
zweite Arbeit widmet sich Ursachen und Folgen fehlerhafter Finanzberichterstattung im 
Rahmen des deutschen Systems der Durchsetzung von Rechnungslegungsregeln. Sie findet 
systematische Unterschiede in der Unternehmensführung von Unternehmen, bei denen fehler-
hafte Finanzberichte festgestellt werden, gegenüber einer Kontrollgruppe. Weitere Ergebnisse 
lassen die Vermutung zu, dass die Aufdeckung fehlerhafter Finanzberichte Verbesserungen in 
der unternehmensspezifischen Aufsicht über den Rechnungslegungsprozess auslösen könnte. 
Die dritte Arbeit nutzt umfangreiche Befragungsergebnisse deutscher Privatanleger zur Unter-
suchung der Ursachen ihres Unternehmensüberwachungsverhaltens. Demnach üben Anleger, 
die ein geringeres Vertrauen in andere Anspruchsgruppen eines Unternehmens haben, zu-
gleich eine geringere Unternehmensüberwachung aus. Darüber hinaus dokumentiert die Ar-
beit, dass Vertrauen und Unternehmensüberwachung in einem Zusammenhang mit dem Aus-
maß der Teilnahme am Aktienmarkt und dem Bildungshintergrund der Anleger stehen. 
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1 
An Introductory Summary 
 
Following Wysocki (2011), I understand financial accounting as an institution intended to 
lower transaction costs in an economy and thus fostering economic development. This effect 
arises from two properties of financial accounting. First, it can reduce information asymme-
tries between market participants. Second, it can serve as a reference point for contracting. 
Altogether, financial accounting can lower the cost of coordination. However, it is not the 
only institution in an economy and consequently develops endogenously. As Wysocki (2011) 
argues, the efficiency of a financial accounting system depends on its interdependencies with 
other institutions like, for example, the legal system, corporate governance mechanisms, or 
the enforcement of laws and rules. The existence of numerous interdependencies between 
financial accounting and other institutions in modern, complex market economics implies that 
the overall costs and benefits of a financial accounting system are difficult to determine in a 
single attempt. It might be functional rather to focus—step by step—on gaining a better in-
depth understanding of selected important interdependencies. Hopefully, various results will 
add up to the larger picture at a certain point of time. Consequently, this thesis investigates 
three important interdependencies: (1) relations between the cultural and professional back-
ground of accounting standard setters and the properties of International Financial Reporting 
Standards, (2) the enforcement of accounting standards and subsequent changes in the corpo-
rate governance of firms targeted by enforcement actions, and (3) demand for financial ac-
counting information from individual investors in the presence of distrust in other market par-
ticipants. 
The first paper of my thesis, titled The Influence of Standard Setters on the Properties of 
International Financial Reporting Standards, adds to the still immature understanding of the 
accounting standard setting process itself (Gipper, Lombardi, and Skinner 2013). In doing so, 
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I develop linguistic proxies to measure (1) the importance of principles relative to rules in and 
(2) the fair value orientation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These 
properties are expected to be related to the fundamental qualitative characteristics of decision-
useful information in the IFRS setting: relevance and faithful representation. My analysis pro-
ceeds in two steps. First, I provide descriptive insights into the development of the properties 
of the full set of IFRS. Second, I apply a multivariate research design in order to examine a 
potential association between changes in the properties of single standards and the personal 
characteristics of International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) members voting in favor 
of these changes. My results indicate that both professional and cultural backgrounds of IASB 
members play a role for IFRS properties. To my knowledge, I am the first to document such 
an association between personal characteristics of standard setters and properties of account-
ing standards in the IASB setting. A comparable pattern has been documented for the U.S. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board before (e.g., Allen and Ramanna 2013; Jiang, Wang, 
and Xie 2014). However, my study is unique because the international institutional environ-
ment in which the IASB operates offers the possibility to examine the role of diverse cultural 
backgrounds of standard setters. 
The second paper of my thesis, titled Enforcement of Accounting Standards and Changes 
in Corporate Governance, adds to the understanding of potential determinants of erroneous 
financial reporting and of potential consequences of financial reporting enforcement actions. I 
investigate (1) whether the corporate governance of error firms differs systematically from 
that of non-error firms and (2) whether error detection is followed by improvements in the 
corporate governance of error firms. In this regard, corporate governance is defined as the 
structure of the internal and external accounting oversight institutions at the firm level or, 
more specifically, of the board of directors and the auditor-client relationship. I examine the 
German financial reporting enforcement setting because it provides several advantages over to 
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the U.S. setting which is predominantly examined by prior literature (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney 1996; Farber 2005): First, virtually all error detections result in mandated error 
announcements to be disclosed by the deviant firms. Second, firms have a high likelihood of 
being repeatedly and randomly chosen for examination. Third, the setting includes a broad 
variety of error types without a particular bias towards extreme cases of errors (i.e., fraud). 
Altogether, I am confident that these features enable a better empirical inference. My analysis 
proceeds in two steps. First, I provide descriptive evidence on the German financial reporting 
enforcement regime and document that non-governance firm characteristics explain the likeli-
hood of being a firm with erroneous financial reporting to a limited extent only. Second, using 
a difference-in-differences approach on a matched sample, I find that error firms seem to be 
different from control firms in the error year with respect to both the auditor-client relation-
ship and the structure of the supervisory board1 in the error year. In the first fiscal year after 
error disclosure, differences to control firms are insignificant with respect to the structure of 
the supervisory board while differences regarding the auditor-client relationship partly persist. 
This may be interpreted as financial reporting enforcement being effective to some extent in 
preventing potential future errors by triggering improvements in firm-level accounting over-
sight. 
The third paper of my thesis, titled Monitoring by Individual Investors, is co-authored by 
Joachim Gassen. Our study is concerned with two mechanism to address information asym-
metries in markets: trust and monitoring. While prior research on the monitoring role of in-
vestors has focused almost exclusively on institutional investors, we use large-scale survey 
evidence from Ernst, Gassen, and Pellens (2009) on German individual investors to explore 
the determinants of their monitoring behavior. Assuming that individual investors more or 
less rationally choose to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of institutional investors, one 
                                                     
1  Joint-stock companies in Germany are required to have a two-tiered board system—a supervisory board 
exercising corporate control over a separate management board responsible for daily operations (Fohlin 
2007). 
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would assume that they provide little effort in monitoring and instead trust their more experi-
enced institutional counterparts to discipline management. However, based on our data, we 
find that a significant portion of the investors in our sample is not trusting. Instead, they state 
that they perceive a high risk that other stakeholder groups are betraying their wealth position. 
At the same time, we find that “untrusting” investors are less active monitors measured by 
their engagement in financial accounting information acquisition and their exercise of share-
holder voting rights. In order to understand the mechanics behind this striking correlation, we 
use structural equation modeling to explore the links between educational background in eco-
nomics or business, stock market exposure, trust and monitoring activity. Our data suggests 
that better-educated investors having higher levels of stock market exposure, trust and moni-
toring activities. In addition, investors with higher stock market exposure engage more in 
monitoring activities and lower levels of trust trigger lower exposure to the stock market but 
have no direct effect on monitoring activities. Our findings should be relevant to regulators 
since they help to understand a group of investors that is most likely less willing to invest in 
the stock market. Understanding the mindset of these investors should help to address their 
concerns. Improving the financial knowledge of individual investors might increase trust, 
monitoring activities, and stock market participation. 
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I 
 
The Influence of Standard Setters on the Properties 
of International Financial Reporting Standards 
 
Marcus Witzky 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether and how personal characteristics of International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) members are associated with properties of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Properties of IFRS are captured by linguistic proxies. I docu-
ment that the overall importance of principles relative to rules in the full set of IFRS de-
creased over time, while the overall fair value orientation increased. Focusing on single IASB 
decisions on IFRS changes, I find that members with an auditing background are associated 
with decreases in the importance of principles relative to rules, while members from common 
law countries are associated with increases in the importance of principles relative to rules. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that members with an auditing or financial services back-
ground are associated with increases in fair value orientation. This paper is the first to docu-
ment an association between personal characteristics of standard setters and properties of ac-
counting standards in the IASB setting. Furthermore, I provide detailed descriptive evidence 
on the time series of IFRS properties and IASB membership. 
 
Keywords: Standard Setting, IASB, IFRS, Principles-based Accounting, Fair Value 
JEL Classification: D72, D78, M40, M41, M48 
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1 Introduction 
Positive accounting research still has an immature understanding of the accounting stand-
ard setting process itself (Gipper, Lombardi, and Skinner 2013). I add to this gap in the litera-
ture by investigating whether and how personal characteristics of International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) members are associated with properties of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Personal characteristics of IASB members are examined in terms 
of their professional and cultural background. IFRS properties are captured by linguistic prox-
ies measuring (1) the importance of principles relative to rules and (2) the fair value orienta-
tion of final standards. I focus on these properties because I expect them to be related to the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics of decision-useful information in the IFRS setting: 
relevance and faithful representation (IASB, 2010: par. QC4–QC18). I conduct my analysis in 
two steps. First, I provide descriptive insights into the development of the properties of the 
full set of IFRS. Second, I apply a multivariate research design in order to examine a potential 
association between changes in the properties of single standards and the personal characteris-
tics of IASB members voting in favor of these changes. 
For analyzing the importance of principles relative to rules, I calculate the number of 
principles (bold type) paragraphs relative to the number of all paragraphs and document a 
considerable decrease in the importance of principles relative to rules in the full set of IFRS 
by 41.0% between 2001 and 2013. For analyzing fair value orientation, I relate the frequency 
of fair value measurement terms to the frequency of all measurement terms and document a 
steady increase in the fair value orientation of the full set of IFRS by 31.3% between 2001 
and 2013. For the second step of my analysis, I identify 105 IASB decisions on IFRS changes 
between 2001 and the end of 2012. After sample adjustments, I am able to use 71 documents 
for my multivariate analysis. Using probit models, I regress the probability of a decision re-
sulting in an increase or decrease in standard properties on the average personal characteris-
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tics of the IASB members voting in favor of that change. I show that decreases in the im-
portance of principles relative to rules are associated with IASB members having a profes-
sional background in auditing while increases are associated with members from common law 
countries. Furthermore, I show that increases in fair value orientation are associated with 
IASB members having a professional background in auditing or financial services. 
My results indicate that both professional and cultural backgrounds of IASB members 
play a role for IFRS properties. To my knowledge, I am the first to document such an associa-
tion between personal characteristics of standard setters and properties of accounting stand-
ards in the IASB setting. A comparable pattern has been documented for the U.S. Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) before (Allen and Ramanna 2013; Jiang, Wang, and Xie 
2013). However, my study is unique because the international institutional environment in 
which the IASB operates offers the possibility to examine the role of diverse cultural back-
grounds of standard setters. I discuss my findings with respect to the institutional environment 
the IASB is exposed to and the political process of accounting standard setting. First, there 
seems to be a demand for rules-based accounting and fair value measurement in the IFRS 
context. Second, the documented development of IFRS properties could be due to a consensus 
within the IASB to balance relevance and faithful representation of accounting information in 
its standard setting activity. Third, the documented development of IFRS properties could be 
due to a political compromise between IASB members preferring either a valuation or a stew-
ardship perspective on accounting. 
This paper contributes to at least three streams of literature. First, I add to the descriptive 
literature on IFRS by developing linguistic proxies to evaluate the development of IFRS 
properties (e.g., Benston, Bromwich, and Wagenhofer 2006; Cairns 2006; Carmona and 
Trombetta 2008). Second, I add to the literature on the influence of the institutional environ-
ment on accounting standards and information (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000; Leuz, 
9 
Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006; Hail 2013) by exploring a 
mechanism through which cultural and other institutional factors shape accounting outcomes. 
Third, by building on the work of Allen and Ramanna (2013), I strengthen the understanding 
of the role of standard setters in accounting standard setting as I examine a more heterogene-
ous setting compared to that of the FASB.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details on the con-
struction and the time series of my linguistic proxies for IFRS properties. Section 3 describes 
the institutional context of the IASB and presents the time series of the personal characteris-
tics of its members. Section 4 explains the design of my multivariate analysis and presents the 
results on associations between personal characteristics of IASB members and IFRS proper-
ties. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Measurement of IFRS properties 
2.1 Data and size of the IFRS universe 
Prior literature has shed light on IFRS properties already (e.g., Benston et al. 2006; 
Cairns 2006; Carmona and Trombetta 2008), investigated differences in accounting treat-
ments between local GAAP and IFRS (e.g., Street 2002; Ding, Jeanjean, and Stolowy 2005; 
Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, and Stolowy 2007; Bae, Tan, and Welker 2008), the IFRS harmoniza-
tion process (e.g., Garrido, León, and Zorio 2002), and convergence between local GAAP and 
IFRS (e.g., Fontes, Rodrigues, and Craig 2005). Unfortunately, the results are not sufficient 
for my purpose, since they either describe a status quo at a certain point of time or are of qual-
itative nature and therefore not useful for empirical analysis. I develop suitable measures for 
IFRS properties by analyzing the texts of final standards following a linguistic approach. 
Hereby, I limit the influence of personal judgment on my measures. 
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In order to systematically analyze the development of IFRS properties, I need consolidat-
ed texts of all standard versions over time. Unfortunately, they are not available continuously. 
Only IASB documents that issue new standards or revise existing standards provide the new 
consolidated versions. IASB documents that amend existing standards just instruct how the 
texts of the targeted standards are to be changed. Consolidated versions of all standards are 
available on a year-by-year basis only in the IFRS Red Books (or Bound Volumes of IFRS, as 
they were called before 2009). The Red Books are published by the IFRS Foundation each 
year and provide the consolidated versions of all standards as issued at January 1 of the re-
spective year. However, two exceptions exist: (1) the 2004 Red Book provides the consolidat-
ed versions as issued at March 31, and (2) the 2008 Red Book provides the consolidated ver-
sions as issued at January 17. It should be noted that the Red Books do not provide the effec-
tive standard versions at the reference date (which can be found in the IFRS Blue Books) but 
the latest versions as approved by the IASB, even if they will become effective after the refer-
ence date. Standards which are still effective at the reference date, but which the IASB has 
decided to withdraw, are not part of the Red Books. My examination period starts in 2001 
when the IASB resumed responsibility for international accounting standard setting. The 
IASB adopted all International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by its predecessor, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Board, making them the core of what 
is now called IFRS (see Zeff 2012, for a historical overview). Therefore, the first Red Book I 
use is that of 2001, the last one published by the IASC. 
I access the Red Books digitally using the eIFRS website. IAS 19 (Employee Benefits) of 
2001 cannot be used as it is incomplete. Therefore, I duplicate IAS 19 of 2002, as there was 
no change in the meantime. Including the duplicate, I obtain 481 standard-year observations 
between 2001 and 2013. For reasons of comparability, I focus on the pure text of standards 
only. This excludes the introduction, table of contents, basis for conclusions, and implementa-
11 
tion guidance. Appendices are included when it is stated that they form an integral part of the 
standard. Illustrative examples are included when they are presented within the course of the 
pure text of a standard. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 present the size of the IFRS universe, i.e. the full set of standards, 
over time. The number of standards increases from 34 in 2001 to 41 in 2013 (+20.6%). The 
sum of words in all standards increases even stronger from 202,217 in 2001 to 354,405 in 
2013 (+75.3%). Two considerable yearly changes are noteworthy. First, between 2003 and 
2004 the sum of words increases by 30.0% due to the completion of the first major IASB pro-
jects. Between June 2003 and March 2004 five new standards are issued (IFRS 1 to IFRS 5) 
and 16 of the existing standards are revised. Second, between 2011 and 2012 the sum of 
words increases by 12.1% which is largely due to the issuance of IFRS 10 to IFRS 13. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Table 1 about here] 
2.2 Importance of principles relative to rules 
The IFRS Preface explains: “Standards approved by the IASB include paragraphs in bold 
type and plain type, which have equal authority. Paragraphs in bold type indicate the main 
principles. […]” (IASB 2002: par. 13) This distinction was not clarified in the Preface to 
Statements of International Accounting Standards which was effective until 2002. However, it 
was applied by the IASC Board already. In order to measure the importance of principles rela-
tive to rules, I count the number of bold and plain type paragraphs in all standard-year obser-
vations. Following the IFRS Preface, I interpret bold type paragraphs as principles para-
graphs.  In contrast, I assume that plain type paragraphs represent rules and interpret them as 
rules paragraphs. 
As Figure 2 and Table 2 show, the sum of principles paragraphs in the IFRS universe de-
creases only slightly by 4.5% between 2001 and 2013. In contrast, the sum of rules para-
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graphs in the IFRS universe increases strongly by 94.6% during that time. %PRIN is the share 
of principles paragraphs based on all paragraphs and decreases by 41.0% between in 2001 and 
2013. This indicates a considerable decline in the importance of principles relative to rules in 
IFRS. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
2.3 Fair value orientation 
In order to capture fair value orientation, I have to assess the importance of fair value 
measurement relative to the importance of other measurement concepts. Nobes (2001) sug-
gests different classifications of asset measurement bases. One is the distinction between past 
and current measurement bases. The only past measurement base is historical cost, while fair 
value belongs to the group of current measurement bases. Following the 2005 IASB discus-
sion paper about measurement bases for financial accounting, I identify as current measure-
ment bases besides fair value: (1) current cost and its two forms, reproduction cost and re-
placement cost, (2) net realizable value, and (3) value in use. Deprival value and recoverable 
amount are not included because they are combinations of measurement bases. Furthermore, 
present value in not included because it does not represent a measurement base but a tech-
nique that can be used to estimate measurement bases (IASB 2005: par. 66–96). 
Fair value and its sub-concept, fair value less costs to sell, were used in IFRS under dif-
ferent names for some time: (1) until the issuance of IFRS 5 (Non-current Assets Held for 
Sale and Discontinued Operations) in March 2004 fair value less costs to sell was called net 
selling price, and (2) until the issuance of IFRS 13 (Fair Value Measurement) in May 2011 in 
some cases the term market value was used instead of fair value. When I examine in the fol-
lowing the importance of fair value measurement, this actually comprises fair value, market 
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value, fair value less costs to sell, and net selling price. The full classification of measurement 
bases that I use in this paper is illustrated in Figure 3. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
I want to evaluate the frequency of terms related to the different measurement concepts in 
all standard-year observations. Searching for the respective major terms alone is not suffi-
cient. For example, the term “historical cost” is rarely used in IFRS. Instead, it is often stated 
that an item should be measured “at cost”. On the other hand, the term “fair value” is used in 
numerous contexts. Therefore, I decide to search for specific phrases that can usually be 
found in a measurement context. I define fair value measurement terms as all possible combi-
nations of the prefixes “at”, “at its”, “at the” and “at their” on the one hand with the terms 
“fair value”, “market value” and “net selling price” on the other hand.2 Other current meas-
urement terms are defined as all possible combinations of the prefixes “at”, “at its”, “at the” 
and “at their” on the one hand with the terms “current cost”, “replacement cost”, “reproduc-
tion cost”, “net realisable value” and “value in use” on the other hand. Historical cost meas-
urement terms are defined as all possible combinations of the prefixes “at”, “at its”, “at the” 
and “at their” on the one hand with the terms “cost”, “historical cost”, “amortised cost” and 
“depreciated cost” on the other hand. The construction of the measurement terms is summa-
rized in Figure 4.3 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 5 and Table 3 show the overall development of fair value orientation based on 
measurement terms. The frequency of fair value terms in the IFRS universe increases consid-
erably from 106 in 2001 to 339 in 2013 (+219.8%). In 2001, fair value terms can be found in 
59% of the standards, while in 2013 85% of all standards contain such terms. The frequency 
of other current value terms is small and constant over time (7). In the frequency of historical 
                                                     
2  The term “fair value less costs to sell” is not listed as its appearance is covered by searching for “fair value”. 
3  I search for “amortised cost” and “net realisable value” because these are the British forms of writing used in 
IFRS. 
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cost terms, I observe an increase from 70 in 2001 to 100 in 2013 (+42.9%). %FV_MT is the 
share of fair value terms based on all measurement terms. It increases by 31.3% between 2001 
and 2013, indicating an increase in the fair value orientation of IFRS over time. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
In order to add to the robustness of my analysis, I offer an alternative measure for fair 
value orientation: the frequency of the single term “fair value” relative to the frequency of the 
single term “cost”.  This measure is more simple and straightforward on the one hand but 
probably induces more noise on the other hand because the terms “fair value” and “cost” are 
used in various contexts besides measurement bases. 
Figure 6 and Table 4 show the overall development of fair value orientation based on the 
terms “fair value” and “cost”. The frequency of the term “fair value” in the IFRS universe 
increases from 645 in 2001 to 1,568 in 2013 (+143.1%). In 2001, the term “fair value” can be 
found in 65% of the standards, while in 2013 90% of all standards contain this term. In the 
frequency of the term “cost” I observe an increase from 985 in 2001 to 1,261 in 2013 
(+28.0%). %FV_CO is the frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of the fre-
quencies of the terms “fair value” and “cost”. It increases by 39.9% between 2001 and 2013. 
Compared to my first measure, the overall increase of fair value orientation is even more pro-
nounced when using my alternative measure. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
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3 IASB member characteristics 
3.1 Structure and member selection 
The IASB is a body of the IFRS Foundation (until 2010: IASC Foundation), a not-for-
profit corporation under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware with its prin-
cipal office in London. The governance structure of the IFRS Foundation is defined in its con-
stitution, of which the first version was approved by the members of the IASC in May 2000. 
Following the constitution, the IASB has the complete responsibility for developing and issu-
ing IFRS. IASB members are appointed by the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation, who are re-
sponsible for all governance issues besides standard setting. The names of the first IASB 
members were announced on January 25, 2001 (Camfferman and Zeff 2006: 497–498). 
In the beginning, the main qualification required for IASB membership was technical ex-
pertise. Following criticism of the IASB as being too theoretical (Zeff 2012: 827–828), this 
criterion was replaced in 2005 by professional competence and practical experience. At the 
same time, an existing minimum quota for the professional background of IASB members 
was dropped. A member selection based on geographical criteria was not allowed for the most 
time of IASB history. However, in July 2012, a minimum quota for the geographical back-
ground of IASB members based on continental regions became effective. The number of 
IASB members required by the constitution increased from 14 to 16 over time, most of them 
serving as full-time members. In order to approve an IFRS change, the required qualified ma-
jority of IASB members increased from eight to ten over time. Table 5 shows the develop-
ment of the IASB structure as defined by the constitution in detail. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Beyond these criteria, the details of IASB member selection by the Trustees are non-
public. In order to better understand the selection process and to identify potential drivers of 
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selection decisions, one would have to focus on how the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation are 
selected in first stage, actually. Although selection criteria for Trustees exist in the constitu-
tion, as well, this process is difficult to comprehend as Trustees are appointed by co-optation. 
The implementation of the Monitoring Board in 2009 as formal link between the Trustees and 
public capital market authorities changed the Trustee selection process slightly in the way that 
appointments of Trustees have to be approved by the Monitoring Board. However, the selec-
tion of new Trustees itself still is in the responsibility of the existing Trustees. Therefore, 
when I provide evidence on the development of personal characteristics of IASB members in 
the following, it remains open whether and to what extent this development is determined by 
the personal characteristics of the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation in the first stage. 
3.2 Professional and cultural background 
From the IASB’s inception in 2001 until the end of 2013, 33 men and women served as 
IASB members. Using annual reports and press releases of the IFRS Foundation, I identify for 
all of them (1) the month when joining the IASB,4 (2) the month when leaving the IASB, (3) 
the home country, and (4) the last principal occupation before joining the IASB. Home coun-
try is supposed to be the country of birth. In the case that I am not able to identify this for a 
certain individual, home country is the country of his or her principal education. If the last 
principal occupation of an individual was being a member or employee of an accounting 
standard setting body, I additionally identify the last principal occupation outside of standard 
setting. 
I classify the professional background of each IASB member by his or her last principal 
occupation that was not related to accounting standard setting. I build on the basic classifica-
tion of professional backgrounds that is used in the constitution of the IFRS Foundation for 
selecting the Trustees: auditing, preparer of financial statements, user of financial statements, 
                                                     
4  There can be a time difference between being appointed to the IASB and joining the IASB. 
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and academia. I adjust this structure as follows: (1) the only unambiguous group of users in 
my setting are analysts, (2) a background in banking or insurance is treated as a group of its 
own, as these industries can be seen as both, preparers and users of financial statements, and 
(3) I include government as a group for all individuals that served for a public authority out-
side of academia. Unfortunately, I am not able to classify one member (Warren J. McGregor) 
based on this structure. His professional background is classified as unclear. Table 6 provides 
the characteristics of all IASB members in detail. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Figure 7 and Table 7 illustrate the development of the professional background by Janu-
ary of each year. The distribution of backgrounds is stable during the first six years of IASB 
history. The most important group in the beginning is auditing (six of 14). However, the im-
portance of this group decreases considerably after 2010. In 2013, no more than two of 15 
members have an auditing background. The number of members with a background in aca-
demia or as preparer decreases, as well. In contrast, the number of members with a back-
ground as analyst, in banking/insurance or in government increases. Especially the develop-
ment of the government group is noteworthy. Before 2007, there are no IASB members with 
such a background, at all. In contrast, members with a government background represent the 
most important professional group in the IASB in 2013 (five of 15). Additionally, I find that 
the number of members having their last principal occupation in accounting standard setting 
decreases over time (from four of 14 in 2001 to one of 15 in 2013). 
[Figure 7 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
For analyzing the cultural background of IASB members, I do not focus on home coun-
tries directly, but classify members by the legal origin of the company law or commercial 
code of their home countries. Hereby, I follow the approach of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
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Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), who use data from Reynolds and Flores (1989). There are two 
major legal families in the world: (1) common law of English origin and (2) civil law of Ro-
mano-Germanic origin. Civil law can be divided into French, German and Scandinavian sub-
families. The basic conceptual difference between common law and civil law could be sum-
marized as follows: historically, the first one was supposed to protect the free people from the 
government, while the latter was supposed to enforce the will of the government (Morck and 
Steier 2007: 40). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) provide evidence 
that civil law countries (especially of the French sub-family) have weaker investor protection 
and less developed capital markets compared to common law countries. 
Figure 8 and Table 8 illustrate the development of the cultural background of IASB 
members by January of each year. Common law includes members from Australia, Canada, 
India, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. French civil law in-
cludes members from Brazil, France, and Netherlands. German civil law includes members 
from Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland. Scandinavian civil law includes mem-
bers from Sweden. IASB members from China are not classified into these families but treat-
ed as a separate group. Again, the distribution of backgrounds is stable during the first six 
years of IASB history. After 2006, the number of members from common law countries de-
creases from ten of 14 to seven of 15 in 2013. This is actually due to a considerable decline in 
the number of members from the United Kingdom from four of 14 before 2007 to one of 15 in 
2013. In contrast, the absolute number of members from the United States is quite stable, re-
sulting in them becoming relatively more important within the common law group over time. 
The increase in the number of members from civil law countries is especially attributable to 
members from French civil law countries. 
[Figure 8 about here] 
[Table 8 about here] 
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4 IFRS properties and IASB member characteristics 
4.1 Research design 
I investigate potential associations between IFRS properties and IASB member character-
istics in a multivariate research design. Using probit regressions, I estimate the probabilities 
that IASB members with certain personal characteristics vote in favor of IFRS changes that 
either increase or decrease the importance of principles relative to rules or fair value orienta-
tion. I use the eIFRS website to identify the voting behavior for 105 IASB decisions on IFRS 
changes between 2001 and the end of 2012. Of that, 35 amend existing standards as part of 
improvements projects,5 32 amend existing standards outside the improvements projects, 24 
revise existing standards and 14 issue new standards. Figure 9 and Table 9 provide an over-
view. The most active years of standard setting are 2003, 2008 and 2009. In contrast, none or 
only few changes take place in 2001, 2002, 2006 and 2007. It is noteworthy that dissenting 
votes and abstentions are common in IASB decisions. Due to the fixed voting requirements 
for IFRS changes (see subsection 3.1) abstentions have the same effect as dissenting votes. 
Only 67.6% of the changes were approved unanimously. 
[Figure 9 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
The dependent variables of my probit regressions are dummy variables that indicate 
whether an IASB decision results in either an increase or a decrease in the respective proper-
ties of the target standard, using my measures developed in section 2. Since consolidated ver-
sions of all standards exist on a yearly basis, only (see subsection 2.1), I have to base this as-
sessment on comparing the target standard version at the beginning of the respective year with 
the target standard version at the beginning of the following year. In nine cases, the title of an 
                                                     
5  I split up the voting behavior for the four improvements projects with respect to the various target standards 
into 35 separate decisions. 
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amendment names more than one target standard. I identify the principal target standards for 
each of these cases. Besides changing the target standard itself, an IASB decision usually in-
cludes consequential amendments to other standards, as well. Since I am only able to assess 
the total change of a standard over the full course of a year, consequential amendments could 
induce noise. However, the impact of consequential amendments is usually rather small. I 
expect that consequential amendments do not change the importance of principles relative 
rules or the fair value orientation of standards. 
%PRIN_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in the 
share of principles paragraphs based on the number of all paragraphs and zero if not. 
%PRIN_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in the 
share of principles paragraphs based on the number of all paragraphs and zero if not. 
%FV_MT_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in the 
share of fair value measurement terms based on all measurement terms and zero if not. 
%FV_MT_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in the 
share of fair value measurement terms based on all measurement terms and zero if not.6 
%FV_CO_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in the 
frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of the frequencies of the terms “fair 
value” and “cost” and zero if not. %FV_CO_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a de-
cision results in a decrease in the frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of the 
frequencies of the terms “fair value” and “cost” and zero if not.7 
I calculate for each decision the share of professional and cultural backgrounds based on 
the IASB members who vote in favor of the respective change. However, I only include a 
                                                     
6  If there are no measurement terms at all in a standard version at the beginning of a year, I interpret this as fair 
value measurement terms being as unimportant as other measurement terms. Therefore, I assume in this case 
that the share of fair value measurement terms equals 0.5. 
7  If there are no “fair value” or “cost” terms at all in a standard version at the beginning of a year, I interpret 
this as the term “fair value” being as unimportant as the term “cost”. Therefore, I assume in this case that the 
share of the term “fair value” equals 0.5. 
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small selection of the professional and cultural background groups that I presented in subsec-
tion 3.2 for my multivariate analysis. On the one hand, 105 IFRS changes between 2001 and 
2012 constitute a rather small basic population. I do not want to reduce the power of this set-
ting by including too many independent variables. On the other hand, since there were only 31 
IASB members between 2001 and 2012, most professional and cultural groups are rather 
small in size. If I use too small groups, it could actually happen that I capture rather personal-
fixed effects than the effects of professional and cultural backgrounds. 
I use %Auditing and %Financial as independent variables for the professional back-
ground. %Auditing is defined as the share of IASB members approving a change whose last 
principal occupation outside of standard setting was in the auditing industry. %Financial is 
defined as the share of IASB members approving a change whose last principal occupation 
outside of standard setting was in financial services, i.e. in the analyst, banking or insurance 
industry. For the cultural background, I use %Common as independent variable. %Common 
is defined as the share of IASB members approving a change who are from countries in which 
the legal origin of the company law or commercial code is common law. 
4.2 Sample development and descriptive statistics 
From the basic population of 105 IASB decisions on IFRS changes, I delete the 13 deci-
sions which issued new standards. Ten standard-year observations are targeted more than 
once by IASB decisions. Since I am not able to distinguish which decisions changed the 
standard properties to what extent, I collapse the respective 24 IASB decisions into ten pseu-
do decisions, one for each standard-year observation. In doing so, I consider only the personal 
characteristics of the IASB members who voted in favor of all decisions affecting a standard-
year observation. Furthermore, I delete one decision targeting IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement) in 2009 and the decision on re-issuing IFRS 9 (Financial In-
struments) in 2010 due to the step-by-step introduction of IFRS 9. Finally, I remove all five 
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decisions in 2011 in order to counter a unique effect that could result from the issuance of 
IFRS 13 (Fair Value Measurement). I end up with a final sample of 71 IASB decisions. Table 
10 summarizes the sample development. 
[Table 10 about here] 
 Of the 71 decisions in the final sample, 28.2% result in an increase in the importance of 
principles relative to rules and 66.2 % result in a decrease. 26.8% result in an increase in the 
fair value orientation based on measurement terms, while 11.3% result in a decrease. Sum-
mary statistics of the final sample are presented in detail in Table 11. The yearly distribution 
of IASB decisions in the final sample affecting standard properties is presented in Figure 10 
and Figure 11. 
[Table 11 about here] 
[Figure 10 about here] 
[Figure 11 about here] 
Table 12 provides Pearson and Spearman correlations for the final sample. The only sig-
nificant correlation (10% level) between IASB member characteristics and changes in stand-
ard properties is a positive association between increases in the importance of principles rela-
tive to rules and members from common law countries. 
[Table 12 about here] 
4.3 Multivariate results 
Tables 13 to 15 present my multivariate results using probit regressions. For each of my 
six dependent variables, I run one regression including only the two independent variables for 
the professional background and one regression including all three independent variables for 
professional and cultural backgrounds together. Table 13 shows that decreases in the im-
portance of principles relative to rules are significantly associated with members having an 
auditing background. A similar association with members having a financial services back-
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ground is only significant in the regressions that do not include the variable for cultural back-
ground. Furthermore, increases in the importance of principles relative to rules are significant-
ly associated with members from common law countries. Table 14 shows that increases in fair 
value orientation based on measurement terms are significantly associated with members hav-
ing an auditing or financial services background. However, I do not find significant associa-
tions with members from common law countries. For the regressions presented in Table 15, I 
use my alternative fair value orientation measure based on the terms “fair value” and “cost”. 
The results confirm my findings presented in Table 14. 
[Table 13 about here] 
[Table 14 about here] 
[Table 15 about here] 
5 Discussion 
Decreases in the importance of principles relative to rules are associated with IASB 
members having an auditing background. This is not surprising because rules-based account-
ing standards provide clearer guidance for audit decisions and hereby reduce litigation costs. 
In contrast, IASB members from common law countries are associated with increases in im-
portance of principles relative to rules. This seems odd when considering U.S. GAAP which 
traditionally follow the rules-based accounting approach. However, principles-based account-
ing increases the flexibility of managers to signal their private information to outsiders. 
Therefore, it is reasonable for me to expect that members from common law countries, which 
have relatively well developed capital markets, appreciate more principles-based accounting 
standards in general. Increases in fair value orientation are associated with IASB members 
having a financial services or auditing background. While the first one is probably in line with 
general perception, the latter is surprising to me. I expected members with an auditing back-
ground to be skeptical about fair value due to the discretion it provides to preparers of finan-
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cial statements when determining fair values, which is particularly the case for level-3 fair 
values (mark-to-model). One explanation could be that auditors can benefit from the exten-
sion of fair value measurement due to increasing demand for fair value-related consulting 
services. 
Ball (2001) shows that accounting regulation evolves endogenously in response to the in-
formation demand of an economy. Thus, the characteristics of accounting information differ 
systematically across countries depending on the institutional environment (e.g., Ball et al. 
2000; Leuz et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Hail 2013). This is in line with Watts (2006) 
who suggests that accounting standard setting is a market-driven process that results in an 
equilibrium of best practice accounting standards which balance opposing accounting objec-
tives. Furthermore, the equilibrium will be prone to political forces, as well. Hereby, account-
ing can be influenced either by changes in the underlying economic and institutional envi-
ronment or by the preferences of special interest groups. This notion of a political influence 
on regulation is supplemented by economic theory suggesting an idiosyncratic influence of 
regulators. This influence is performed by regulators who either follow their individual beliefs 
on ideal regulatory intervention (ideology theory) or who support special interest groups (cap-
ture theory) (Kau and Rubin 1979). In the context of accounting, prior literature provides evi-
dence for both, institutional factors influencing the properties of accounting information (e.g., 
Ball et al. 2000) and idiosyncratic influence of standard setters on accounting standards (Allen 
and Ramanna 2013; Jiang et al. 2013). 
Technically, the institutional environment can affect accounting standards only via the 
men and women who actually set the standards. Hence, I interpret the idiosyncratic influence 
of standard setters on accounting standards as a mechanism for the influence of the institu-
tional environment. If standard setters follow individual beliefs, these ideologies will be based 
on individual personal characteristics like the professional or cultural background. Hence, 
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ideologies are at least partly a result of the institutional environment to which finally pub-
lished accounting standards are exposed to. If standard setters are captured by special interest 
groups, these groups will probably approach standard setters with similar professional or cul-
tural backgrounds. Thus, even potential capture reflects partly the institutional environment to 
which finally published accounting standards are exposed to. However, I acknowledge that a 
perfect distinction between ideology and capture is empirically impossible. Altogether, this 
implies that in the IASB setting the heterogeneity in the personal characteristics of IASB 
members reflects on average the internationally heterogeneous institutional contexts to which 
IFRS are exposed to. 
Following my results, this implies that in the institutional environment of IFRS exists 
demand for fair value measurement and rules-based accounting standards. This combination 
is actually consistent with prior discussions on the design choices accounting standard setters 
have to make. Following the Conceptual Framework, decision-useful accounting information 
has two fundamental qualitative characteristics: relevance and faithful representation (IASB 
2010: par. QC4–QC16). However, the implementation of these characteristics into accounting 
standards can be arbitrary. The Conceptual Framework requires decision-useful information 
to exhibit both characteristics to a sufficient degree (IASB 2010: par. QC17). 
Barth (2006), an IASB member between 2001 and 2009, states that fair value measure-
ment is discussed in almost every standard setting project because it is supposed to be the 
most relevant one in many cases. However, when preparers of financial statements are pro-
vided with substantial discretion over determining fair values, particularly when it comes to 
level-3 fair values (mark-to-model), a high fair value orientation can reduce the degree of 
faithful representation of accounting information (Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner 2010). To 
counter this effect, standard setters would have to provide detailed instructions on the applica-
tion of fair value measurement to ensure an accounting practice as intended. This results tech-
26 
nically in an increase in rules (Schipper 2003). Hence, the decisions to increase fair value ori-
entation and to decrease the importance of principles relative to rules are probably not inde-
pendent from each other. When standard setters consider fair value as the most relevant meas-
urement concept, they have to incorporate sufficient rules to ensure faithful representation of 
accounting information at the same time. My results support this notion, suggesting that there 
could be a consensus within the IASB of balancing the fundamental qualitative characteristics 
of accounting information. This trade off leads to an increase in fair value orientation on the 
one hand and to a decrease in the importance of principles relative to rules on the other hand.8 
More conceptually, financial accounting systems are supposed to serve as a single input 
device in heterogeneous contractual settings (Ball 2001). Prior literature divides the general 
demand for accounting information into a pre-decision valuation demand and a post-decision 
stewardship demand (Beaver and Demski 1979). Formal analyses predominantly show that 
information that is useful for valuation is not necessarily useful for stewardship and vice versa 
(Gjesdal 1981; Paul 1992; Feltham and Xie 1994; Christensen and Demski 2003), which is 
corroborated by empirical evidence (Gassen 2008). However, recent analytical (Drymiotes 
and Hemmer 2013) and empirical (e.g., Bushman, Engel, and Smith 2006) work questions 
this view and even the IASB considered to subsume the stewardship objective under a broad 
resource allocation objective during Phase A of its Conceptual Framework project. Neverthe-
less, following criticism of the respective discussion paper (IASB 2006), the stewardship ob-
jective is still present in the Conceptual Framework (IASB 2010: par. OB4), documenting that 
the IASB views stewardship as a separate objective (see IASB 2013: par 9.7, as well). 
Hence, the IASB has to align its accounting standards towards one of the two objectives. 
The value relevance literature shows that equity capital markets appreciate fair value-
orientated accounting (e.g., Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 1996). Thus, accounting infor-
                                                     
8  However, Hans Hoogervorst, chairman of the IASB since 2011, stated: “One persistent myth about the IASB 
is that we (perhaps secretly) would only be interested in fair value. The truth is that we have always been 
proponents of a mixed measurement model.” (Hoogervorst, 2012) 
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mation based on fair value is supposed to primarily target the valuation role of accounting.9 
Furthermore, Kothari et al. (2010) outline that a regulator can allocate either less (rules-based 
approach) or more (principles-based approach) accounting choices to the firm level. Follow-
ing the principles-based approach, the regulator draws abstract boundaries for accounting 
treatments and leaves the ex-post solution to preparers and auditors. Following the rules-
based approach, the regulator identifies his preferred solution from the set of possible ac-
counting treatments ex ante. I assume that the rules-based approach is consistent with a domi-
nance of the stewardship perspective on accounting because it decreases the opportunistic 
influence of managers on financial reporting and hence decreases litigation costs from misre-
porting and the variability of accounting earnings.10 However, for IFRS I observe both, an 
increase in fair value orientation and a decrease in the importance of principles relative to 
rules. Thus, I am not able to identify an overall development towards either the valuation or 
the stewardship perspective on accounting within IFRS. This might hint at a political process 
which leads to a compromise between standard setters. It could be the case that the IASB is 
split into two groups, the first one preferring a valuation perspective on accounting, the sec-
ond one preferring a stewardship perspective. The observed development of an increasing fair 
value orientation and a decreasing importance of principles relative to rules could be a classic 
political compromise which caters the contradicting preferences of both groups to some ex-
tent. 
This implies that the IASB can use distinct channels in order to align different prefer-
ences of accounting standard setters for standards properties. Within these channels, the dif-
ferent preferences are mutually exclusive. For example, the IASB cannot increase fair value 
orientation and historical cost orientation at the same time. However, the IASB can align a 
certain channel towards one direction of preferences and another channel towards a different 
                                                     
9  This view abstracts from the current debate on the influence of market frictions. See e.g. Laux and Leuz 
(2009) and Kothari et al. (2010) on this issue. 
10  See Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) for possibly confounding effects of real earnings management. 
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direction. Thus, I show with my results that in order to better understand accounting standard 
setting one has to investigate the development of standard properties within different chan-
nels. 
6 Conclusion  
This study sheds light on the development of central IFRS properties and links it to the 
personal characteristics of IASB members. My analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I docu-
ment a decrease in the importance of principles relative to rules for the full set of IFRS, and 
an increase in the fair value orientation of IFRS over time. Second, I show that changes in 
IFRS properties are associated with certain features of the professional and cultural back-
grounds of IASB members who vote in favor of these changes. To my knowledge, these re-
sults are new to the literature. However, I acknowledge that the power of my tests is limited 
due to the short history of IASB standard setting. Furthermore, I emphasize that I document 
associations only. It remains open whether and to what extent causal relations do exist. There-
fore, my results have to be interpreted carefully. 
My findings have three potential implications that may enhance the understanding of the 
accounting standard setting process. First, the composition of the IASB could be understood 
as a mechanism reflecting the internationally heterogeneous institutional environment to 
which IFRS are exposed to. Thus, my results imply that there is a demand for rules-based 
accounting and fair value measurement in the IFRS context. Second, the decrease in the im-
portance of principles relative to rules, and the increase in fair value orientation could be the 
result of a consensus within the IASB to balance the two fundamental qualitative characteris-
tics of decision-useful accounting information: relevance and faithful representation. Third, 
instead of a consensus on desired qualitative characteristics, the decrease in the importance of 
principles relative to rules, and the increase in fair value orientation could be the result of a 
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classic political compromise between different parties in the IASB preferring either a valua-
tion or a stewardship perspective on accounting. 
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Figure 1: Size of the IFRS universe 
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Figure 2: Importance of principles relative to rules 
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%PRIN is the share of principles paragraphs based on all paragraphs. 
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Figure 3: Classification of measurement bases 
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Figure 4: Construction of measurement terms11 
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11  The term “fair value less costs to sell” is not listed as its appearance is covered by searching for “fair value”. 
I search for “amortised cost” and “net realisable value” because these are the British forms of writing used in 
IFRS. 
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Figure 5: Fair value orientation based on measurement terms 
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Measurement terms are grouped into fair value terms, other current terms and his-
torical cost terms. Since other current terms are small and constant in their num-
ber (7) they are omitted in this figure. Fair value terms are all combinations of the 
prefixes “at”, “at its”, “at the”, “at their” with the terms “fair value”, “market val-
ue”, “net selling price”. Historical cost terms are all combinations of the prefixes 
“at”, “at its”, “at the”, “at their” with the terms “cost”, “historical cost”, “amor-
tised cost”, “depreciated cost”. %FV_MT is the share of fair value terms based on 
all measurement terms. 
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Figure 6: Fair value orientation based on the terms “fair value” and “cost” 
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%FV_CO is the frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of the fre-
quencies of the terms “fair value” and “cost”. 
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Figure 7: Professional background of IASB members 
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Number of members by January of each year. The professional background of a 
member is based on his or her last principal occupation outside of standard set-
ting. One member whose professional background is unclear is omitted in this 
figure. 
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Figure 8: Cultural background of IASB members 
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Number of members by January of each year. Cultural background is defined as 
the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of a member’s home 
country. Common law includes members from Australia, Canada, India, New 
Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. Civil law includes 
members from Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Swe-
den, and Switzerland. 
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Figure 9: IASB decisions on IFRS changes 
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In total 105 decisions. Unanimous approval is defined as a decision being ap-
proved without dissenting votes or abstentions. The four improvements projects 
are split up into 35 decisions with respect to the target standards. 
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Figure 10: Distribution of IASB decisions in the final sample 
affecting the importance of principles relative to rules 
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%PRIN is the share of principles paragraphs based on all paragraphs. %PRIN_inc 
is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %PRIN 
and zero if not. %PRIN_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision re-
sults in a decrease in %PRIN and zero if not. 
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Figure 11: Distribution of IASB decisions in the final sample affecting fair value orientation 
0
1
2
3
4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of %FV_MT changes
%FV_MT_inc=1 %FV_MT_dec=1
0
2
4
6
8
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of %FV_CO changes
%FV_CO_inc=1 %FV_CO_dec=1
 
%FV_MT is the share of fair value measurement terms based on all measurement 
terms. %FV_MT_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in 
an increase in %FV_MT and zero if not. %FV_MT_dec is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %FV_MT and zero if not. 
%FV_CO is the frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of the fre-
quencies of the terms “fair value” and “cost”. %FV_CO_inc is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %FV_CO and zero if not. 
%FV_CO_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a de-
crease in %FV_CO and zero if not. 
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Table 1: Size of the IFRS universe 
Year IFRS as issued at  
Number of 
standards  Words 
Words per 
standard 
2001 Jan 1  34  202,217 5,948 
2002 Jan 1  34  204,167 6,005 
2003 Jan 1  34  205,611 6,047 
2004 Mar 31  36  267,391 7,428 
2005 Jan 1  37  268,491 7,257 
2006 Jan 1  37  274,643 7,423 
2007 Jan 1  37  270,888 7,321 
2008 Jan 17  37  282,307 7,630 
2009 Jan 1  37  290,341 7,847 
2010 Jan 1  38  300,574 7,910 
2011 Jan 1  38  308,338 8,114 
2012 Jan 1  41  345,780 8,434 
2013 Jan 1  41  354,405 8,644 
Δ —  +20.6%  +75.3% +45.3% 
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Table 2: Importance of principles relative to rules 
Year IFRS as issued at  
Principles 
paragraphs 
Rules 
paragraphs %PRIN 
2001 Jan 1  740 1,507 0.329 
2002 Jan 1  740 1,507 0.329 
2003 Jan 1  742 1,508 0.330 
2004 Mar 31  778 1,985 0.282 
2005 Jan 1  794 2,022 0.282 
2006 Jan 1  780 2,034 0.277 
2007 Jan 1  738 2,029 0.267 
2008 Jan 17  688 2,184 0.240 
2009 Jan 1  693 2,257 0.235 
2010 Jan 1  707 2,376 0.229 
2011 Jan 1  708 2,448 0.224 
2012 Jan 1  696 2,825 0.198 
2013 Jan 1  707 2,933 0.194 
Δ —  –4.5% +94.6% –41.0% 
%PRIN is the share of principles paragraphs based on all paragraphs. 
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Table 3: Fair value orientation based on measurement terms 
Year IFRS as issued at  
Number of 
standards 
Standards w/ 
measurement 
terms 
Standards w/ 
fair value 
terms 
 Fair value terms 
Other current 
terms 
Historical 
cost terms  %FV_MT 
2001 Jan 1  34 25 20  106 7 70  0.579 
2002 Jan 1  34 25 20  106 7 70  0.579 
2003 Jan 1  34 25 20  106 7 70  0.579 
2004 Mar 31  36 30 26  195 7 78  0.696 
2005 Jan 1  37 31 26  195 7 79  0.694 
2006 Jan 1  37 31 26  253 7 86  0.731 
2007 Jan 1  37 31 26  253 7 86  0.731 
2008 Jan 17  37 32 28  261 7 83  0.744 
2009 Jan 1  37 32 29  269 7 87  0.741 
2010 Jan 1  38 33 30  296 7 100  0.734 
2011 Jan 1  38 34 31  294 7 97  0.739 
2012 Jan 1  41 37 33  314 7 99  0.748 
2013 Jan 1  41 38 35  339 7 100  0.760 
Δ —  +20.6% +52.0% +75.0%  +219.8% 0.0% +42.9%  +31.3% 
Measurement terms are grouped into fair value terms, other current terms and historical cost terms. Fair value terms are all combinations of the pre-
fixes “at”, “at its”, “at the”, “at their” with the terms “fair value”, “market value”, “net selling price”. Other current terms are all combinations of the 
prefixes “at”, “at its”, “at their”, “at the” with the terms “current cost”, “replacement cost”, “reproduction cost”, “net realisable value”, “value in use”. 
Historical cost terms are all combinations of the prefixes “at”, “at its”, “at the”, “at their” with the terms “cost”, “historical cost”, “amortised cost”, 
“depreciated cost”. %FV_MT is the share of fair value terms based on all measurement terms. 
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Table 4: Fair value orientation based on the terms “fair value” and “cost” 
Year IFRS as issued at 
 
Number of 
standards 
Standards w/ 
“fair value” 
or “cost” 
Standards w/ 
“fair value”  “Fair value” “Cost” 
 
%FV_CO 
2001 Jan 1  34 34 22  645 985  0.396 
2002 Jan 1  34 34 22  644 984  0.396 
2003 Jan 1  34 34 22  646 992  0.394 
2004 Mar 31  36 36 27  1,107 1,258  0.468 
2005 Jan 1  37 37 27  1,109 1,278  0.465 
2006 Jan 1  37 37 27  1,186 1,286  0.480 
2007 Jan 1  37 37 27  1,186 1,284  0.480 
2008 Jan 17  37 37 29  1,195 1,196  0.500 
2009 Jan 1  37 37 30  1,241 1,222  0.504 
2010 Jan 1  38 38 31  1,289 1,235  0.511 
2011 Jan 1  38 38 32  1,311 1,255  0.511 
2012 Jan 1  41 41 35  1,517 1,253  0.548 
2013 Jan 1  41 41 37  1,568 1,261  0.554 
Δ —  +20.6% +20.6% +68.2%  +143.1% +28.0%  +39.9% 
%FV_CO is the frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of the frequencies of the terms “fair value” and “cost”. 
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Table 5: Development of the IASB structure as defined by the constitution of the IFRS Foundation 
Time 
period  Members 
Of that: 
part-time  
Majority for 
approving 
IFRS 
 Main qualification for membership 
Quota for 
professional 
background 
Quota for 
geographical 
background 
2000-05 
– 
2005-06 
 14 2  8  “Technical expertise” 
Min. 5 auditing, 
3 preparer, 3 user, 
1 academia 
— 
2005-06 
– 
2009-01 
 14 2  9  “Professional competence and practical experience” — — 
2009-01 
– 
2012-06 
 14–16 Max. 3  
10 (if less 
than 16 
members: 9) 
 “Professional competence and practical experience” — — 
From 
2012-07  16 Max. 3  10  
“Professional competence 
and practical experience” — 
Min. 4 Asia/Oceania, 
4 Europe, 4 North America, 
1 Africa, 1 South America 
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Table 6: List of all 33 IASB members between 2001 and 2013 
Name Joining IASB 
Leaving 
IASB 
Home 
country 
Last principal occupation 
was standard setting? 
Last principal occupation 
outside of standard setting 
Professional 
background 
Barth, 
Mary E. 2001-01 2009-06 US No Stanford University, Professor of Accounting Academia 
Bruns, 
Hans-Georg 2001-01 2007-06 DE No DaimlerChrysler, Chief Accounting Officer Preparer 
Cooper, 
Steven 2007-07 — UK No 
UBS Investment Bank, Managing Director and 
Head of Valuation and Accounting Research Analyst 
Cope, 
Anthony T. 2001-01 2007-06 UK Yes: U.S. FASB, Member 
Wellington Management Co, 
Director of Fixed Income Research Analyst 
Danjou, 
Philippe 2006-07 — FR No 
Autorité des Marchés Financiers, 
Director of the Accounting Division Government 
Edelmann, 
Martin 2012-07 — DE No Deutsche Bank AG, Head of Group Reporting 
Banking/ 
insurance 
Engström, 
Jan 2004-05 — SE No Volvo Bus Corporation, Chief Executive Officer Preparer 
Finnegan, 
Patrick 2009-07 — US No 
CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integri-
ty, Director of Financial Reporting Policy Group Analyst 
Garnett, 
Robert P. 2001-01 2010-06 ZA No 
Anglo American plc, 
Executive Vice President of Finance Preparer 
Gélard, 
Gilbert 2001-01 2010-06 FR No KPMG, Partner Auditing 
Gomes, 
Amaro Luiz de 
Oliviera 
2009-07 — BR No Central Bank of Brazil, Head of Financial System Regulation Department Government 
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(Table 6: continued) 
Name Joining IASB 
Leaving 
IASB 
Home 
country 
Last principal occupation 
was standard setting? 
Last principal occupation 
outside of standard setting 
Professional 
background 
Herz, 
Robert H. 2001-01 2002-06 US No PwC, Partner Auditing 
Hoogervorst, 
Hans 2011-07 — NL No 
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Market, 
Chairman Government 
Jones, 
Thomas E. 2001-01 2009-06 UK No Citicorp, Principal Financial Officer 
Banking/ 
insurance 
Kabureck, 
Gary 2013-04 — US No Xerox Corporation, Chief Accounting Officer Preparer 
Kalavacherla, 
Prabhakar 2009-01 — IN No KPMG, Audit Partner Auditing 
König, 
Elke 2010-07 2011-12 DE No Hannover Re Group, Chief Financial Officer 
Banking/ 
insurance 
Leisenring, 
James J. 2001-01 2010-06 US 
Yes: U.S. FASB, Director of 
International Activities 
Bristol, Leisenring, Herkner & Co, 
Partner and Director of Accounting and Auditing Auditing 
Mackintosh, 
Ian 2011-07 — NZ Yes: UK ASB, Chairman World Bank, Financial Management South Asia Government 
McConnell, 
Patricia 2009-07 — US No 
Bear Stearns & Co, Equity Research, 
Accounting and Tax Policy Analyst Analyst 
McGregor, 
Warren J. 2001-01 2011-06 AU No Stevenson McGregor, Director Unclear 
Ochi, 
Takatsugu 2011-07 — JP No 
Sumitomo Corporation, Financial Resources 
Management Group, Assistant General Manager Preparer 
O'Malley, 
Patricia 2001-01 2007-06 CA Yes: ASB of Canada, Chair KPMG, Technical Partner Auditing 
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(Table 6: continued) 
Name Joining IASB 
Leaving 
IASB 
Home 
country 
Last principal occupation 
was standard setting? 
Last principal occupation 
outside of standard setting 
Professional 
background 
Pacter, 
Paul 2010-07 2012-11 US 
Yes: IASB, Director of 
Standards for SMEs 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
Global IFRS Office, Director Auditing 
Schmid, 
Harry K. 2001-01 2004-03 CH No Nestlé, Senior Vice President Preparer 
Scott, 
Darrel 2010-10 — ZA No FirstRand Banking Group, Chief Financial Officer 
Banking/ 
insurance 
Smith, 
John T. 2002-09 2012-06 US No Deloitte & Touche, Partner Auditing 
Suh, 
Chung Woo 2012-07 — KR No Kookmin University, Professor of Accounting Academia 
Tokar, 
Mary 2013-01 — US No KPMG, International Financial Reporting Group Auditing 
Tweedie, 
Sir David 2001-01 2011-06 UK Yes: UK ASB, Chairman KPMG, Partner Auditing 
Whittington, 
Geoffrey 2001-01 2006-06 UK No 
Cambridge University, 
Professor of Financial Accounting Academia 
Yamada, 
Tatsumi 2001-01 2011-06 JP No ChuoAoyama Audit Corporation, Partner Auditing 
Zhang, 
Wei-Guo 2007-07 — CN No 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
Department of International Affairs, 
Chief Accountant and Director General 
Government 
There can be a time difference between being appointed to the IASB and joining the IASB. Home country codes: AU: Australia, BR: Brazil, CA: Canada, 
CH: Switzerland, CN: China, DE: Germany, FR: France, IN: India, JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, NL: Netherlands, NZ: New Zealand, SE: Sweden, UK: United 
Kingdom, US: United States, ZA: South Africa. 
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Table 7: Development of the professional background of IASB members 
Year Month Members 
 Standard 
setting as 
last principal 
occupation 
 Professional background (last principal occupation outside of standard setting) 
Academia Analyst Auditing Banking/ insurance Government Preparer Unclear 
2001 Jan 14  4  2 1 6 1 0 3 1 
2002 Jan 14  4  2 1 6 1 0 3 1 
2003 Jan 14  4  2 1 6 1 0 3 1 
2004 Jan 14  4  2 1 6 1 0 3 1 
2005 Jan 14  4  2 1 6 1 0 3 1 
2006 Jan 14  4  2 1 6 1 0 3 1 
2007 Jan 14  4  1 1 6 1 1 3 1 
2008 Jan 13  2  1 1 5 1 2 2 1 
2009 Jan 14  2  1 1 6 1 2 2 1 
2010 Jan 15  2  0 3 6 0 3 2 1 
2011 Jan 15  2  0 3 5 2 3 1 1 
2012 Jan 14  2  0 3 3 1 5 2 0 
2013 Jan 15  1  1 3 2 2 5 2 0 
54 
Table 8: Development of the cultural background of IASB members 
Year Month Members  
Common law 
 
Civil law 
 China 
UK U.S. Other countries 
French 
type 
German 
type 
Scandinavian 
type 
2001 Jan 14  4 3 3  1 3 0  0 
2002 Jan 14  4 3 3  1 3 0  0 
2003 Jan 14  4 3 3  1 3 0  0 
2004 Jan 14  4 3 3  1 3 0  0 
2005 Jan 14  4 3 3  1 2 1  0 
2006 Jan 14  4 3 3  1 2 1  0 
2007 Jan 14  3 3 3  2 2 1  0 
2008 Jan 13  3 3 2  2 1 1  1 
2009 Jan 14  3 3 3  2 1 1  1 
2010 Jan 15  2 4 3  3 1 1  1 
2011 Jan 15  2 4 3  2 2 1  1 
2012 Jan 14  1 4 3  3 1 1  1 
2013 Jan 15  1 3 3  3 3 1  1 
Cultural background is defined as the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of a member’s home country. Other countries of common law includes 
members from Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa. French civil law includes members from Brazil, France, and Netherlands. German civil 
law includes members from Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland. Scandinavian civil law includes members from Sweden. 
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Table 9: IASB decisions on IFRS changes 
Year 
 Decisions 
on IFRS 
changes 
Share of 
unanimous 
approval 
 Type of decisions 
  Issuances of standards 
Revisions of 
standards 
Amendments 
to standards 
Improvements 
projects 
2001  0 —  — — — — 
2002  2 0.500  — 1 1 — 
2003  15 0.800  1 14 — — 
2004  10 0.200  5 2 3 — 
2005  7 0.714  1 — 6 — 
2006  1 0.000  1 — — — 
2007  2 0.000  — 2 — — 
2008  23 0.696  — 3 6 14 
2009  17 0.647  1 1 5 10 
2010  11 0.909  1 — 4 6 
2011  9 0.667  4 1 4 — 
2012  8 1.000  — — 3 5 
Total  105 0.676  14 24 32 35 
Unanimous approval is defined as a decision being approved without dissenting votes or abstentions. The four 
improvements projects are split up into 35 decisions with respect to the target standards. 
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Table 10: Sample development 
IASB decisions on IFRS changes between 2001 and  2012 105 
Decisions issuing new standards are removed –13 
Multiple decisions targeting a standard within a year are collapsed into a 
pseudo decision (24 decisions collapsed into 10 pseudo decisions) –14 
Decisions targeting IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Meas-
urement) after 2008 and the 2010 re-issuance of IFRS 9 (Financial Instru-
ments) are removed due to the step-by-step introduction of IFRS 9 
–2 
All decisions in 2011 are removed due to the issuance of IFRS 13 (Fair 
Value Measurement) –5 
Final sample 71 
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Table 11: Summary statistics of final sample 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
%PRIN_inc 71 0.282     
%PRIN_dec 71 0.662     
%FV_MT_inc 71 0.268     
%FV_MT_dec 71 0.113     
%FV_CO_inc 71 0.380     
%FV_CO_dec 71 0.310     
%Auditing 71 0.392 0.074 0.154 0.400 0.545 
%Financial 71 0.170 0.052 0.077 0.154 0.333 
%Common 71 0.640 0.067 0.500 0.615 0.889 
%PRIN is the share of principles paragraphs based on all paragraphs. %PRIN_inc is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a decision results in an increase in %PRIN and zero if not. %PRIN_dec is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %PRIN and zero if not. %FV_MT is the share of fair 
value measurement terms based on all measurement terms. %FV_MT_inc is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a decision results in an increase in %FV_MT and zero if not. %FV_MT_dec is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %FV_MT and zero if not. %FV_CO is the frequency of the 
term “fair value” divided by the sum of the frequencies of the terms “fair value” and “cost”. %FV_CO_inc is 
a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %FV_CO and zero if not. 
%FV_CO_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %FV_CO and zero if 
not. %Auditing is the share of IASB members approving a change whose last principal occupation outside of 
standard setting was in the auditing industry. %Financial is the share of IASB members approving a change 
whose last principal occupation outside of standard setting was in financial services, i.e. the analyst, banking 
or insurance industry. %Common is the share of IASB members approving a change who are from countries 
in which the legal origin of the company law or commercial code is common law. 
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Table 12: Pearson correlations (below the diagonal) and Spearman correlations (above the diagonal) 
N=71 %PRIN _inc 
%PRIN 
_dec 
%FV_MT 
_inc 
%FV_MT 
_dec 
%FV_CO 
_inc 
%FV_CO 
_dec %Auditing %Financial %Common 
%PRIN_inc X –0.876 (0.000) 
–0.166 
(0.166) 
0.173 
(0.149) 
–0.104 
(0.390) 
0.054 
(0.653) 
–0.067 
(0.581) 
–0.053 
(0.662) 
0.215 
(0.071) 
%PRIN_dec –0.876 (0.000) X 
0.163 
(0.175) 
–0.122 
(0.311) 
0.130 
(0.278) 
0.028 
(0.816) 
0.083 
(0.492) 
0.037 
(0.757) 
–0.195 
(0.103) 
%FV_MT_inc –0.166 (0.166) 
0.163 
(0.175) X 
–0.215 
(0.071) 
0.575 
(0.000) 
–0.199 
(0.097) 
0.167 
(0.163) 
0.058 
(0.634) 
–0.001 
(0.995) 
%FV_MT_dec 0.173 (0.149) 
–0.122 
(0.311) 
–0.215 
(0.071) X 
–0.096 
(0.428) 
0.339 
(0.004) 
0.030 
(0.803) 
–0.103 
(0.393) 
0.112 
(0.352) 
%FV_CO_inc –0.104 (0.390) 
0.130 
(0.278) 
0.575 
(0.000) 
–0.096 
(0.428) X 
–0.525 
(0.000) 
0.177 
(0.139) 
0.077 
(0.522) 
–0.110 
(0.360) 
%FV_CO_dec 0.054 (0.653) 
0.028 
(0.816) 
–0.199 
(0.097) 
0.339 
(0.004) 
–0.525 
(0.000) X 
–0.079 
(0.515) 
–0.077 
(0.522) 
0.138 
(0.250) 
%Auditing –0.077 (0.525) 
0.061 
(0.616) 
0.137 
(0.254) 
0.081 
(0.502) 
0.123 
(0.307) 
0.008 
(0.947) X 
–0.647 
(0.000) 
0.408 
(0.000) 
%Financial –0.061 (0.613) 
0.074 
(0.537) 
0.052 
(0.669) 
–0.108 
(0.370) 
0.083 
(0.492) 
–0.104 
(0.386) 
–0.773 
(0.000) X 
–0.576 
(0.000) 
%Common 0.200 (0.094) 
–0.184 
(0.125) 
0.073 
(0.543) 
0.079 
(0.513) 
–0.067 
(0.580) 
0.109 
(0.364) 
0.373 
(0.001) 
–0.347 
(0.003) X 
%PRIN is the share of principles paragraphs based on all paragraphs. %PRIN_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %PRIN and ze-
ro if not. %PRIN_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %PRIN and zero if not. %FV_MT is the share of fair value measurement 
terms based on all measurement terms. %FV_MT_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %FV_MT and zero if not. %FV_MT_dec is 
a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %FV_MT and zero if not. %FV_CO is the frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of 
the frequencies of the terms “fair value” and “cost”. %FV_CO_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %FV_CO and zero if not. 
%FV_CO_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %FV_CO and zero if not. %Auditing is the share of IASB members approving a 
change whose last principal occupation outside of standard setting was in the auditing industry. %Financial is the share of IASB members approving a change whose last 
principal occupation outside of standard setting was in financial services, i.e. the analyst, banking or insurance industry. %Common is the share of IASB members approv-
ing a change who are from countries in which the legal origin of the company law or commercial code is common law. P-values are provided in braces. Bold entries indi-
cate significance at the 10% level or lower. 
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Table 13: Changes in the importance of principles relative to rules using probit regressions 
Dependent  Prob(%PRIN_inc=1)  Prob(%PRIN_dec=1) 
Model  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Constant  3.860 (2.484) 
0.954 
(–2.778)  
–3.598 
(2.309) 
–1.042 
(2.647) 
%Auditing  –7.069* (4.087) 
–9.012** 
(4.586)  
6.287* 
(3.803) 
7.777* 
(4.112) 
%Financial  –10.059* (5.968) 
–9.558 
(6.150)  
9.304* 
(5.535) 
8.703 
(5.618) 
%Common  — 5.547* (2.896)  — 
–4.721* 
(2.712) 
LR ChiSq  3.549 7.573  3.306 6.477 
Prob>ChiSq  0.170 0.056  0.192 0.091 
N(Dependent=1)  20 20  47 47 
N(Dependent=0)  51 51  24 24 
N  71 71  71 71 
%PRIN is the share of principles paragraphs based on all paragraphs. %PRIN_inc is a dummy var-
iable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %PRIN and zero if not. %PRIN_dec is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a decrease in %PRIN and zero if not. %Au-
diting is the share of IASB members approving a change whose last principal occupation outside 
of standard setting was in the auditing industry. %Financial is the share of IASB members approv-
ing a change whose last principal occupation outside of standard setting was in financial services, 
i.e. the analyst, banking or insurance industry. %Common is the share of IASB members approv-
ing a change who are from countries in which the legal origin of the company law or commercial 
code is common law. Standard errors are provided in braces. Bold entries and ***/**/* indicate 
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 14: Changes in fair value orientation based on 
measurement terms using probit regressions 
Dependent  Prob(%FV_MT_inc=1)  Prob(%FV_MT_dec=1) 
Model  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Constant  –5.142** (2.128) 
–5.644** 
(2.665)  
–0.437 
(2.766) 
–1.223 
(3.280) 
%Auditing  7.484** (3.563) 
7.251** 
(3.607)  
0.009 
(4.650) 
–0.272 
(4.763) 
%Financial  9.196* (4.939) 
9.349* 
(5.004)  
–4.797 
(6.818) 
–4.577 
(6.846) 
%Common  — 0.887 (2.603)  — 
1.335 
(3.151) 
LR ChiSq  5.192 5.304  1.069 1.229 
Prob>ChiSq  0.075 0.151  0.586 0.746 
N(Dependent=1)  19 19  8 8 
N(Dependent=0)  52 52  63 63 
N  71 71  71 71 
%FV_MT is the share of fair value measurement terms based on all measurement terms. 
%FV_MT_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in an increase in %FV_MT 
and zero if not. %FV_MT_dec is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision results in a de-
crease in %FV_MT and zero if not. %Auditing is the share of IASB members approving a change 
whose last principal occupation outside of standard setting was in the auditing industry. %Finan-
cial is the share of IASB members approving a change whose last principal occupation outside of 
standard setting was in financial services, i.e. the analyst, banking or insurance industry. %Com-
mon is the share of IASB members approving a change who are from countries in which the legal 
origin of the company law or commercial code is common law. Standard errors are provided in 
braces. Bold entries and ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 15: Changes in fair value orientation based on the 
terms “fair value” and “cost” using probit regressions 
Dependent  Prob(%FV_CO_inc=1)  Prob(%FV_CO_dec=1) 
Model  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Constant  –5.642*** (2.187) 
–4.419* 
(2.601)  
2.181 
(2.218) 
0.856 
(2.613) 
%Auditing  8.527** (3.609) 
9.118** 
(3.668)  
–3.776 
(3.665) 
–4.404 
(3.789) 
%Financial  11.734** (5.155) 
11.368** 
(5.134)  
–7.148 
(5.336) 
–6.742 
(5.345) 
%Common  — –2.182 (2.543)  — 
2.340 
(2.596) 
LR ChiSq  6.724 7.436  1.893 2.650 
Prob>ChiSq  0.035 0.059  0.388 0.449 
N(Dependent=1)  27 27  22 22 
N(Dependent=0)  44 44  49 49 
N  71 71  71 71 
%FV_CO is the frequency of the term “fair value” divided by the sum of the frequencies of the 
terms “fair value” and “cost”. %FV_CO_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if a decision re-
sults in an increase in %FV_CO and zero if not. %FV_CO_dec is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a decision results in a decrease in %FV_CO and zero if not. %Auditing is the share of IASB 
members approving a change whose last principal occupation outside of standard setting was in 
the auditing industry. %Financial is the share of IASB members approving a change whose last 
principal occupation outside of standard setting was in financial services, i.e. the analyst, banking 
or insurance industry. %Common is the share of IASB members approving a change who are from 
countries in which the legal origin of the company law or commercial code is common law. Stand-
ard errors are provided in braces. Bold entries and ***/**/* indicate significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level. 
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II 
 
Enforcement of Accounting Standards and 
Changes in Corporate Governance 
 
Marcus Witzky 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates (1) whether the corporate governance of firms with erroneous finan-
cial reporting differs systematically from that of non-error firms and (2) whether error detec-
tion is followed by improvements in the corporate governance of error firms. I apply a differ-
ence-in-differences approach on a matched sample from Germany. In contrast to the U.S., 
firms are selected randomly and repeatedly for examination under the German financial re-
porting enforcement regime. For the error year, I find error firms less likely to be audited by a 
big-four firm, to have an unqualified auditor’s opinion, and to have an audit committee. They 
are subject to a more time-consuming auditing process and their supervisory boards have few-
er members and committees. In the first full fiscal year after error disclosure, differences be-
tween error and control firms are insignificant for the structure of the supervisory board but 
partly persist with respect to the auditor-client relationship. This may be interpreted as finan-
cial reporting enforcement being effective to some extent in preventing potential future errors 
by triggering improvements in firm-level accounting oversight. 
 
Keywords: Enforcement, Accounting Errors, Error Announcements, Financial Reporting, 
Corporate Governance, Supervisory Board, Auditor-client Relationship 
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1 Introduction 
Prior literature suggests that enforcement of accounting standards matters for the quality 
of financial reporting (see Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010 for an overview). Potentially, the 
quality of corporate governance represents a mechanism in this relationship. I define corpo-
rate governance as the structure of the internal and external accounting oversight institutions 
at the firm level or, more specifically, of the board of directors and the auditor-client relation-
ship. In this regard, I add to the understanding of potential determinants of erroneous financial 
reporting and of potential consequences of financial reporting enforcement actions. Using a 
difference-in-differences approach on a matched sample from Germany, I investigate (1) 
whether the corporate governance of error firms differs systematically from that of non-error 
firms and (2) whether error detection is followed by improvements in the corporate govern-
ance of error firms. 
Erroneous financial reporting can result either from differential judgment on implicit ac-
counting choices between management and enforcement bodies or from—intentional or unin-
tentional—errors during the preparation of the financial reporting by the management. The 
latter case might hint at the inability or unwillingness of the responsible firm-level oversight 
institutions to perform their duties. For example, Jensen (1993) argues that problems in a 
firm’s internal control system are induced by failures at the level of the board of directors. For 
listed firms, the internal oversight of the accounting process by the board of directors is com-
plemented by an audit of the financial reporting as external verification mechanism. Thus, 
undetected material errors in the financial reporting could be interpreted as a failure of both 
the internal and external accounting oversight mechanisms. Consequently, it is interesting 
whether the detection of erroneous financial reporting will result in improvements of account-
ing oversight mechanisms. If not, this would question the effectiveness of financial reporting 
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enforcement—at least with respect to its preventive function (Berger 2010)—and could have 
implications for the cost-benefit assessment of enforcement regimes. 
I examine potential corporate governance consequences of financial reporting enforce-
ment in the German setting. Introduced in 2004 for all firms listed at an EU-regulated market 
in Germany, the German financial reporting enforcement regime is characterized by high 
standards (Brown, Preiato, and Tarca 2014) and considerable rates of error findings (13% of 
examinations led to error detections in 2014 according to FREP 2015). Virtually all error de-
tections result in mandated error announcements to be disclosed by the deviant firms. The 
German enforcement regime is purely based on a name-and-shame mechanism without any 
further legal consequences arising from error announcements. Furthermore, firms have a high 
likelihood of being repeatedly and randomly chosen for examination (every four to ten years 
depending on stock market index membership). This is in contrast to the U.S. setting, where 
the investigations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are not based on a sam-
pling mechanism. Over and above, for cost reasons the SEC focuses on such cases with a po-
tential high message value to the market (Feroz, Park, and Pastena 1991). Thus, Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases resulting from SEC investigations are potentially biased 
towards extreme cases of erroneous reporting. Consequently, the German enforcement regime 
with a more balanced population of examined firms better enables empirical inference. Final-
ly, certain aspects of internal and external accounting oversight are observable in the German 
setting but not in the U.S. For example, German firms have discretion whether to establish an 
audit committee and auditor’s opinions are usually signed in person by the responsible partner 
and manager of the audit firm. 
My analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I provide descriptive evidence on the German 
financial reporting enforcement regime and document that non-governance firm characteris-
tics explain the likelihood of being a firm with erroneous financial reporting to a limited ex-
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tent only. Second, I examine corporate governance characteristics of 83 error cases and 83 
matched control cases in error and post years using a difference-in-differences approach. Er-
ror cases are constructed at the firm-year level. An error year is the fiscal year of financial 
statements and/or management reports detected with errors by the enforcement bodies. A post 
year is the first full fiscal year after the publication of the first error announcement relating to 
an error case. On average, the post year is the third fiscal year after the error year. I find that 
error firms seem to be different from control firms in the error year with respect to both the 
auditor-client relationship and the structure of the supervisory board12 in the error year. They 
are less likely to be audited by a big-four audit firm and to have an unqualified auditor’s opin-
ion and are subject to a more time-consuming auditing process. Furthermore, supervisory 
boards of error firms have fewer committees, fewer members, and are less likely to have an 
audit committee. In the post year, differences to control firms are insignificant with respect to 
the structure of the supervisory board, and error firms are more likely to have changed their 
auditor. However, error firms are still less likely to be audited by a big-four audit firm and 
they are more likely to receive an auditor’s opinion with supplementary notes compared to 
control firms in the post year. 
This paper contributes to three streams of literature. First, I add to the literature on poten-
tial determinants of erroneous financial reporting detected by enforcement activities. Only 
few papers have focused on this issue so far (e.g., Beasley 1996; Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1996; Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2001; Farber 2005) and produced ambiguous re-
sults, especially with respect to the role of audit committees. Furthermore, as outlined above, 
the German setting provides several advantages over the U.S. setting which is used in most of 
these studies. Second, I add to the literature on potential corporate governance consequences 
of financial reporting enforcement. While several papers examine corporate governance con-
                                                     
12  Joint-stock companies in Germany are required to have a two-tiered board system—a supervisory board 
exercising corporate control over a separate management board responsible for daily operations (Fohlin 
2007). 
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sequences of restatements, Farber (2005) is to my knowledge the only comprehensive study 
on corporate governance consequences of enforcement actions. Again, the mentioned ad-
vantages of the German setting exist over the U.S. setting which Farber (2005) examines. Fur-
thermore, while he focuses on fraud cases exclusively, my sample includes a broad variety of 
error types. Thus, my results tend to be more generalizable (Farber 2005: 560). Third, I add to 
the literature on potential determinants and consequences of errors detected by the German 
enforcement regime. While prior studies examine various firm characteristics (e.g., Hitz, 
Ernstberger, and Stich 2012; Strohmenger 2014; Böcking, Gros, and Worret 2015) or auditor 
dismissals (e.g., Brocard, Franke, and Voeller 2015; Ebner, Hottmann, and Zülch 2015) of 
error firms, I am the first to my knowledge to present a comprehensive study of corporate 
governance characteristics in the German enforcement setting. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related lit-
erature and explains the German financial reporting regime. Section 3 presents the research 
design and describes the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Erroneous financial reporting and corporate governance 
There is evidence that corporate governance plays a role for earnings quality. Leuz, Nan-
da, and Wysocki (2003) examine systematic cross-country differences in the level of earnings 
management and its relations to country-level institutional characteristics. They find earnings 
management of firms to be negatively associated with investor protection, that is, the extent of 
minority shareholder rights and the enforcement of these rights. Klein (2002) studies potential 
relations between board of directors and audit committee characteristics on the one hand and 
earnings management on the other hand in the U.S. Her results suggest that reductions in the 
independence of boards of directors or audit committees from the management are followed 
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by substantial increases in abnormal accruals. She concludes that more independent boards of 
directors have a better ability to monitor the accounting process effectively. Vafeas (2005) 
studies board and audit committee structures in the U.S. between 1994 and 2000. He finds 
that insider-dominated audit committees are associated with lower earnings quality. In con-
trast, audit committees which meet more often and which have more experienced board mem-
bers are associated with better earnings quality. 
More specifically, prior literature suggests that the likelihood of erroneous financial re-
porting might be influenced by corporate governance attributes of the respective firms. 
Beasley (1996) finds the likelihood of fraudulent reporting in the U.S. to be negatively associ-
ated with the proportion of outside members in the board of directors. However, he is not able 
to find an association with the presence of an audit committee. Dechow et al. (1996) conclude 
that earnings manipulation is motivated by external financing needs. Studying firms which are 
subject to SEC enforcement actions, they find that these firms have a lower corporate govern-
ance quality (e.g., board of directors dominated by the management, no audit committee). 
Peasnell et al. (2001) study firms in the United Kingdom which have been subject to en-
forcement actions. They find these firms to have a lower performance in the error year and to 
be less likely audited by a big-five audit firm in the error year compared to a control sample. 
Some results suggest that error firms are less likely to have an audit committee, as well. 
Farber (2005) contributes to potential determinants of erroneous financial reporting as to 
potential subsequent changes in corporate governance. He examines firms which have been 
identified by the SEC as having fraudulently manipulated their financial statements. Fraud 
firms tend to have lower corporate governance quality (e.g., fewer audit committee meetings, 
fewer audits by big-four audit firms) compared to control firms in the year prior to fraud de-
tection. However, three years after fraud detection these firms have improved their corporate 
68 
governance quality and—with respect to the number of audit committee meetings—even sur-
pass control firms. 
There is further evidence in the literature that error firms have incentives to improve their 
corporate governance after errors are exposed—whether by restatements or by error an-
nouncements after enforcement actions. Wiedman and Hendricks (2013) conclude that firms 
invest in signaling improved reporting quality after restatements. The authors measure better 
accrual quality for such firms afterwards regardless of whether restatements were earnings-
related or not. This effect is more pronounced for firms which were subject to a concurrent 
CEO change. In general, the structures of boards of directors tend to change following ex-
traordinary events for a firm (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Srinivasan (2005) reports signif-
icant labor market penalties for outside board members subsequent to restatements. These 
directors exhibit a greater turnover rate in the three years after a restatement. This effect is 
especially pronounced for audit committee members and increases in error severity. John-
stone, Li, and Rupley (2011) study corporate governance changes after the mandatory disclo-
sure of internal control material weaknesses. Such firms exhibit a greater turnover rate of 
board of directors, audit committee, and top management members. Furthermore, respective 
disclosures are followed by structural changes in the composition of the board of directors and 
the audit committee. Chakravarthy, deHaan, and Rajgopal (2014) examine firm actions which 
might be intended to regain reputation after restatements. They find a significant increase in 
the number of such actions targeting capital providers (e.g., improving board composition, 
management turnover, changes in internal control systems) and other stakeholder groups. 
Further research suggests that detection of erroneous financial reporting has consequenc-
es for auditors, as well. Mande and Son (2013) expect firms after restatements to dismiss their 
auditors in order to increase audit quality and to regain reputation. Their results show an in-
creased likelihood of auditor changes after restatements. This effect is more pronounced when 
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error severity is high and when the respective firm has had a high level of corporate govern-
ance, already. Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2014) study auditor turnover after restatements, as 
well. They find that the restatement severity is positively associated with the likelihood of 
auditor dismissals and that this effect is driven by dismissals of non-big-four audit firms. Fur-
ther results suggest that firms with higher auditor replacement costs and with fewer auditor 
alternatives are less likely to switch their audit firm. 
2.2 Financial reporting enforcement in Germany 
Institutional setting 
Berger (2010) summarizes the development of and differences between financial report-
ing enforcement regimes in the European Union (EU). In preparation for the introduction of 
mandatory IFRS for financial reporting on the consolidated level of firms listed at EU-
regulated markets in 2005, the EU Transparency Directive of 2004 required member states to 
ensure the adherence to accounting standards by the implementation of respective enforce-
ment regimes. Within the boundaries of EU legislation, member states had discretion in shap-
ing their national enforcement regimes. The EU securities authority—back then CESR, nowa-
days called ESMA—provided guidance to and coordination of member states with respect to 
enforcement. Germany, which had had no financial reporting enforcement regime before, 
passed the respective national legislation in December 2004. It set up a two-tiered enforce-
ment regime with a private body—the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP)—at 
the first tier and the public financial markets regulator—the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin)—at the second tier. 
The German financial reporting enforcement regime is supposed to affect the economy 
across three dimensions: (1) the revelation of erroneous financial reporting, (2) the preventive 
improvement of accounting quality, and (3) consequently an increase in the trust into capital 
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markets.13 Primarily, financial reporting enforcement examinations in Germany are exercised 
by the FREP, a non-governmental membership corporation registered in Berlin. Membership 
is open to associations of preparers and users of financial reporting. The FREP is recognized 
by the German Federal Government as the first tier of the German financial reporting en-
forcement regime. However, no firm selected for examination is obliged to cooperate with the 
FREP nor does the FREP have the ability to exercise public authority. If a firm chooses not to 
cooperate with the FREP, or if a firm does not accept its investigation results, the FREP refers 
the case to the BaFin—as the second tier of the enforcement regime and public authority—for 
re-assessment. Furthermore, all examinations completed by the FREP have to be submitted to 
the BaFin, which in turn will usually order the respective firm to publish an immediate error 
announcement, given that material errors had been detected by the FREP. Thus, the FREP 
could be characterized as possessing quasi-authority arising from the oversight by the BaFin. 
Subject to the enforcement regime are all firms with equity or debt instruments listed at 
the EU-regulated market of an exchange in Germany. This includes foreign firms with such a 
listing in Germany, as well. Firms are selected for examination based on (1) specific indica-
tions of errors received by the FREP, (2) a request by the BaFin, or (3) a risk adjusted-
sampling mechanism. The latter tends to be the most prominent reason for examinations. 
Firms listed in the top indices of Frankfurt Stock Exchange (DAX, MDAX, TecDax, SDAX) 
are supposed to be selected every four to five years for examination, while all other firms are 
supposed to be selected every eight to ten years. When a firm is selected for an enforcement 
procedure, the last prepared consolidated and individual annual financial statements, consoli-
dated and individual annual management reports, and the last published interim report are 
examined. The FREP evaluates whether the reporting is in line with the relevant GAAP (usu-
ally IFRS) and the legislation on financial reporting. However, the enforcement procedure is 
                                                     
13 The following summary of the institutional details of the German financial reporting enforcement regime is 
based on Förschle, Grottel, Schmidt, Schubert, and Winkeljohann (2014: § 342b). 
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not supposed to have the extent of a second audit. For each year, the FREP decides on certain 
core areas of examination, which will be made available to the public in advance. 
Besides the mandatory publication of an error announcement, error detection has no fur-
ther legal consequences for the respective firm—at least with respect to the consolidated fi-
nancial reporting. Restatements are only necessary when stipulated by the corresponding 
GAAP regulations (IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors 
for IFRS). Thus, the German financial reporting enforcement regime relies purely on a name-
and-shame mechanism. A detailed flow chart of the enforcement procedure is provided by 
Böcking et al. (2015: 439). 
In 2014, the FREP completed 104 examinations of which 99 were sampling examina-
tions. 13% of examinations led to error detections. Errors were attributable either to the ac-
counting for complex transactions or to insufficient reporting in the notes or in the manage-
ment report. In 77% of the examinations with error detection the respective firm accepted the 
judgement of the DPR. The remaining examinations were referred to the BaFin for re-
assessment (FREP 2015). 
Berger (2010) concludes that listed firms in Germany are subject to close control by the 
enforcement bodies. In line with that, Germany’s scoring in the financial reporting enforce-
ment activity index of Brown et al. (2014) improved from five points in 2002 to 19 points in 
2005 and 21 points in 2008. In the latter year, this surpasses France (16 points) and is almost 
on a par with the United Kingdom (22 points). The maximum of 24 points was reached in 
2008, for example, by the U.S. 
Empirical literature 
Ernstberger, Stich, and Vogler (2012) study overall capital market effects potentially re-
lated to the German enforcement regime. Their balanced sample of firms listed in Frankfurt 
between 2003 and 2006 consists of firm-years before and after the introduction of the en-
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forcement regime. However, after the introduction some firms—more specifically those not 
listed at the EU-regulated market but at the exchange-regulated market—remain outside of 
the enforcement regime and serve as a control group. Firm-years subject to the enforcement 
regime show significantly less earnings management, higher stock liquidity, and greater mar-
ket capitalization compared to the pre-introduction and the exchange-regulated firm-years. 
There is some evidence that these effects might partly be more pronounced for firms which 
have no cross-listing in the U.S. 
Hitz at al. (2012) provide evidence on capital market consequences after error announce-
ments for a sample of cases up to 2009. Conducting an event study they document negative 
abnormal returns, reductions in daily trading volumes and increasing bid-ask spreads subse-
quent to the publication of error announcements. The authors conclude that the error an-
nouncements represent new, negative information for market participants. A regression analy-
sis suggests that the magnitude of negative abnormal returns might be associated with the 
severity of errors. Furthermore, the authors construct a principal component for corporate 
governance quality based on non-compliance with German Corporate Governance Code rules, 
the importance of variable management compensation, and the extent of earnings manage-
ment. For their sample, corporate governance quality is significantly negatively correlated 
with the severity of errors. 
Strohmenger (2014) examines characteristics of 85 error cases concerning fiscal years 
from 2004 to 2009 using a matched sample. He finds that error firms have a significantly 
lower return on total assets and a significantly lower equity ratio compared to control firms in 
the year of erroneous reporting on average. Furthermore, multivariate models based on sever-
al metrics suggest that error firms exhibit lower earnings quality. Böcking et al. (2015) com-
pare earnings management proxies of error firms with those of firms that have been examined 
by the enforcement bodies without any error detection. They are able to identify the latter 
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group of firms by using internal BaFin data. The authors document that (1) error firms man-
age earnings to a larger extent in the error year compared to non-error firms and (2) error 
firms show more pronounced earnings management across time in general compared to firms 
for which errors have never been detected. 
Brocard et al. (2015) find that that error firms are more likely to change their auditor in 
general and to switch from a non-big-four to a big-four audit in particular. In contrast, Ebner 
at al. (2015) find no significantly different turnover rates for auditors of error firms in the first 
or second year after the publication of an error announcement compared to a control group. 
Häfele and Riediger (2015) investigate potential contagion effects of error announcements. 
They provide evidence that industry peers of error firms (1) suffer from negative abnormal 
returns after the respective error announcements and (2) increase the timeliness of their loss 
recognition afterwards. 
Altogether, the hitherto existing literature suggests that error firms in Germany have a 
lower performance and greater leverage and show larger amounts of earnings management 
compared to control firms. Lower corporate governance quality might be associated with 
more severe errors. The publication of error announcements seems to provide new, negative 
information to market participants. 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data and base sample 
Enforcement regime data 
All firms with equity or debt instruments listed at the EU-regulated market of a German 
exchange are subject to the German financial reporting enforcement regime. Based on data 
BaFin data, I derive the number of firms subject to the enforcement regime by year. A firm is 
classified as being subject to the enforcement regime in a specific year when its annual report 
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for this year could be examined by the enforcement bodies. Between 2004 and 2013, the 
number of firms subject to the enforcement regime fell from 1,234 to 756 (–39%). In each 
year, the majority of these firms has its primary equity instrument listed at a German stock 
exchange according to Datastream and Worldscope data. This implies that the respective 
firms are subject to the enforcement regime because either (1) the equity instrument is listed 
at an EU-regulated market or (2) the equity instrument is listed at an exchange-regulated mar-
ket but the firm has a debt instrument listed at an EU-regulated market at the same time. 
Hence, the remaining firms are subject to the enforcement regime because either (1) they have 
equity instruments listed at an EU-regulated market in Germany which are cross-listings only 
or (2) they have debt instruments but no equity instruments listed at an EU-regulated market 
in Germany. 
Error case data 
As a result of the activities of the enforcement bodies, firms had to publish 210 error an-
nouncements in the electronic Federal Gazette until the end of 2014. The first error an-
nouncement was published on February 3, 2006. The last error announcement considered in 
this study was published on November 15, 2014. The errors of a specific firm-year are some-
times split into multiple error announcements, and sometimes error announcements are 
amended by subsequent error announcements. Therefore, I construct 186 error cases from the 
210 error announcements. Error cases can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated 
and individual annual financial statements and in the consolidated and individual annual man-
agement reports. They are constructed on the firm-year level with respect to the year of the 
erroneous reports. The yearly share of error cases relative to all firms subject to the enforce-
ment regime ranges from 1.1% to 2.9% between 2004 and 2012. No error announcements 
relating to the reporting of 2013 had been published by the end of 2014, and further error an-
nouncements concerning the reporting before 2013 might be published after 2014. The aver-
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age duration of the enforcement procedure, i.e. the time between the fiscal-year end of an er-
ror case and the publication of the first related error announcement, declined from 2.7 years 
with respect to the 2004 error cases to 1.3 years with respect to the 2012 error cases. The 
numbers of firms subject to the enforcement regime and of error cases by year are presented 
in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Table 1. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes basic features of the 186 error cases. 85% involve errors in the con-
solidated reporting, and 96% involve errors in the consolidated or individual financial state-
ments. 8% are cases of recurrence, i.e. they are not the first error cases for a specific firm. The 
average duration of the enforcement procedure across all error cases is 1.8 years. While most 
cases were completed by the FREP at the first tier of the enforcement regime, 21% were re-
ferred to BaFin for re-assessment. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Sample development 
This study focuses on firms with primary equity listings at stock exchanges in Germany. 
The Datastream universe provides 12,179 respective firm-years for the years 2004 to 2012. 
The latter is the last year for which error cases had become public by the end of 2014. Subject 
to the enforcement regime are 6,069 firm-years. I exclude observations which are of foreign 
firms, not reported in EUR, not following IFRS, or have incomplete fiscal years. Finally, ob-
servations with required Worldscope financial statements data missing and with equity or 
sales equal to or less than zero are deleted. This yields a base sample of 4,017 firm-years. 
Thereof 128 are error cases. Table 3 summarizes the sample development. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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3.2 Potential non-governance determinants of error cases 
Variable distribution and correlations 
Table 4 presents the distribution of firm-years in the base sample by year and by industry 
based on SIC divisions. The most represented industry is manufacturing (44%), followed by 
services (23%) and finance, insurance, and real estate (17%). 
[Table 4 about here] 
Summary statistics of general firm characteristics are presented in Table 5. All non-
dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. About 3% of the firm-years in the 
base sample are error cases (ERROR_CASE) and 95% are listed with their primary equity 
instrument at Frankfurt Stock Exchange or on XETRA (FRANKFURT). The latter is in line 
with the dominance of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange compared to the other so-called “region-
al” stock exchanges in Germany. For details on the structure of the German stock market see 
Stehle and Schmidt (2015). On average, firm-years have total assets of 7.3 billion EUR (TA), 
total shareholder’s equity of 1.1 billion EUR (EQUITY), and a market capitalization of 1.8 
billion EUR (MKTCAP). 
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations of general firm characteristics for the 
base sample. The ERROR_CASE dummy is—at the 10% level—significantly positively corre-
lated with a listing at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange or on XETRA and significantly negative-
ly correlated with earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the return on total assets 
(ROA). However, the correlations are rather small. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Logit regression analysis 
Before examining corporate governance differences between error cases control cases, I 
provide an analysis of potential non-governance determinants of error cases in order to get a 
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better understanding of the empirical setting. Table 7 summarizes the results. The ER-
ROR_CASE dummy is regressed on selected general firm characteristics using a logit regres-
sion. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (TA_LN). The equity ratio 
represents the leverage (EQ_RATIO). The market-to-book ratio is a common proxy for ex-
pected firm growth and for firm risk (MTB). Profitability is measured by the return on total 
assets (ROA). Furthermore, the dummy for a primary equity listing at Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change or on XETRA is included (FRANKFURT) as are year-fixed effects and industry-fixed 
effects based on SIC divisions. Firm size is significantly negatively associated with error cas-
es while a listing in Frankfurt is significantly positively associated with error cases. The latter 
could be due to the fact that firms in the major indices of Frankfurt Stock Exchange have a 
higher likelihood to be selected for examination by the enforcement bodies. With respect to 
the fixed effects, the year 2005 increases the likelihood for error cases significantly at the 1% 
level. 2005 was the first year of mandatory IFRS reporting at the consolidated level by firms 
listed at an EU-regulated equity market. Thus, the significant dummy variable for 2005 might 
hint at IFRS adoption problems. 
However, the results of the logit regression might be biased by firms from the finance, in-
surance, and real estate industry which tend to have a distinctively different balance sheet 
structure compared to other firms. Therefore, I re-estimate the logit regression after excluding 
firms from the respective industry from the base sample. The 2005 dummy stays significant 
(at the 5% level), but FRANKFURT and TA_LN lose significance. Instead, the equity ratio 
shows a significantly negative association with error cases. Of the 96 error cases in the re-
spective sample, only one is not listed in Frankfurt. Therefore, I re-estimate the latter logit 
regression for firms listed in Frankfurt only and obtain similar results. As a last robustness 
check, I replace TA_LN with the natural logarithm of net sales (SALES_LN) as an alternative 
proxy for firm size, and obtain similar results again. The regression results indicate that firms 
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with a smaller equity ratio and observations from 2005—the first year of mandatory IFRS 
reporting—have a higher likelihood to be an error case. However, the independent variables 
employed are just to a limited extend able to explain the error cases: the Nagelkerke R² ranges 
from 2.8% to 3.4% depending on the regression model. The finding for the equity ratio is in 
line with Strohmenger (2014). In contrast to him, I am not able to document a significant as-
sociation between error cases and lower returns on total assets. Furthermore, the documented 
negative association between the equity ratio and error cases is supported by Dechow et al. 
(1996) who suggest for the U.S. that firms with greater external financing needs are more 
likely to manipulate earnings. 
[Table 7 about here] 
3.3 Difference-in-differences analysis of corporate governance 
Matching procedure 
In the following, I examine potential corporate governance differences between error and 
control cases and whether error detection is associated with subsequent changes in corporate 
governance. Therefore, I apply a matching procedure in order to assign one control case to 
each error case. The intention is to match firms which are likely to have similar corporate 
governance based on their general firm structure in the error year. It should be noted that it is 
not of my interest to match firms with a similar likelihood of being error cases. Matching is 
done starting from the base sample developed above, from which I exclude all potential con-
trol cases of firms which have prior or subsequent error cases, and error cases of same firms 
for which the enforcement procedures overlap. Following Farber (2005), control cases have to 
be within ±25% of net sales of an error case and from the same industry. Furthermore, their 
primary equity instruments have to be listed at the same stock exchange and their fiscal-year 
ends have to be equal. Pair-wise matching is done without replacement and priority is given to 
those error cases with the smallest amount of potential matches. Industry is matched based on 
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the most detailed SIC code possible. 12% of the pairs are matched on four-digit SIC codes, 
17% on three-digit SIC codes, 24% on two-digit SIC codes, and 47% on SIC divisions. Final-
ly, if possible, the distance in net sales is minimized. 
Given these requirements, 84 of 111 error cases could be matched if replacement would 
be applied. Without replacement, I obtain 83 matched pairs. Table 8 summarizes the matching 
procedure. Table 9 provides a comparison of general firm characteristics of the matched pairs 
in the error years. However, the differences are insignificant for all variables examined. Thus, 
the matched pairs are expected to have a similar corporate governance based on their general 
firm structure. 
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
Corporate governance data and variables 
Data on corporate governance is hand collected for error and control cases from the (con-
solidated, if applicable) annual reports of the error year and of the post year. A post year is 
defined as the first full fiscal year after the publication of the first error announcement related 
to an error case. This definition is supposed to ensure that the enforcement procedure has been 
completed by the beginning of the post year. Therefore, the corporate governance characteris-
tics of the post year are expected to be uninfluenced by an ongoing enforcement procedure. 
The post year is the second fiscal year after the error year in 11% of the cases, the third fiscal 
year in 64% of the cases, the fourth fiscal year in 22% of the cases, and the fifth or sixth fiscal 
year in 4% of the cases. The matched sample consists of 332 firm-years. However, sample 
size varies across variables because of missing data. This is primarily due to (1) firms orga-
nized in a non-German legal form, (2) annual reports not yet or not anymore being available 
on a firm’s website or in the electronic Federal Gazette, (3) post-year observations having 
incomplete fiscal years, (4) post-year reporting in local GAAP, (5) non-disclosure of items in 
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annual reports, and (6) incomplete Worldscope data on total assets. Furthermore, enforcement 
regime status information is not available for 2014 and 2015 yet. 
Table 10 presents summary statistics of the collected corporate governance characteristics 
for the matched pairs across error and post years. All non-dummy variable are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level. ENF_REGIME and EQ_LISTING indicate whether a firm-year is sub-
ject to the enforcement regime and whether a fiscal-year end market price for the primary 
equity instrument of a firm is available on Worldscope, respectively. The remaining variables 
concern either the auditor-firm relationship or the structure of the supervisory board. An audi-
tor’s opinion has to be signed in Germany by the auditor in person.14 For a larger audit firm, 
usually two auditors—the responsible partner and manager—sign. AUD_TEAM_ROTATE 
indicates whether all signing auditors in the post year are different from the signing auditors 
in the error year. Such a complete change of the audit team can be either due to internal rota-
tion or a switch to another audit firm. The latter is specifically indicated by 
AUD_FIRM_ROTATE, which is conceptually a subset of AUD_TEAM_ROTATE. Firm-years 
audited by one of the internationally dominant audit firms Deloitte, EY, KPMG, or PWC are 
indicated with BIG4. Prior literature suggests that large audit firms are more independent 
from its clients and thus provide higher audit quality (DeAngelo 1981). Since the German 
audit market is actually characterized by five dominant audit firms, I use BIG5 as an addition-
al dummy incorporating BDO, as well (Ashbaugh and Warfield 2003). 
AUD_UNQUAL indicates an unqualified auditor’s opinions. Additional to the type of the 
auditor’s opinion, a German auditor has the opportunity or the duty to supplement a—
unqualified or qualified—auditor’s opinion with notes on specific issues.15 First, an auditor 
can provide supplementary notes on any issue he deems relevant (usually uncertain issues 
arising from the financial reporting). Second, an auditor has to provide supplementary notes if 
                                                     
14  Förschle et al. (2014: § 322, note 155). 
15 Förschle et al. (2014: § 322, notes 36–39). 
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the survival of the firm is uncertain to a significant extant (even if the circumstances do not 
require a qualification of the auditor’s opinion). AO_SUPPL indicates that the auditor’s opin-
ion contains such supplementary notes. AUD_TIME is the period in days between the fiscal-
year end and the date of the auditor’s opinion. This so-called audit delay can be interpreted as 
a proxy for time and resources spent on an audit (Ashton, Willingham, and Elliott 1987). The 
fees charged by the auditor for auditing the annual financial statements and the management 
report have to be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. Audit fees are supposed to 
reflect the audit effort on the one hand and expected losses from the auditing on the other 
hand (Simunic 1980). AUD_FEE_TA are the audit fees scaled by the average total assets of a 
fiscal year. Non-audit-services charged by the same auditor have to be disclosed, as well. 
They can comprise audit-related services, tax advisory, and other services.16 
NAS_AUD_RATIO are the fees for non-audit services charged by the auditor divided by the 
audit fees. It might be the case that the importance of non-audit service fees within an auditor-
client relationship is negatively associated with audit quality, although empirical results are 
mixed (DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002). TOT_FEE_TA is the sum of audit 
and non-audit services fees scaled by the average total assets of a fiscal year. 
Information on the structure of the supervisory board is obtained from the mandatory re-
port of the supervisory board, the remuneration report within the management report, and the 
notes to the financial statements. BOARD_MEET is the number of ordinary and extraordinary 
meetings of the supervisory board in a fiscal year including conference calls. COMMITTEES 
is the number of committees of the supervisory board. Audit committees are not mandatory 
for joint-stock companies in Germany.17 Thus, AUDIT_COMM indicates whether the supervi-
sory board has voluntarily established an audit committee. BOARD_MEMB is the number of 
members of the supervisory board. COMP_MEMB_TA is the average yearly compensation of 
                                                     
16 Förschle et al. (2014: § 314, notes 90–94). 
17 Förschle et al. (2014: § 324, note 3). 
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a supervisory board member scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. There is 
some evidence that performance-based management compensation reduces earnings quality 
(Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). Likewise, a performance-based compensation of supervi-
sory board members might decrease their incentives to fulfill their oversight role over the ac-
counting process sufficiently. VAR_COMP indicates whether the compensation of the super-
visory board has variable components, regardless of whether the respective criteria (e.g., firm 
performance, dividend payments) are met in the respective fiscal year. 
[Table 10 about here] 
Difference-in-differences analysis with unbalanced sample 
This difference-in-differences analysis of corporate governance characteristics is con-
ducted based on the unbalanced matched sample developed above. Thus, it contains matched 
pairs with missing data in order to utilize a larger sample size. A second difference-in-
differences analysis based on a balanced matched sample is conducted later on as a robustness 
check. The results for the unbalanced sample are presented in Table 11. In the following, I 
summarize primarily statistically significant differences and developments. 
[Table 11 about here] 
In the post year, 17% of error cases and 20% of controls cases are not subject to the en-
forcement regime, anymore, and 7% of both error and control cases have delisted with their 
primary equity instrument from the stock exchange. However, there is no significantly differ-
ent development between error and control cases. 42% of error cases have switched their au-
ditor by the post year which are significantly more than for the control cases (24%). This re-
sult contrasts with Ebner et al. (2015) who do not find a significantly different turnover rate 
for error firms but confirms Brocard et al. (2015). In terms of having a big-four audit firm, 
error cases seem to be systematically different from control cases. In both error and post years 
they have a significantly lesser likelihood of being audited by a big-four firm. This is in line 
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with results by Farber (2005) for the U.S. and with correlations by Böcking et al. (2015) for 
the German setting on the one hand but contrasts with Brocard et al. (2015) for the post year 
on the other hand. However, there is no significant difference when big-five audit firms are 
examined. In the error year, significantly less error cases have unqualified auditor’s opinions 
compared to the control cases. 93% of the error cases have unqualified auditor’s opinions, 
while all auditor’s opinions of the control cases are unqualified. Gassen and Skaife (2009) 
find for the whole German market 98% of auditor’s opinions to be unqualified in 1999/2000. 
My finding can be interpreted in two different ways. First, error cases might be in a worse 
financial condition in the error year compared to the control cases and therefore are more like-
ly to receive a qualified auditor’s opinion. However, the comparison of general firm charac-
teristics presented in Table 9 does not support such an interpretation. Second, auditors might 
have detected at least some of the errors which will result in error announcements later on and 
have decided to qualify their auditor’s opinion due to these errors. This would imply that not 
all error cases should be considered as audit failures. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that it 
might be possible that a qualified auditor’s opinion actually triggered a subsequent enforce-
ment procedure. 
In the post year, the difference in the shares of unqualified auditor’s opinions is insignifi-
cant. However, error cases have a significantly greater probability to receive an unqualified or 
qualified auditor’s opinion with supplementary notes in the post year compared to the control 
cases (19% vs. 3%). This implies that either (1) financial reporting issues or the survival of 
the firm itself are more uncertain for error cases in post years compared to the control cases, 
or (2) that auditors are more prudent in the assessment of error cases in post years compared 
to the control cases. The time period between the fiscal-year end and the date of the respective 
auditor’s opinion is significantly longer for error cases compared to the control cases in both 
error and post years (average difference of 17 days in error years and 16 days in post years). 
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Presumably, either the auditing process itself or the negotiations between auditor and firm 
about controversial issues are more complex for error cases across periods. Again, this might 
hint at error cases being systematically different from control cases in this respect. The find-
ing on audit time is generally in line with findings by Hitz, Löw, and Solka (2013) for the 
German setting. However, while they find an average audit time of 72 days across all observa-
tions, the average audit time across my matched sample amounts to 85 days. With respect to 
audit fees and total fees charged by the auditor, average scaled values are greater for error 
cases. However, the differences are insignificant. 
Examining the structure of the supervisory board, error cases have in the error year sig-
nificantly fewer committees, a lower probability to have an audit committee, and fewer super-
visory board members compared to control firms. The lower frequency of audit committees is 
in line with results by Dechow et al. (1996) for the U.S. setting. All these differences are in-
significant in the post year. This might hint at a potential improvement of the structure of the 
supervisory board resulting from the enforcement procedure and, in turn, an alignment with 
control cases in the post year. Furthermore, the average scaled compensation of supervisory 
board members has increased for error cases significantly by the post year. However, the dif-
ferences to the control cases are insignificant in both error and post years. 
Robustness check: difference-in-differences analysis with balanced sample 
In order to obtain a balanced sample, all matched pairs which have any missing corporate 
governance variable in the error or post year are deleted. This results in 31 matched pairs or 
124 firm-year observations. Many of the differences and developments summarized above 
turn insignificant when the balanced matched sample is used for the difference-in-differences 
analysis of corporate governance characteristics. However, the directions are similar. The 
following findings from above remain significant: (1) error cases are less likely to be audited 
by a big-four firm in the error year compared to the control cases, (2) error cases are more 
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likely to receive an auditor’s opinion with supplementary notes in the post year compared to 
the control cases, and (3) the average scaled compensation of supervisory board members has 
increased by the post year for error cases. The results of the robustness check are presented in 
Table 12. 
[Table 12 about here] 
4 Conclusion 
This paper sheds light on characteristics of firms detected with financial reporting errors 
under the German financial reporting enforcement regime with a special emphasis on corpo-
rate governance. Furthermore, it examines whether corporate governance characteristics have 
changed after the publication of detected errors using a matched-sample approach. First, I 
document that several non-governance characteristics are only weakly associated with the 
likelihood to become an error firm. Second, error firms seem to be different from control 
firms with respect to corporate governance. Examining the auditor-client relationship in the 
error year, firms with erroneous financial reporting are less likely to be audited by a big-four 
audit firm and have more often a qualified auditor’s opinion. The average duration of an audit 
is longer than for the control firms. Turning to the structure of the supervisory board, error 
firms have fewer committees and members of the supervisory board in the error year. Fur-
thermore, they are less likely to have an audit committee. Third, an analysis of error firms in 
the first full fiscal year after the first respective error announcement suggests that there might 
be improvements in their corporate governance. The differences in the structure of the super-
visory board have turned insignificant compared to control firms and the compensation of 
supervisory board members has increased. In contrast, the lower likelihood of being audited 
by a big-four auditor and the greater duration of audits remain. However, error firms exhibit 
more auditor changes, and are more likely to receive auditor’s opinions with supplementary 
notes after the error announcement. 
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My findings have three potential implications for the understanding of the determinants 
of erroneous financial reporting and of the mechanisms of financial reporting enforcement. 
First, erroneous financial reporting seems to be associated with corporate governance charac-
teristics of error firms. Second, while several corporate governance characteristics of error 
firms seem to improve after enforcement actions, some differences relative to control firms 
continue to exist with respect to the auditor-client relationship. Third, the German financial 
reporting enforcement regime might be able contribute to the prevention of potential future 
errors by triggering corporate governance improvements. However, further research is neces-
sary in this regard. Finally, I emphasize that my results must be interpreted with caution, es-
pecially due to the small number of matched firm pairs under examination. 
87 
References 
Ashbaugh, H., and T. D. Warfield. 2003. Audits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evi-
dence from the German market. Journal of International Accounting Research 2 (1): 1–
21. 
Ashton, R. H., J. J. Willingham, and R. K. Elliott. 1987. An Empirical Analysis of Audit De-
lay. Journal of Accounting Research 25 (2): 275–292. 
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review 71 (4): 443–465. 
Berger, A. 2010. The Development and Status of Enforcement in the European Union. Ac-
counting in Europe, 7 (1): 15–35. 
Bergstresser, D., and T. Philippon. 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal 
of Financial Economics 80 (3): 511–529. 
Böcking, H.-J., M. Gros, and D. Worret. 2015. Enforcement of accounting standards: how 
effective is the German two-tier system in detecting earnings management? Review of 
Managerial Science 9 (3): 431–485. 
Brocard, M., B. Franke, and D. Voeller. 2015. Enforcement Actions and Auditor Changes. 
Working Paper, Universität Mannheim. Available at: http://www.ssrn.com (last access 
August 29, 2015). 
Brown, P., J. Preiato, and A. Tarca. 2014. Measuring Country Differences in Enforcement of 
Accounting Standards: An Audit and Enforcement Proxy. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 41 (1) & (2): 1–52. 
Chakravarthy, J., E. deHaan, and S. Rajgopal. 2014. Reputation Repair After a Serious Re-
statement. The Accounting Review 89 (4): 1329–1363. 
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor Independence, ‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 (2): 113–127. 
Dechow, P. M., W. Ge, and C. Schrand. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of 
the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics 50: 344–401. 
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and Consequences of Earnings 
Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Con-
temporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1–36. 
DeFond, M. L., K. Raghunandan, and K. R. Subramanyam. 2002. Do Non-Audit Service Fees 
Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions. Journal of 
Accounting Research 40 (4): 1247–1274. 
88 
Ebner, G., J. Hottmann, and H. Zülch. 2015. Error Announcements and Auditor Fluctuation – 
Evidence from Germany. Working Paper, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. 
Available at: http://www.ssrn.com (last access August 29, 2015). 
Ernstberger, J., M. Stich, and O. Vogler. 2012. Economic Consequences of Accounting En-
forcement Reforms: The Case of Germany. European Accounting Review 21 (2): 217–
251. 
Farber, D. B. 2005. Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter? The 
Accounting Review 80 (2): 539–561. 
Feroz, E. H., K. Park, and V. S. Pastena. 1991. The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC’s 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. Journal of Accounting Research 29 
(Supplement): 107–142. 
Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP). 2015. Annual Activity Report 2014. Berlin: 
FREP. Available at: http://www.frep.info (last access August 29, 2015). 
Fohlin, C. 2007. The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany. In A History 
of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional 
Managers, edited by R. K. Mock, 223–281. Chicago, London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Förschle, G., B. Grottel, S. Schmidt, W. J. Schubert, and N. Winkeljohann, eds. 2014. 
Beck’scher Bilanzkommentar: Handels- und Steuerbilanz. [Legal commentary on Ger-
man financial reporting regulation.] Munich: Beck. 
Gassen, J., and H. A. Skaife. Can Audit Reforms Affect the Information Role of Audits? Evi-
dence from the German Market. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (3): 867–898. 
Häfele, S., and M. Riediger. 2015. Consequences of Error Announcements on Industry Peers: 
Capital Market Reaction and Financial Reporting Decisions. Working Paper, Freie Uni-
versität Berlin. Available at: http://www.ssrn.com (last access August 29, 2015). 
Hennes, K. M., A. J. Leone, and B. P. Miller. 2014. Determinants and Market Consequences 
of Auditor Dismissals after Accounting Restatements. The Accounting Review 89 (3): 
1051–1082. 
Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach. 2003. Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Deter-
mined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. FRBNY Economic Policy Review 
9 (1): 7–26. 
Hitz, J.-M., J. Ernstberger, and M. Stich. 2012. Enforcement of Accounting Standards in Eu-
rope: Capital-Market-Based Evidence for the Two-Tier Mechanism in Germany. Europe-
an Accounting Review 21 (2): 253–281. 
Hitz, J.-M., P. Löw, and M. Solka. 2013. Determinants of audit delay in a mandatory IFRS 
setting. Die Betriebswirtschaft 73 (4): 293–305. 
89 
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Con-
trol Systems. The Journal of Finance 48 (3): 831–880. 
Johnstone, K., C. Li, and K. H. Rupley. 2011. Changes in Corporate Governance Associated 
with the Revelation of Internal Control Material Weaknesses and Their Subsequent Re-
mediation. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (1): 331–383. 
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 375–400. 
Leuz, C., D. Nanda, and P. D. Wysocki. 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: 
an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69 (3): 505–527. 
Mande, V., and M. Son. 2013. Do Financial Restatements Lead to Auditor Changes? Audit-
ing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 32 (2): 119–145. 
Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, and S. Young. 2001. The characteristics of firms subject to ad-
verse rulings by the Financial Reporting Review Panel. Accounting and Business Re-
search 31 (4): 291–311. 
Simunic, D. A. 1980. The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Ac-
counting Research 18 (1): 161–190. 
Srinivasan, S. 2005. Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evi-
dence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members. Journal of Ac-
counting Research 43 (2): 291–334. 
Stehle, R., and M. H. Schmidt. 2015. Returns on German Stocks 1954 to 2013. Credit and 
Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital (forthcoming). Working Paper available at: 
http://www.ssrn.com (last access August 29, 2015). 
Strohmenger, M. 2014. Enforcement Releases, Firm Characteristics, and Earnings Quality: 
Insights from Germany’s Two-tiered Enforcement System. Journal of International Fi-
nancial Management & Accounting 25 (3): 271–304. 
Vafeas, N. 2005. Audit Committees, Boards, and the Quality of Reported Earnings. Contem-
porary Accounting Research 22 (4): 1093–122. 
Wiedman, C. I., and K. B. Hendricks. 2013. Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A 
Signaling View. Journal of Business Finance & Economics 40 (9) & (10): 1095–1125. 
 
 
90 
Figure 1: Firms subject to enforcement regime by year 
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Figure 2: Error cases by year 
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Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements pub-
lished until the end of 2014. An error case can comprise one or several errors in 
the consolidated and individual annual financial statements and in the consolidat-
ed and individual annual management reports. 
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Table 1: Firms subject to enforcement regime and error cases by year 
Year 
Firms subject to enforcement regime 
Error cases 
Duration of 
enforcement 
procedure 
 (average 
years) 
Total 
Primary 
equity listing 
in Germany 
Public debt or 
cross-listing 
only 
2004 1,234 728 506 13 2.725 
  (59.0%) (41.0%) (1.1%)  
2005 1,120 712 408 32 1.812 
  (63.6%) (36.4%) (2.9%)  
2006 1,074 731 343 31 1.945 
  (68.1%) (31.9%) (2.9%)  
2007 1,029 745 284 21 1.827 
  (72.4%) (27.6%) (2.0%)  
2008 965 707 258 22 1.780 
  (73.3%) (26.7%) (2.3%)  
2009 915 667 248 24 1.536 
  (72.9%) (27.1%) (2.6%)  
2010 873 624 249 20 1.626 
  (71.5%) (28.5%) (2.3%)  
2011 824 605 219 14 1.423 
  (73.4%) (26.6%) (1.7%)  
2012 751 550 201 9 1.349 
  (73.2%) (26.8%) (1.2%)  
2013 756 517 239 — — 
  (68.4%) (31.6%)   
Σ    186  
Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 
2014. An error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial 
statements and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. The duration of the en-
forcement procedure is the time between the fiscal-year end of an error case and the publication of the 
first related error announcement. Values in braces represent the share of the total numbers of firms subject 
to the enforcement regime in the respective fiscal year. 
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Table 2: Error case characteristics 
Characteristics N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Consolidated reporting 
concerned only 186 0.608       
Consolidated and 
individual reporting 
concerned 
186 0.242       
Individual reporting 
concerned only 186 0.151       
Financial statements 
concerned only 186 0.790       
Financial statements 
and management 
reports concerned 
186 0.172       
Management reports 
concerned only 186 0.038       
Cases of recurrence 186 0.075       
Duration of enforce-
ment procedure 
(years) 
186 1.789 0.702 0.556 1.334 1.642 2.162 4.975 
Enforcement proce-
dure  completed by 
BaFin (second tier, 
public) 
186 0.210       
Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. 
An error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements 
and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. The duration of the enforcement procedure 
is the time between the fiscal-year end of an error case and the publication of the first related error announce-
ment. 
94 
Table 3: Sample development 
 Total 
Thereof: 
error 
cases 
Datastream firm-years with primary equity listing in Germany (2004–2012) 12,179 167 
Not subject to enforcement regime –6,110 — 
Foreign firms –265 –10 
Reporting not in EUR –620 –2 
Reporting not following IFRS –906 –12 
Incomplete fiscal years –47 –3 
Required Worldscope financial statements data missing –53 –2 
Equity or sales equal to or less than zero –161 –10 
Base sample 4,017 128 
Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. 
An error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements 
and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. 
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Table 4: Firm-year observations by year and by industry 
Year Total 
Thereof: 
error 
cases 
  
SIC divisions Total 
Thereof: 
error 
cases 
2004 236 4   A: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (01–09) 23 1 
2005 466 24   B: Mining (10–14) 26 1 
2006 521 21   C: Construction (15–17) 55 2 
2007 532 13   D: Manufacturing (20–39) 1,749 45 
2008 499 17   E: Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services (40–49) 305 11 
2009 474 16   F: Wholesale trade (50–51) 110 2 
2010 451 14   G: Retail trade (52–59) 136 5 
2011 439 12   H: Finance, insurance, and real estate (60–67) 692 32 
2012 399 7   I: Services (70–89) 921 29 
Σ 4,017 128    4,017 128 
Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. An error case can comprise one or several er-
rors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. Two-digit SIC code 
ranges of SIC divisions are provided in braces. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics of general firm characteristics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
ERROR_CASE 4,017 0.032       
FRANKFURT 4,017 0.952       
TA 4,017 7,341,690 29,223,594 4,426 52,616 175,534 951,740 205,603,000 
EQUITY 4,017 1,113,604 4,071,030 1,343 23,302 73,642 320,637 30,261,000 
EQ_RATIO 4,017 0.442 0.229 0.018 0.278 0.416 0.603 0.978 
MKTCAP 4,017 1,793,571 5,969,040 3,409 32,356 105,801 566,495 41,704,171 
MTB 4,017 2.071 1.865 0.313 0.988 1.514 2.461 11.769 
SALES 4,017 3,002,219 10,338,181 1,044 38,946 146,099 792,489 67,956,000 
EBIT 4,017 246,515 933,680 –155,793 1,312 9,309 61,700 6,567,000 
ROA 4,017 0.053 0.128 –0.502 0.016 0.061 0.109 0.387 
ERROR_CASE is a dummy variable for firm-years representing an error case. Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements 
published until the end of 2014. An error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements and in the 
consolidated and individual annual management reports. FRANKFURT is a dummy variable for firms with primary equity listing at Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change or on XETRA. TA is total assets in thousand EUR (WC02999). EQUITY is total shareholder’s equity in thousand EUR (WC03995). EQ_RATIO is 
total shareholder’s equity divided by total assets. MKTCAP is market capitalization in thousand EUR (WC08001). MTB is market capitalization divided by 
total shareholder’s equity. SALES is net sales or revenues in thousand EUR (WC01001). EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes in thousand EUR 
(WC18191). ROA is earnings before interest and taxes divided by the average of total assets and total assets of the previous fiscal year. All non-dummy vari-
ables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
  
97 
Table 6: Pearson (below) and Spearman (above) correlations of general firm characteristics 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) ERROR_CASE X 0.027 –0.013 –0.024 –0.022 –0.023 0.009 –0.023 –0.030 –0.027 
(2) FRANKFURT 0.027 X 0.094 0.102 0.006 0.122 0.058 0.169 0.111 0.056 
(3) TA_LN –0.016 0.105 X 0.941 –0.458 0.887 0.003 0.886 0.744 0.056 
(4) EQUITY_LN –0.025 0.111 0.942 X –0.187 0.923 –0.037 0.838 0.752 0.129 
(5) EQ_RATIO –0.019 0.005 –0.488 –0.217 X –0.207 –0.085 –0.437 –0.237 0.243 
(6) MKTCAP_LN –0.022 0.126 0.899 0.938 –0.241 X 0.310 0.817 0.773 0.231 
(7) MTB 0.020 0.036 –0.088 –0.150 –0.085 0.165 X 0.074 0.173 0.306 
(8) SALES_LN –0.010 0.061 0.615 0.611 –0.255 0.584 –0.057 X 0.726 0.150 
(9) EBIT –0.030 0.058 0.581 0.581 –0.220 0.562 –0.036 0.846 X 0.537 
(10) ROA –0.026 0.019 0.108 0.178 0.115 0.229 0.082 0.007 0.052 X 
N = 4,017. ERROR_CASE is a dummy variable for firm-years representing an error case. Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error an-
nouncements published until the end of 2014. An error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial state-
ments and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. FRANKFURT is a dummy variable for firms with primary equity listing at 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange or on XETRA. TA_LN is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousand EUR (WC02999). EQUITY_LN is the natural loga-
rithm of total shareholder’s equity in thousand EUR (WC03995). EQ_RATIO is total shareholder’s equity divided by total assets. MKTCAP_LN is the nat-
ural logarithm of market capitalization in thousand EUR (WC08001). MTB is market capitalization divided by total shareholder’s equity. SALES_LN is the 
natural logarithm of net sales or revenues in thousand EUR (WC01001). EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes in thousand EUR (WC18191). ROA is 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by the average of total assets and total assets of the previous fiscal year. All non-dummy variables are winso-
rized at the 1% and 99% level. Bold values indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. 
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Table 7: Logit regression analysis of potential non-governance determinants of error cases 
 ERROR_CASE 
 Base sample No financials No financials; Frankfurt only 
No financials; 
Frankfurt only 
Intercept –3.287 (1.035) 
*** 
 
–3.747 
(1.320) 
*** 
 
–1.956 
(0.949) 
** 
 
–2.091 
(0.970) 
** 
 
FRANKFURT 1.448 (0.724) 
** 
 
1.675 
(1.019)  —  —  
TA_LN –0.099 (0.050) 
** 
 
–0.072 
(0.061)  
–0.076 
(0.061)  —  
EQ_RATIO –0.638 (0.460)  
–0.979 
(0.544) 
* 
 
–1.087 
(0.548) 
** 
 
–1.093 
(0.562) 
* 
 
MTB 0.027 (0.044)  
0.024 
(0.050)  
0.021 
(0.051)  
0.023 
(0.050)  
SALES_LN —  —  —  –0.066 (0.061)  
ROA –0.780 (0.664)  
–0.922 
(0.750)  
–0.949 
(0.753)  
–0.918 
(0.777)  
Fixed effects Year Industry  
Year 
Industry  
Year 
Industry  
Year 
Industry  
R² (Nagelkerke) 0.034  0.030  0.029  0.028  
N (ERROR_CASE = 1) 128  96  95  95  
N 4,017  3,325  3,181  3,181  
ERROR_CASE is a dummy variable for firm-years representing an error case. Error cases are constructed 
on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. An error case can com-
prise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements and in the consol-
idated and individual annual management reports. FRANKFURT is a dummy variable for firms with prima-
ry equity listing at Frankfurt Stock Exchange or on XETRA. TA_LN is the natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousand EUR (WC02999). EQ_RATIO is total shareholder’s equity (WC03995) divided by total assets. 
MTB is market capitalization (WC08001) divided by total shareholder’s equity. SALES_LN is the natural 
logarithm of net sales or revenues in thousand EUR (WC01001). ROA is earnings before interest and taxes 
(WC18191) divided by the average of total assets and total assets of the previous fiscal year. Industry-fixed 
effects are measured by SIC divisions. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
“No financials” indicates that firms of SIC division H (finance, insurance, and real estate) are excluded. 
“Frankfurt only” indicates that only firms with primary equity listing at Frankfurt Stock Exchange or on 
XETRA are retained. Standard errors for parameter estimates are provided in braces. Estimates for logit re-
gressions are the natural logarithms of the odds ratios. */**/*** marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 8: Matching procedure 
 Error cases 
Control 
cases 
Base sample 128 3,889 
Control cases of firms with prior or subsequent error cases — –704 
Error cases of same firm for which enforcement procedures overlap –17 — 
Sample for matching 111 3,185 
Potential matched pairs if replacement would be applied 84 73 
Matched pairs (without replacement) 83 83 
Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. 
An error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements 
and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. Control cases are firm-years which do not 
represent error cases in the respective fiscal year. 
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Table 9: Comparison of general firm characteristics of matched pairs in error years 
Variable Error cases (a) 
Control cases 
(b) (a) – (b)  
ERROR_CASE 1.000 0.000 1.000 (0.000) 
*** 
 
FRANKFURT 1.000 1.000 0.000 (0.000)  
TA_LN 12.011 12.001 0.010 (0.311)  
EQUITY_LN 10.918 11.112 –0.194 (0.296)  
EQ_RATIO 0.432 0.491 –0.059 (0.037)  
MKTCAP_LN 11.348 11.510 –0.162 (0.309)  
MTB 2.622 1.898 0.724 (0.560)  
SALES_LN 11.594 11.609 –0.015 (0.295)  
EBIT 79,695 74,901 4,794 (57,732)  
ROA 0.035 0.032 0.003 (0.020)  
N 83 83   
N = 166. Error year is the fiscal year of an error case. Error cases are constructed on 
firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. An error 
case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual finan-
cial statements and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. Con-
trol cases are firm-years which do not represent error cases in the respective fiscal year. 
ERROR_CASE is a dummy variable for firm-years representing an error case. Error cas-
es are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the 
end of 2014. FRANKFURT is a dummy variable for firms with primary equity listing at 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange or on XETRA. TA_LN is the natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousand EUR (WC02999). EQUITY_LN is the natural logarithm of total sharehold-
er’s equity in thousand EUR (WC03995). EQ_RATIO is total shareholder’s equity divid-
ed by total assets. MKTCAP_LN is the natural logarithm of market capitalization in 
thousand EUR (WC08001). MTB is market capitalization divided by total shareholder’s 
equity. SALES_LN is the natural logarithm of net sales or revenues in thousand EUR 
(WC01001). EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes in thousand EUR (WC18191). 
ROA is earnings before interest and taxes divided by the average of total assets and total 
assets of the previous fiscal year. All non-dummy variables were winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% level. Standard errors for differences in means are provided in braces. */**/*** 
marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 10: Summary statistics of corporate governance of matched pairs in error and post years 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
ENF_REGIME 306 0.915       
EQ_LISTING 318 0.969       
AUD_TEAM_ROTATE 117 0.487       
AUD_FIRM_ROTATE 118 0.331       
BIG4 279 0.513       
BIG5 279 0.613       
AO_UNQUAL 279 0.968       
AO_SUPPL 279 0.136       
AUDIT_TIME 279 85.025 32.358 35 66 79 98 225 
AUD_FEE_TA 269 0.00204 0.00231 0.00004 0.00046 0.00133 0.00256 0.01205 
NAS_AUD_RATIO 275 0.548 0.942 0.000 0.060 0.283 0.534 5.735 
TOT_FEE_TA 269 0.00276 0.00304 0.00008 0.00067 0.00175 0.00365 0.01578 
BOARD_MEET 275 6.302 3.011 3 4 5 7 23 
COMMITTEES 278 1.245 1.582 0 0 0 2 5 
AUDIT_COMM 278 0.410       
BOARD_MEMB 279 5.846 3.923 3 3 6 6 20 
COMP_MEMB_TA 273 0.00034 0.00048 0.00000 0.00005 0.00013 0.00045 0.00242 
VAR_COMP 268 0.493       
N = 332. Varying sample size on the variable level results from missing data. Error year is the fiscal year of an error case. Post year is the first full fiscal year af-
ter the publication of the first error announcement related to an error case. Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published 
until the end of 2014. An error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements and in the consolidated and 
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individual annual management reports. Control cases are firm-years which do not represent error cases in the respective fiscal year. ENF_REGIME is a dummy 
variable for firm-years subject to the enforcement regime. EQ_LISTING is dummy variable for firm-years with a market price at the fiscal-year end (WC05001). 
AUD_TEAM_ROTATE is a dummy variable for firms where all signees of the auditor’s opinion for the post year are different from the signees of the auditor’s 
opinion of the error year. AUD_FIRM_ROTATE is a dummy variable for firms where the audit firm for the post year is different from the audit firm the error 
year. AUD_TEAM_ROTATE and AUD_FIRM_ROTATE are measured in post years only. BIG4 is a dummy variable for firm-years in which Deloitte, EY, 
KPMG, or PWC is the auditor. BIG5 is a dummy variable for firm-years in which BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, or PWC is the auditor. AO_UNQUAL is a dummy 
variable for firm-years with an unqualified auditor’s opinion. AO_SUPPL is a dummy variable for firm-years in which the auditor’s opinion contains supplemen-
tary notes. AUDIT_TIME is the period in days between the fiscal-year end and the date of the respective auditor’s opinion. AUD_FEE_TA are the audit fees 
scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. NAS_AUD_RATIO are the fees for non-audit services charged by the auditor divided by audit fees. 
TOT_FEE_TA is the sum of audit and non-audit services fees scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. BOARD_MEET is the number of meetings of 
the supervisory board. COMMITTEES is number of committees of the supervisory board. AUDIT_COMM is a dummy variable for firm years in which the super-
visory board has an audit committee. BOARD_MEMB is the number of members of the supervisory board. COMP_MEMB_TA is the average compensation of a 
supervisory board member scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. VAR_COMP is a dummy variable for firm-years in which the compensation of su-
pervisory board members has a variable component, regardless of whether the respective criteria (e.g., firm performance, dividend payments) are met. All non-
dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 11: Difference-in-differences analysis of corporate governance of matched pairs (unbalanced sample) 
(A) ENF_REGIME Error years Post years   (D) AUD_FIRM_ROTATE  Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)      (ii)   
 Error cases (a) 
1.000 
(N = 83) 
0.829 
(N = 70) 
–0.171 
(0.043) 
*** 
  
Error 
cases (a)  
0.424 
(N = 59)   
 Control cases (b) 
1.000 
(N = 83) 
0.800 
(N = 70) 
–0.200 
(0.044) 
*** 
  
Control 
cases (b)  
0.237 
(N = 59)   
  (a) – (b) 0.000 (0.041) 
0.029 
(0.045) 
0.029 
(0.061)     (a) – (b)  
0.186 
(0.086)   
             **   
              
(B) EQ_LISTING Error years Post years   (E) BIG4 Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
1.000 
(N = 83) 
0.934 
(N = 76) 
–0.066 
(0.027) 
** 
  
Error 
cases (a) 
0.408 
(N = 76) 
0.429 
(N = 63) 
0.021 
(0.084)   
 Control cases (b) 
1.000 
(N = 83) 
0.934 
(N = 76) 
–0.066 
(0.028) 
** 
  
Control 
cases (b) 
0.620 
(N = 79) 
0.590 
(N = 61) 
–0.030 
(0.084)   
  (a) – (b) 0.000 (0.027) 
0.000 
(0.028) 
0.000 
(0.039)   
  (a) – (b) –0.212 (0.079) 
–0.162 
(0.090) 
0.051 
(0.119)   
            *** *   
              
(C) AUD_TEAM_ROTATE  Post years   (F) BIG5 Error years Post years   
    (ii)      (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a)  
0.552 
(N = 58)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.566 
(N = 76) 
0.587 
(N = 63) 
0.022 
(0.083)   
 Control cases (b)  
0.424 
(N = 59)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.671 
(N = 79) 
0.623 
(N = 61) 
–0.048 
(0.083)   
  (a) – (b)  0.128 (0.092)     (a) – (b) 
–0.105 
(0.079) 
–0.036 
(0.088) 
0.069 
(0.118)   
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(Table 11: continued) 
(G) AO_UNQUAL Error years Post years   (J) AUD_FEE_TA Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
0.921 
(N = 76) 
0.952 
(N = 63) 
0.031 
(0.030)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.00212 
(N = 75) 
0.00242 
(N = 61) 
0.00030 
(0.00040)   
 Control cases (b) 
1.000 
(N = 79) 
1.000 
(N = 61) 
0.000 
(0.030)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.00180 
(N = 76) 
0.00183 
(N = 57) 
0.00004 
(0.00000)   
  (a) – (b) –0.079 (0.028) 
–0.048 
(0.032) 
0.031 
(0.042)     (a) – (b) 
0.00033 
(0.00038) 
0.00059 
(0.00042) 
0.00026 
(0.00057)   
   ***              
              
(H) AO_SUPPL Error years Post years   (K) NAS_AUD_RATIO Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
0.197 
(N = 76) 
0.190 
(N = 63) 
–0.007 
(0.058)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.638 
(N = 75) 
0.422 
(N = 63) 
–0.216 
(0.161)   
 Control cases (b) 
0.114 
(N = 79) 
0.033 
(N = 61) 
–0.081 
(0.058)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.528 
(N = 76) 
0.593 
(N = 61) 
0.065 
(0.162)   
  (a) – (b) 0.083 (0.055) 
0.158 
(0.061) 
0.074 
(0.082)     (a) – (b) 
0.110 
(0.154) 
–0.171 
(0.169) 
–0.281 
(0.229)   
     **            
              
(I) AUDIT_TIME Error years Post years   (L) TOT_FEE_TA Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
95.776 
(N = 76) 
90.492 
(N = 63) 
–5.284 
(5.340)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.00307 
(N = 75) 
0.00295 
(N = 61) 
–0.00012 
(0.00053)   
 Control cases (b) 
78.658 
(N = 79) 
74.230 
(N = 61) 
–4.429 
(5.341)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.00249 
(N = 76) 
0.00250 
(N = 57) 
0.00001 
(0.00100)   
  (a) – (b) 17.118 (5.035) 
16.263 
(5.736) 
–0.856 
(7.553)     (a) – (b) 
0.00058 
(0.00050) 
0.00044 
(0.00056) 
–0.00013 
(0.00075)   
   *** ***            
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(Table 11: continued) 
(M) BOARD_MEET Error years Post years   (P) BOARD_MEMB Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
6.440 
(N = 75) 
6.279 
(N = 61) 
–0.161 
(0.521)    
Error 
cases (a) 
5.066 
(N = 76) 
5.429 
(N = 63) 
0.363 
(0.663)   
 Control cases (b) 
6.000 
(N = 78) 
6.541 
(N = 61) 
0.541 
(0.515)    
Control 
cases (b) 
6.481 
(N = 79) 
6.426 
(N = 61) 
–0.055 
(0.663)   
  (a) – (b) 0.440 (0.488) 
–0.262 
(0.547) 
–0.702 
(0.733)     (a) – (b) 
–1.415 
(0.626) 
–0.998 
(0.705) 
0.418 
(0.938)   
            **     
              
(N) COMMITTEES Error years Post years   (Q) COMP_MEMB_TA Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
0.961 
(N = 76) 
1.143 
(N = 63) 
0.182 
(0.269)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.00029 
(N = 76) 
0.00046 
(N = 61) 
0.00017 
(0.00008) ** 
 Control cases (b) 
1.436 
(N = 78) 
1.459 
(N = 61) 
0.023 
(0.269)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.00029 
(N = 79) 
0.00037 
(N = 57) 
0.00008 
(0.00000)   
  (a) – (b) –0.475 (0.254) 
–0.316 
(0.284) 
0.159 
(0.380)     (a) – (b) 
0.00000 
(0.00008) 
0.00009 
(0.00009) 
0.00009 
(0.00012)   
   *              
              
(O) AUDIT_COMM Error years Post years   (R) VAR_COMP Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
0.329 
(N = 76) 
0.365 
(N = 63) 
0.036 
(0.084)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.425 
(N = 73) 
0.517 
(N = 60) 
0.092 
(0.087)   
 Control cases (b) 
0.474 
(N = 78) 
0.475 
(N = 61) 
0.001 
(0.084)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.560 
(N = 75) 
0.467 
(N = 60) 
–0.093 
(0.087)   
  (a) – (b) –0.145 (0.079) 
–0.110 
(0.089) 
0.035 
(0.118)     (a) – (b) 
–0.135 
(0.082) 
0.050 
(0.092) 
0.185 
(0.123)   
   *              
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(Table 11: continued) 
N = 332. Varying sample size on the variable level results from missing data. Error year is the fiscal year of an error case. Post year is the first full fiscal year after the publica-
tion of the first error announcement related to an error case. Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. An 
error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. 
Control cases are firm-years which do not represent error cases in the respective fiscal year. ENF_REGIME is a dummy variable for firm-years subject to the enforcement 
regime. EQ_LISTING is dummy variable for firm-years with a market price at the fiscal-year end (WC05001). AUD_TEAM_ROTATE is a dummy variable for firms where all 
signees of the auditor’s opinion for the post year are different from the signees of the auditor’s opinion of the error year. AUD_FIRM_ROTATE is a dummy variable for firms 
where the audit firm for the post year is different from the audit firm the error year. AUD_TEAM_ROTATE and AUD_FIRM_ROTATE are measured in post years only. BIG4 
is a dummy variable for firm-years in which Deloitte, EY, KPMG, or PWC is the auditor. BIG5 is a dummy variable for firm-years in which BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, or 
PWC is the auditor. AO_UNQUAL is a dummy variable for firm-years with an unqualified auditor’s opinion. AO_SUPPL is a dummy variable for firm-years in which the 
auditor’s opinion contains supplementary notes. AUDIT_TIME is the period in days between the fiscal-year end and the date of the respective auditor’s opinion. 
AUD_FEE_TA are the audit fees scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. NAS_AUD_RATIO are the fees for non-audit services charged by the auditor divided by 
audit fees. TOT_FEE_TA is the sum of audit and non-audit services fees scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. BOARD_MEET is the number of meetings of the 
supervisory board. COMMITTEES is number of committees of the supervisory board. AUDIT_COMM is a dummy variable for firm years in which the supervisory board has 
an audit committee. BOARD_MEMB is the number of members of the supervisory board. COMP_MEMB_TA is the average compensation of a supervisory board member 
scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. VAR_COMP is a dummy variable for firm-years in which the compensation of supervisory board members has a variable 
component, regardless of whether the respective criteria (e.g., firm performance, dividend payments) are met. Standard errors for differences in means are provided in braces. 
*/**/*** marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 12: Difference-in-differences analysis of corporate governance of matched pairs (balanced sample) 
(A) ENF_REGIME Error years Post years   (D) AUD_FIRM_ROTATE  Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)      (ii)   
 Error cases (a) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
0.935 
(N = 31) 
–0.065 
(0.039)    
Error 
cases (a)  
0.419 
(N = 31)   
 Control cases (b) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
0.968 
(N = 31) 
–0.032 
(0.039)    
Control 
cases (b)  
0.258 
(N = 31)   
  (a) – (b) 0.000 (0.039) 
–0.032 
(0.039) 
–0.032 
(0.055)     (a) – (b)  
0.161 
(0.120)   
                
              
(B) EQ_LISTING Error years Post years   (E) BIG4 Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
0.000 
(0.000)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.419 
(N = 31) 
0.516 
(N = 31) 
0.097 
(0.126)   
 Control cases (b) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
0.000 
(0.000)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.677 
(N = 31) 
0.581 
(N = 31) 
–0.097 
(0.126)   
  (a) – (b) 0.000 (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)     (a) – (b) 
–0.258 
(0.126) 
–0.065 
(0.128) 
0.194 
(0.178)   
            **     
              
(C) AUD_TEAM_ROTATE  Post years   (F) BIG5 Error years Post years   
    (ii)      (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a)  
0.484 
(N = 31)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.516 
(N = 31) 
0.581 
(N = 31) 
0.065 
(0.125)   
 Control cases (b)  
0.387 
(N = 31)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.710 
(N = 31) 
0.581 
(N = 31) 
–0.129 
(0.125)   
  (a) – (b)  0.097 (0.127)     (a) – (b) 
–0.194 
(0.125) 
0.000 
(0.126) 
0.194 
(0.177)   
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(Table 12: continued) 
(G) AO_UNQUAL Error years Post years   (J) AUD_FEE_TA Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
0.935 
(N = 31) 
0.968 
(N = 31) 
0.032 
(0.039)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.00220 
(N = 31) 
0.00255 
(N = 31) 
0.00035 
(0.00064)   
 Control cases (b) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
1.000 
(N = 31) 
0.000 
(0.039)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.00171 
(N = 31) 
0.00177 
(N = 31) 
0.00006 
(0.00100)   
  (a) – (b) –0.065 (0.039) 
–0.032 
(0.039) 
0.032 
(0.055)     (a) – (b) 
0.00049 
(0.00064) 
0.00078 
(0.00064) 
0.00029 
(0.00091)   
                  
              
(H) AO_SUPPL Error years Post years   (K) NAS_AUD_RATIO Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
0.161 
(N = 31) 
0.194 
(N = 31) 
0.032 
(0.080)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.374 
(N = 31) 
0.459 
(N = 31) 
0.084 
(0.173)   
 Control cases (b) 
0.065 
(N = 31) 
0.032 
(N = 31) 
–0.032 
(0.080)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.501 
(N = 31) 
0.529 
(N = 31) 
0.028 
(0.172)   
  (a) – (b) 0.097 (0.080) 
0.161 
(0.08) 
0.065 
(0.113)     (a) – (b) 
–0.127 
(0.173) 
–0.070 
(0.173) 
0.057 
(0.245)   
     **            
              
(I) AUDIT_TIME Error years Post years   (L) TOT_FEE_TA Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
86.355 
(N = 31) 
87.452 
(N = 31) 
1.097 
(8.040)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.00282 
(N = 31) 
0.00308 
(N = 31) 
0.00026 
(0.00077)   
 Control cases (b) 
73.161 
(N = 31) 
74.258 
(N = 31) 
1.097 
(8.007)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.00228 
(N = 31) 
0.00244 
(N = 31) 
0.00015 
(0.00100)   
  (a) – (b) 13.194 (8.040) 
13.194 
(8.096) 
0.000 
(11.370)     (a) – (b) 
0.00053 
(0.00077) 
0.00064 
(0.00077) 
0.00011 
(0.00109)   
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(Table 12: continued) 
(M) BOARD_MEET Error years Post years   (P) BOARD_MEMB Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
6.419 
(N = 31) 
6.419 
(N = 31) 
0.000 
(0.749)    
Error 
cases (a) 
5.903 
(N = 31) 
5.903 
(N = 31) 
0.000 
(1.121)   
 Control cases (b) 
6.097 
(N = 31) 
6.452 
(N = 31) 
0.355 
(0.746)    
Control 
cases (b) 
6.710 
(N = 31) 
6.452 
(N = 31) 
–0.258 
(1.116)   
  (a) – (b) 0.323 (0.749) 
–0.032 
(0.746) 
–0.355 
(1.059)     (a) – (b) 
–0.806 
(1.121) 
–0.548 
(1.119) 
0.258 
(1.585)   
                  
              
(N) COMMITTEES Error years Post years   (Q) COMP_MEMB_TA Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
1.194 
(N = 31) 
1.323 
(N = 31) 
0.129 
(0.416)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.00030 
(N = 31) 
0.00053 
(N = 31) 
0.00023 
(0.00012) * 
 Control cases (b) 
1.742 
(N = 31) 
1.710 
(N = 31) 
–0.032 
(0.414)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.00028 
(N = 31) 
0.00035 
(N = 31) 
0.00007 
(0.00000)   
  (a) – (b) –0.548 (0.416) 
–0.387 
(0.417) 
0.161 
(0.588)     (a) – (b) 
0.00002 
(0.00012) 
0.00018 
(0.00012) 
0.00015 
(0.00018)   
                  
              
(O) AUDIT_COMM Error years Post years   (R) VAR_COMP Error years Post years   
   (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)     (i) (ii) (ii) – (i)  
 Error cases (a) 
0.452 
(N = 31) 
0.419 
(N = 31) 
–0.032 
(0.128)    
Error 
cases (a) 
0.419 
(N = 31) 
0.419 
(N = 31) 
0.000 
(0.128)   
 Control cases (b) 
0.548 
(N = 31) 
0.548 
(N = 31) 
0.000 
(0.128)    
Control 
cases (b) 
0.581 
(N = 31) 
0.484 
(N = 31) 
–0.097 
(0.127)   
  (a) – (b) –0.097 (0.128) 
–0.129 
(0.128) 
–0.032 
(0.181)     (a) – (b) 
–0.161 
(0.128) 
–0.065 
(0.128) 
0.097 
(0.181)   
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(Table 12: continued) 
N = 124. Varying sample size on the variable level results from missing data. Error year is the fiscal year of an error case. Post year is the first full fiscal year after the publica-
tion of the first error announcement related to an error case. Error cases are constructed on firm-year level from all error announcements published until the end of 2014. An 
error case can comprise one or several errors in the consolidated and individual annual financial statements and in the consolidated and individual annual management reports. 
Control cases are firm-years which do not represent error cases in the respective fiscal year. ENF_REGIME is a dummy variable for firm-years subject to the enforcement 
regime. EQ_LISTING is dummy variable for firm-years with a market price at the fiscal-year end (WC05001). AUD_TEAM_ROTATE is a dummy variable for firms where all 
signees of the auditor’s opinion for the post year are different from the signees of the auditor’s opinion of the error year. AUD_FIRM_ROTATE is a dummy variable for firms 
where the audit firm for the post year is different from the audit firm the error year. AUD_TEAM_ROTATE and AUD_FIRM_ROTATE are measured in post years only. BIG4 
is a dummy variable for firm-years in which Deloitte, EY, KPMG, or PWC is the auditor. BIG5 is a dummy variable for firm-years in which BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, or 
PWC is the auditor. AO_UNQUAL is a dummy variable for firm-years with an unqualified auditor’s opinion. AO_SUPPL is a dummy variable for firm-years in which the 
auditor’s opinion contains supplementary notes. AUDIT_TIME is the period in days between the fiscal-year end and the date of the respective auditor’s opinion. 
AUD_FEE_TA are the audit fees scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. NAS_AUD_RATIO are the fees for non-audit services charged by the auditor divided by 
audit fees. TOT_FEE_TA is the sum of audit and non-audit services fees scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. BOARD_MEET is the number of meetings of the 
supervisory board. COMMITTEES is number of committees of the supervisory board. AUDIT_COMM is a dummy variable for firm years in which the supervisory board has 
an audit committee. BOARD_MEMB is the number of members of the supervisory board. COMP_MEMB_TA is the average compensation of a supervisory board member 
scaled by the average total assets of the fiscal year. VAR_COMP is a dummy variable for firm-years in which the compensation of supervisory board members has a variable 
component, regardless of whether the respective criteria (e.g., firm performance, dividend payments) are met. Standard errors for differences in means are provided in braces. 
*/**/*** marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Monitoring by Individual Investors 
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Abstract 
This study uses large-scale survey evidence from German individual investors to explore the 
determinants of their monitoring behavior. We expect that individual shareholders either trust 
the monitoring by other stakeholders or that they engage in monitoring activities themselves. 
First, we document that a significant share of German individual investors lacks trust in their 
fellow stakeholders and that the level of trust is only marginally affected by demographic 
characteristics. Second, we study two aspects of monitoring, acquisition of financial reporting 
information and voting activity, and show that less trusting investors engage in less monitor-
ing. Using structural equation modeling, we document that the main mechanism for this find-
ing is that non-trusting investors tend to have less exposure to the stock market and that expo-
sure is positively related to monitoring activities. Finally, we provide robust evidence that an 
educational background in economics or business has a positive impact on trust, stock market 
exposure, and monitoring activities. Hence, improving the financial knowledge of individual 
investors might increase trust, monitoring activities, and stock market participation. 
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1 Introduction 
Individual investors matter. While the share of U.S. direct stock ownership declined from 
above 40% in the 1980s to about 20 % in 2007 (French 2008), the category “Corporate Equi-
ties held by the Household Sector” hovers fairly constantly around 37% of all equities since 
2008 (Federal Reserve Bank, Report Z.1, Table L.213, as of March 12, 2015). In total 
amounts, at the end of 2014, households and nonprofit firms held publicly traded equity with 
a market value of around 13.3 trillion US$.18 This is clearly a sizable fraction of the U.S. eq-
uity market. 
Prior literature documents on the one hand that at least some individual investors tend to 
make inefficient portfolio allocations (French 2008; Barber and Odean 2013) and information 
acquisition decisions (Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos, and Meyer 2012). On the other 
hand, individual investors are important providers of liquidity (Kaniel, Saar, and Titman 
2008) and in some cases even help to impound information into price (Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and 
Titman 2012). Finally, since portfolio theory suggests that investors should distribute their 
wealth across different asset classes, individual investors withdrawing from equity markets 
give rise to the so-called “stock market participation puzzle” and might impose a general 
threat to their wealth and thus, ultimately, general welfare (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2004). 
Research in markets and financial intermediation also documents the importance of trust in 
fostering private investment in equity markets (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008; Gennaio-
li, Shleifer, and Vishny 2015). 
While trust is one mechanism to address information asymmetries in markets, monitoring 
is another. This study uses large-scale survey evidence from German individual investors to 
explore the determinants of their monitoring behavior. Prior research on the monitoring role 
                                                     
18  As discussed in detail by French (2008: 1562–1563), the statistic reported by the Federal Reserve Bank also 
includes preferred stock and closely held corporations. Since French (2008) tries to identify these compo-
nents for his study, the data presented by him are not directly comparable to the original data of the Federal 
Reserve Bank. 
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of investors has focused almost exclusively on institutional investors (Chen, Harford, and Li 
2007; Ferreira and Matos 2008). Given the limited stake and amount of time that individual 
investors have at their disposal, this focus on institutional investors is in line with theory 
(Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Assuming that individual investors 
more or less rationally choose to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of institutional investors, 
one would assume that they provide little effort in monitoring and instead trust their more 
experienced institutional counterparts to discipline management. However, based on our data, 
we find that a significant portion of the investors in our sample is not trusting. Instead, they 
state that they perceive a high risk that other stakeholder groups (management, majority 
shareholders, other large investors, financial intermediaries) are betraying their wealth posi-
tion. This finding opens up an interesting array of questions: Are these non-trusting investors 
more or less engaged monitors? Do they have more or less exposure to the stock market? 
Does better education affect this risk assessment?  
Using 11,260 responses from a large-scale survey of German individual shareholders in-
vested in Deutsche Post, we are able to address these questions. We find that “untrusting” 
investors are less active monitors. We study two different aspects of monitoring. The first is 
the intensity of financial accounting information acquisition. The second is the likelihood to 
vote on an annual meeting. Investors that assess agency risks to be higher are both, less likely 
to acquire financial accounting information and less likely to vote. 
In order to understand the mechanics behind this striking correlation, we use structural 
equation modeling to explore the links between educational background, stock market expo-
sure, trust and monitoring activity. In line with prior literature, we expect trust to influence the 
level of stock market exposure positively. Also, based on the theoretical argument that trust 
and monitoring should act as substitutes, we predict trust to be negatively related to monitor-
ing activity. Since they should face lower information processing costs, we expect individual 
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investors with an educational background in economics or business to have higher stock mar-
ket exposure and to engage in more monitoring. We also allow for a direct link of the educa-
tional background on trust. A priori, this link could be positive or negative. If a lack of trust is 
based on informed beliefs, than investors with lower information processing cost should be 
less trusting. If lack of trust is instead related more to insecurity, fear and prejudices than to 
information, better-informed investors should exhibit higher levels of trust. Finally, we expect 
that investors with higher stock market exposure engage in more monitoring. 
Our data is consistent with better-educated investors having higher levels of stock market 
exposure, trust and monitoring activities. In addition, as predicted, investors with higher stock 
market exposure engage more in monitoring activities. Lower levels of trust trigger lower 
exposure to the stock market but have no direct effect on monitoring activities. In an addition-
al analysis based on Deutsche Post affiliates we document that for these investors—who we 
consider to participate in the stock market for reasons that are exogenous to our analyses—
trust has a positive impact on financial reporting information acquisition. Taken together, our 
findings are consistent with, if anything, trust having a positive impact on monitoring activi-
ties. The observed low level of trust in our data seems to be partly due to a lack of financial 
background and is inconsistent with it being driven by informed critical individual investors. 
We contribute to the literature by exploring the monitoring behavior of individual inves-
tors. Existing knowledge on this issue is limited on specific activities like attendance of annu-
al meetings (Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner 1996; de Jong, Mertens, and Roosenboom 2006; 
Carrington and Johed 2007; Harris 2010) and the use and assessment of financial reporting 
information (Elliott, Hodge, and Jackson 2008; Lawrence 2013; Cascino, Clatworthy, García 
Osma, Gassen, Imam, and Jeanjean 2014 for a more comprehensive review). In general, little 
is known about the determinants of monitoring by individual investors. In addition, we con-
tribute to the behavioral finance literature by exploring the determinants and consequences of 
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trust, a concept that recent literature has argued to be an important component of financial 
decision making of individual investors (Fehr 2009; Guiso et al. 2008; Gennaioli et al. 2015). 
In particular, we verify and complement the findings of Guiso et al. (2008) by providing evi-
dence that the level of trust by German individual investors is important for their stock market 
participation decision. We extent their findings by showing that individual investors with 
higher levels of economic education tend to show higher levels of trust towards other finan-
cial market participants. Also, we document that there is a positive association between trust 
and monitoring activities that seems to be driven by the educational background in economics 
or business and the stock market participation decision. 
Our findings should also be relevant to regulators since they help to understand a group 
of investors that is most likely less willing to invest in the stock market. Understanding the 
mindset of these investors should help to address their concerns. This is a relevant issue from 
a welfare perspective since individual investors generally benefit from being able to diversify 
their wealth across different asset classes. This requires them to be either trusting or monitor-
ing. Our results, that remain exploratory due to inherent data limitations, are consistent with 
investors showing a lack of trust and with investor education positively influencing trust, 
stock market participation and monitoring activities. 
2 Background 
As discussed in the introduction, individual investors hold a sizable portion of the organized 
equity market, either directly or indirectly via funds. However, prior literature generally finds 
that individual investors hold suboptimal portfolios and thus realize suboptimal returns since 
they tend to be under-diversified (Dorn and Hubermann 2005), fail to incorporate new infor-
mation (Bhattacharya et al. 2012) and are subject to behavioral biases (Barber and Odean 
2008; for an early overview on the behavior of individual investors see de Bondt 1998). While 
some research also identifies settings where individual investors seem capable to trade on 
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private information (Kaniel et al. 2012), this generally supports the notion that individual in-
vestors fail to incorporate all available information when making investment decisions. 
Another reason for this finding is that a sizable portion of individual investors can be re-
garded as (partly) financially illiterate. Financially literacy is significantly associated with the 
amount of education that investors received (van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011). Given 
that effects of financial literacy on financial behavior are generally evaluated to be larger 
when financial literacy is assessed rather than administered through an experiment (Fer-
nandes, Lynch Jr., and Netemeyer 2014), it remains an open issue whether financial literacy is 
itself causal for financial behavior or whether more fundamental skills like intelligence and 
numeracy drive the differences in financial decision making. 
Another influential determinant of stock market participation is trust (Guiso et al. 2008). 
While definitions of trust vary throughout the literature, in principal trust can be defined as a 
behavior or as a belief (Fehr 2009). The former can only be measured by experimental game 
setups like the gift exchange game. The latter is assessable via survey questions. In a study 
based on Dutch and Italian survey data, Guiso et al. (2008) provide evidence that trusting in-
vestors are more likely to invest in the stock market, are relatively more diversified and hold 
larger portfolios. They also provide evidence that the influence of trust seems to be different 
from the effects of risk aversion and ambiguity. While our results confirm the findings of 
Guiso et al. (2008) for a large sample of German investors, we are also able to explore another 
important aspect of financial behavior: the monitoring activities of individual investors. Prior 
literature (Ferrin, Bligh, and Kohles 2007; Fehr 2009) predicts that monitoring and trust 
should be substitutes. Based on this we would expect less-trusting investors to be more en-
gaged in monitoring activities. If, however, untrusting investors are also not confident that 
they can efficiently monitor their investment, then we would expect the opposite. 
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With respect to the monitoring activities of individual investors, we first briefly review 
the literature on information acquisition. Prior evidence documents that individual investors 
generally prefer filtered verbal information to quantitative non-filtered financial data (Elliott 
et al.  2008). While the overall literature on the effect of information usage on trading perfor-
mance is mixed, recent studies indicate that returns are better when the information is easier 
to read and process (Lawrence 2013). Experimental evidence also supports that more readable 
disclosures lead to stronger reactions from individual investors (Rennekamp, JAR 2012). In 
general, research shows that more experienced investors focus more on opaque firms and rely 
more on quantitative data relative to less experienced individual investors (Lawrence 2013).  
Turning to the voting behavior of investors, almost the entire literature focuses on coor-
dinated activities by institutional investors or groups of shareholder activists.19 Smith (1996) 
documents firms that were attacked by the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS) to engage in governance changes and to experience positive market reactions but 
no change in operating performance. Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) find little evi-
dence that shareholder proposals have a clear effect on firm value. Gillan and Starks (2000) 
document that the nature of the shareholder putting forth the proposal matters for the likeli-
hood of success and—measured by market reaction—institutional investors and coordinated 
institutional investors are most likely to succeed. In line with this, Strickland, Wiles, and Zen-
ner (1996) study activities of the United Shareholder Association over the period 1986 to 
1993 to show that coordinated monitoring activity by small shareholders can positively affect 
shareholder value. For individual proposals by small Japanese shareholders however, Yeh 
(2014) shows no significant market reaction, indicating that these proposals seem to fail to 
affect firm value. Finally, Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) provide evidence that “just 
say no” campaigns around elections can induce boards to take action in the interest of share-
                                                     
19 Due to the richness of the according literature, this review is superficial and focuses on individual investors. 
For a more detailed and balanced picture, refer to Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011). 
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holders. Taken together, prior evidence provides little support for shareholder activism of 
individual investors to have a direct effect on corporate governance and firm value. However, 
it also hints at voting being a mechanism to express concerns about managerial behavior.  
Summing up the findings of this section, we expect the monitoring behavior of individual 
investors to be influenced by their (lack of) resources and educational background, by their 
level of trust and by their demand for information as well as by their incentives to express 
their views about firm behavior. 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data and sample development 
To explore the monitoring behavior of individual investors, we use survey data from 
Ernst, Gassen, and Pellens (2009), a large-scale descriptive study of information needs, divi-
dend preferences and voting behavior of German equity investors. For our study, we focus on 
the data about individual investors only. Since it is not possible to identify the basic popula-
tion of all German individual investors, Ernst et al. (2009) conducted their survey in coopera-
tion with Deutsche Post, a German blue chip from the logistics industry with registered 
stocks. On December 14, 2007 the survey questionnaire was sent by the CFO of Deutsche 
Post to all its 465,321 shareholders who were natural persons with residence in Germany. In 
line with that, we define individual investors as those who buy stocks using their personal 
name and not a legal name. The survey period ended on January 22, 2008. By then, 44,321 
questionnaires or 9.5% had been returned. The CFO of Deutsche Post had emphasized in a 
cover letter to the individual investors that the survey was not concerned with the stocks of 
Deutsche Post in particular but with stock market investments in general. 
For our study, we exclude all questionnaires with missing answers on demographic items 
used in our analysis (7,924). In the next step, we identify erroneous answers on any relevant 
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item and exclude these questionnaires, as well (521). Questionnaires of investors who stated 
that they had delegated their investment decisions to other persons (2,165) and of investors 
aged less than 18 years (30) are removed from the sample. Furthermore, all questionnaires of 
investors who are current or former employees of Deutsche Post are excluded because their 
response pattern might be biased due to their personal ties to the company that sent the ques-
tionnaires (4,005). Finally, we exclude all questionnaires with missing answers on any agency 
risk or monitoring item used in our study (18,416). This yields a final sample of 11,260 ques-
tionnaires for our main analysis. Table 1 summarizes the sample development. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Individual investors were asked to provide local identifiers indicating their area of resi-
dence. We connect these identifiers with the current 402 administrative districts of Germany 
(NUTS 3 regions: Landkreise and kreisfreie Städte). Thus, we are able to include economic 
and cultural attributes for each individual investor’s district of residence into our analysis. All 
district-level data is obtained from Regionaldatenbank Deutschland, a joint database of the 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany and the statistical offices of the federated states of 
Germany. 
3.2 Trust in stakeholders 
Our measure of trust in stakeholders is based on a question concerning the betrayal risk 
perceived by individual investors: How high do you rate the probability of betrayal by the 
following parties, negatively affecting your wealth position?20 With respect to four different 
stakeholder groups, the probability could be rated as very low, low, moderate, high, or very 
high. Table 2 provides the response pattern for the questionnaire items. On average, the high-
                                                     
20  Original question in German: Wie groß schätzen Sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass sich folgende 
Parteien auf Ihre Kosten bereichern? 
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est betrayal risk is perceived to arise from the management, followed by the majority share-
holder and by financial intermediaries. Other large investors occupy the last rank. 
We conduct a principal component analysis in order to evaluate potential redundancy be-
tween the four questionnaire items because they might represent a common construct of trust. 
For the analysis, we use ones as prior communality estimates and the principal axis method to 
extract the components. Only the first principal component displays an eigenvalue greater 
than one. In line with that, a scree test suggests that only the first component is meaningful, 
which accounts for 55.1% of the total variance in the response pattern. Since only one com-
ponent is retained, a rotation is neither necessary nor feasible. With respect to the unrotated 
factor pattern, an item is said to load on the component if the factor loading is 0.4 or greater 
(Stevens 1992), which is the case for each stakeholder group. Thus, we interpret the first 
component as a comprehensive measure for trust. Since we are interested in trust rather than 
betrayal risk, we multiply the first component with –1 and label it TRUST, representing the 
trust in stakeholders by individual investors. The principal component analysis is summarized 
in Appendix B. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Next, we examine potential associations between trust and demographic characteristics of 
the individual investors in our final sample. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of the varia-
bles. As a result of the principle component analysis, TRUST is standardized with a mean of 
zero and a variance of one. 89.9% of our sample are men (MALE). On average, the individual 
investors are 54 years old (AGE). For the subsequent univariate and multivariate analyses, we 
use the natural logarithm of AGE. 37.6% have completed vocational training or academic ed-
ucation in economics or business (ECON). The level of general education is represented by 
EDU. 56.2% completed academic education and further 4.7% had academic education with-
out obtaining a degree; 38.9% hold different types of high school degrees and 0.2% do not 
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have a high school degree. ECON_EDU is the interaction of ECON and EDU, indicating the 
level of general education conditional on having vocational training or academic education in 
economics or business. HOUSING represents the housing situation. 64.3% live in their own 
house and 12.1% in a condominium; the remaining either have rented a house or apartment 
(21.8%) or live at their parent’s residence (1.9%). 
Based on the districts of residence, we construct several variables for the economic and 
cultural environment of the individual investors. PRODUCTIVITY measures the gross domes-
tic product in Euro of a district for 2007 divided by the persons in employment. For the sub-
sequent univariate and multivariate analyses, we use the natural logarithm of PRODUCTIVI-
TY. UNEMPLOYMENT is the average unemployment rate of a district for 2007. FOREIGN-
ERS is the share of inhabitants of a district without German citizenship. TURNOUT is the 
voters turnout in a district for the federal elections of 2005. CONSERVATIVE is the share of 
votes for the five major German political parties that was collected by the Christian Demo-
crats (CDU/CSU) or the Liberals (FDP) in the federal elections of 2005 in a district. PARISH-
IONERS is the share of inhabitants of a district who are members of the Roman Catholic 
Church or the Evangelical Church in Germany based on the 2011 census. Both churches are 
organized as corporations under German public law and represent the two major religious 
denominations in Germany. CATHOLICS is the number of members of the Roman Catholic 
Church divided by all members of the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in 
Germany in a district based on the 2011 census. EAST_GERMANY is a dummy variable for 
individual investors who reside in the former German Democratic Republic including the 
whole of Berlin (12.4%). 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 provides Pearson and Spearman correlations for trust and the demographic char-
acteristics. With respect to the personal attributes, TRUST is significantly positively correlated 
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with MALE, ECON and ECON_EDU; significant negative correlations exist with LN_AGE 
and with HOUSING. Figure 1 shows the average value of TRUST by six age classes. The 
youngest seem to be the most trusting investors while the least trusting ones are not the eldest 
but the group of the 55–64 year-old investors. Figure 2 depicts the average value of TRUST 
by the four levels of ECON_EDU. While TRUST is below the sample mean for investors 
without any educational background in economics or business, it is well above the sample 
mean for investors with such a background regardless of their level of general education. 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
For a deeper understanding of potential determinants of TRUST, we provide a regression 
analysis in Table 5. While the first three models regress the independent variables on TRUST 
using OLS, the fourth models estimates the probability of having a TRUST level greater than 
or equal to the sample median using a logit approach. Since Figure 1 suggests a non-linear 
relation between TRUST and age, we include the respective age classes as fixed effects in all 
regression models. The district-level variables for the economic and cultural environment are 
added in the second model. Instead of these variables, district fixed effects are included in the 
third and fourth model. MALE and ECON are significantly positive in all models. Results for 
age classes are mixed, however, the 40–54 years class and the 55–64 years class are negative-
ly significant across all models. With respect to the district-level variables defined above, only 
LN_PRODUCTIVITY and EAST_GERMANY are (positively) significant. It is noteworthy that 
the R² (adjusted or Nagelkerke) of the regression models ranges between 0.005 and 0.018 for 
the OLS models and equals 0.061 for the logit model. Thus, the demographic characteristics 
available can explain TRUST to a limited extent only. 
[Table 5 about here] 
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3.3 Monitoring behavior 
Financial accounting information acquisition 
Individual investors were asked to assess the relevance of seven different information 
sources for making their investment decisions. (i.e., buying and selling stocks).21 The rele-
vance could be rated as very low, low, moderate, high, or very high. Table 6 summarizes the 
response pattern. On average, the most relevant information source for individual investors is 
the media (i.e., newspapers, magazines, and business programs on television or the internet), 
followed by the annual report (including the financial statements). The other information 
sources in decreasing order of relevance are: advisory by banks and brokers, the interim re-
port, investor relation releases, the company website, and the social circle (i.e., family and 
friends). 
[Table 6 about here] 
In Table 7, we present a subsample analysis of the average relevance of information 
sources for investment decisions by TRUST. For the five most important information sources, 
the assessed relevance is significantly greater in the high-trust subsample (TRUST ≥ median). 
No significant difference is documented for the company website, while the social circle is the 
only information source with a significantly greater relevance in the low-trust subsample. 
Thus, individual investors with high trust tend to assess most information sources as more 
relevant, regardless of whether these are provided by the investment targets itself or by third 
parties. The ranking of the information sources does not differ between the subsamples. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Next, we focus on the annual report as the most relevant information source that is pro-
vided by an investment target. Individual investors were asked how intensively they use 
                                                     
21  Original question in German: Welche Informationsquellen nutzen Sie für Ihre Aktienkauf- oder  
-verkaufsentscheidungen und wie beurteilen Sie diese [hinsichtlich ihrer Bedeutung]? 
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twelve individual components of the annual report.22 The intensity could be rated as very low, 
low, moderate, high, or very high. Table 8 summarizes the response pattern. On average, the 
three most intensively used components are the income statement, the balance sheet, and the 
management report, while the least intensively used components are the notes and the audi-
tor’s opinion. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Table 9 provides the subsample analysis of the intensity of use of the annual report com-
ponents by TRUST. For nine of the twelve components, the intensity of use is significantly 
greater in the high-trust subsample (TRUST ≥ median). No significant differences are docu-
mented for the statement of changes in equity and for the auditor’s opinion. The remuneration 
report is the only component for which the intensity of use is significantly greater in the low-
trust subsample. For five components, their rank differs between the subsamples. 
[Table 9 about here] 
Since we are especially interested in the acquisition of financial accounting information, 
we conduct a principal component analysis of the eight annual report components which are 
part of the financial statements: the income statement, the balance sheet, the management re-
port, the statement of changes in equity, the cash flow statement, the segment reporting, the 
auditor’s opinion, and the notes. Thus, we evaluate potential redundancy between the respec-
tive items because the might represent a common construct. For the analysis, we use ones as 
prior communality estimates and the principal axis method to extract the components. Only 
the first principal component displays an eigenvalue greater than 1. In line with that, a scree 
test suggests that only the first principal component is meaningful, which accounts for 62.3% 
of the total variance in the response pattern. Since only one principal component is retained, a 
rotation is neither necessary nor feasible. With respect to the unrotated factor pattern, an item 
                                                     
22  Original question in German: Wie intensiv nutzen Sie die einzelnen Teile des Geschäftsberichts? 
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is said to load on the principal component if the factor loading is 0.4 or greater (Stevens 
1992), which is the case for all items. Thus we label the first principal component FINACC 
and interpret it as the intensity of financial accounting information acquisition by individual 
investors. The principal component analysis in summarized in Appendix C. 
Exercise of shareholder voting rights 
Our second proxy for monitoring behavior is based on a questionnaire item where indi-
vidual investors had to indicate the extent of their past or intended exercise of shareholder 
voting rights.23 Potential answers were (1) having never voted and no intention to do so, (2) 
having never voted but intending to delegate the voting right to a proxy for the next annual 
meeting, (3) having never voted but intending to visit the next annual meeting, (4) having 
voted by delegation to a proxy, and (5) having voted personally at an annual meeting. We 
construct a simple variable bound by zero and one to represent these five potential answers 
and label it VOTING. 
Monitoring behavior and investor characteristics 
We examine potential associations between the monitoring behavior of individual inves-
tors, their trust in stakeholders, and other personal characteristics. Table 10 provides the vari-
able distribution. As a result of the principle component analysis, FINACC and TRUST are 
standardized with means of zero and variances of one. With respect to VOTING, 66.5% have 
exercised their voting rights already, either personally or by delegation to a proxy. 13.8% in-
tend to visit the next annual meeting or to authorize a proxy while the remaining 19.7% have 
neither voted in the past nor intend to do so with respect to the next annual meeting. We use 
the interaction term ECON_EDU, i.e., the level of general education conditional on having 
vocational training or academic education in economics or business, in the subsequent anal-
                                                     
23  Original question in German: Als Aktionär haben Sie ein Stimmrecht. Haben Sie dies im Rahmen 
einer Hauptversammlung (HV) bereits in Anspruch genommen oder planen Sie eine 
Inanspruchnahme? 
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yses as an inverse proxy for the costs of monitoring. The variables %STOCKS, #FIRMS, and 
HORIZON are introduced in order to proxy for the stock market exposure of individual inves-
tors and thus to represent the benefits of monitoring. %STOCKS is the share of wealth—
excluding the own residence—that is invested in stocks except mutual funds. The average 
individual investor has 29.8% of his wealth invested in stocks and 14.9% of the investors 
have invested more than half of their wealth in stocks. #FIRMS is the number of firms of 
which stocks are held. On average, stocks of eleven different firms are held by an individual 
investor. 3.8% hold stocks of more than 30 different firms. HORIZON represents the invest-
ment horizon. 76.2% state that they are interested in the long-term formation of wealth, 20.0% 
seek regular income from dividends or trading and 3.8% focus on short-term gains. The re-
maining four variables are controls that we do not assume to represent costs or benefits of 
monitoring. MALE, AGE, and HOUSING were introduced above, already. YEARS represents 
the number of years having been invested in stocks except mutual funds. On average, this 
period amounts to 17.6 years. For the subsequent univariate and multivariate analyses, we use 
the natural logarithm of one plus YEARS. 
[Table 10 about here] 
Table 11 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations for monitoring proxies and investor 
characteristics. FINACC and VOTING are significantly positively correlated with TRUST and 
with most of the controls. HORIZON is significantly negatively correlated with both monitor-
ing proxies while the Spearman correlation between VOTING and HOUSING is insignificant. 
As an example, Figure 3 depicts the average levels of TRUST by the different response levels 
for the intensity of use of the income statement, which is the most intensively used component 
of FINACC. Figure 4 presents the average levels of TRUST by the different response levels 
for VOTING. 
[Table 11 about here] 
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[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
In order to examine potential associations between the monitoring proxies and investor 
characteristics in more depth, we conduct several regression analysis in Table 12. We use 
OLS regressions for the continuous dependent variable FINACC. In the first model, TRUST 
and the controls which we interpret as proxies for costs and benefits of monitoring are used as 
independent variables. All of them are significantly positively associated with FINACC, ex-
cept HORIZON, for which we document a significant negative association. The results remain 
stable when we add the remaining controls in the second model. The only exemption is 
HORIZON, which turns insignificant. We get similar results when examining the voting be-
havior. However, since VOTING is not continuous but consists of five response levels, we use 
logit regressions in that case. 
[Table 12 about here] 
3.4 Structural equation modeling 
Intuitively, we would expect that trusting investors engage in less monitoring. In contrast, 
we documented positive associations between trust in stakeholders and our two monitoring 
proxies: financial accounting information acquisition and the exercise of shareholder voting 
rights. In the following, we use structural equation modeling to examine potential mecha-
nisms driving these associations. Especially, the positive relation between trust and monitor-
ing might partly be due to backdoor effects via investor characteristics that are associated with 
both concepts. Our proposed structural equation model to be tested is summarized in Figure 5. 
First, we model a direct effect of trust on monitoring, and we expect it to be negative. Trust is 
a latent construct measured inversely by the respective four questionnaire items for agency 
risk perception as reflective indicator variables (omitted in the figure). Monitoring is either a 
latent construct for financial accounting information acquisition or the variable VOTING. 
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Second, we use ECON_EDU as an inverse proxy for the costs of monitoring and thus, we 
expect it to have a positive effect on monitoring. The extent of trust in stakeholders might 
depend on the acquired knowledge about economic activities and interrelations. Therefore, we 
allow ECON_EDU to have an effect on trust, as well. However, we do not have an expecta-
tion for the respective sign. Third, we introduce stock market exposure, a latent construct to 
represent the benefits of monitoring. The variables %STOCKS, #FIRMS and HORIZON are 
used as reflective indicator variables for stock market exposure (omitted in the figure). Higher 
levels of %STOCKS should increase the stake at risk, and higher levels of #FIRMS or HORI-
ZON should increase the accumulated probability that stakeholders negatively affect an indi-
vidual investor’s wealth position. We expect investors with a greater stock market exposure to 
engage more in monitoring. Furthermore, investors with low levels of trust are expected to 
rather shun the stock market and thus to have lower stock market exposure. This would imply 
a positive effect of trust on stock market exposure. Finally, we expect investors with high lev-
els of ECON_EDU to have a greater stock market exposure. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
We use maximum-likelihood estimation for the structural equation modeling. For each la-
tent construct in the model, the path to one of its indicator variables is fixed to one in order to 
scale the latent construct. The degrees of freedom are greater than zero for each model esti-
mated, thus satisfying the t rule as necessary condition for the identification of a model (Bol-
len 1989). All estimated covariance matrices are positively definite and no negative variances 
are encountered during the estimations. We present standardized solutions in which the vari-
ances of independent variables are fixed to one and parameter values are bound by zero and 
one. To assess the fit of our model estimations, i.e., how well a model estimation is able to 
replicate the covariance matrix of the data, we use (1) the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index 
(AGFI), (2) the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and (3) the Root Mean Square Error of Approx-
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imation (RMSEA). Typically, AGFI and CFI greater than or equal to 0.90 (0.95) are consid-
ered as a reasonable (good) fit (Lei and Wu 2007), and a RMSEA less than or equal to 0.08 
(0.05) is considered as a reasonable (good) fit (MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara 1996). 
Additionally, we provide the Chi² values for the null hypothesis that the covariance matrix of 
the data equals the covariance matrix implied by the model. However, it is not uncommon that 
for large samples this hypothesis is rejected although the model might fit the data well. 
Figure 6 presents the modeling solution with financial accounting information acquisition 
as monitoring proxy. This latent construct is measured by the eight questionnaire items for the 
intensity of use of financial statements components as reflective indicator variables (omitted 
in the figure). The direct effect of trust on financial accounting information acquisition is in-
significant. All remaining parameters are significant and show the expected sign. The effect of 
ECON_EDU on trust is positive. Of the indicator variables, HORIZON is the only one with an 
insignificant parameter. The fit measures indicate a reasonable fit. Taken together, the solu-
tion suggests that the positive association between trust and financial accounting information 
acquisition we have documented is a joint effect of three mechanisms. First, individual inves-
tors with an educational background in economics or business tend to be more trusting and to 
engage more in information acquisition. Second, these investors tend to have greater stock 
market exposure which tends to result in more information acquisition, as well. Third, more 
trusting investors tend to have greater stock market exposure in general and thus tend to en-
gage more in information acquisition. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
Figure 7 provides the modeling solution with VOTING as monitoring proxy. In terms of 
parameter signs and significance levels, it is in line with the previous solution for financial 
accounting information acquisition. AGFI and CFI suggest a good fit while RMSEA is close 
to the good-fit threshold. The same mechanisms suggested above seem to jointly explain the 
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overall positive association between trust and the exercise of shareholder voting rights we 
have documented. Again, the solution suggests no direct effect of trust on monitoring. 
 [Figure 7 about here] 
Table 13 presents a summary of the fit measures for the two modeling solutions presented 
above. Our final sample consists of questionnaires only which provide a full set of answers on 
all monitoring items used throughout this paper. As a robustness check, we re-estimate our 
proposed model using relaxed samples allowing monitoring items to be missing if not re-
quired for the respective modeling solution. Thus, our sample size increases by 68.6% for the 
solution regarding financial accounting information acquisition and by 129.6% for the solu-
tion regarding VOTING. The respective fit measures are presented in Table 13, as well, and 
are in line with the fit measures of the solutions based on the final sample. However, when 
using relaxed samples, the parameter for the direct effect of trust on monitoring is significant 
in both cases. Since the signs are—against expectation—positive, this might hint at the exist-
ence of additional mechanisms connecting trust and monitoring. 
[Table 13 about here] 
 
3.5 Monitoring behavior by Deutsche Post affiliates 
For the final sample examined above, all current or former employees of Deutsche Post 
were excluded because their response pattern might be biased due to their personal ties to the 
company that sent the questionnaires. Furthermore, Deutsche Post affiliates are highly likely 
to have been provided with Deutsche Post stocks as part of an employee compensation pack-
age. Thus, their stock holdings are—at least to some extent—not based on independent in-
vestment decisions.  
While this generally is undesirable for our main analyses, the sample of Deutsche Post af-
filiates allows us to explore a sample where the stock market participation decision is likely to 
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be more exogenous with respect to our main variables of interest. This enables us to explore 
the effect of trust and our other independent variables on monitoring activities in a setting 
where omitted variables explaining the stock market participation decision are less likely to 
bias our inferences. 
We construct a sample of all Deutsche Post affiliates who are invested in one firm only. 
By survey design, this investment is Deutsche Post. Besides, we apply the same data re-
strictions as for the final sample, which yields us a sample of 180 individuals. Table 14 pro-
vides a comparison of trust, monitoring, and controls between the final sample and Deutsche 
Post affiliates with one investment only. On average, there is no significant difference for 
TRUST and FINACC. With respect to voting, Deutsche Post affiliates are less likely to exer-
cise their shareholder voting rights at the annual meeting of Deutsche Post. In terms of de-
mographics, Deutsche Post affiliates are less educated, have a smaller portion of their wealth 
invested into the stock market, a shorter investment horizon, less years of investment experi-
ence, are more likely to be female, younger and less wealthy situated in terms of housing. In 
other words and in line with our expectations, they are atypical investors. 
[Table 14 about here] 
Table 15 presents regression analyses of TRUST, FINACC, and VOTING for Deutsche 
Post affiliates with one investment only. With respect to trust in stakeholders, only MALE is 
significant. Financial accounting information acquisition is significantly associated with 
TRUST, but there is neither a significant association with ECON_EDU nor with %STOCKS. 
With respect to VOTING, the only significant associations exist with ECON_EDU and with 
younger investors, who have a lower levels of VOTING. While the small sample size is signif-
icantly reducing the power of our tests, we take special interest in the positive and significant 
coefficient of TRUST on FINACC. This is consistent with trust having a positive impact on 
monitoring, even in a setting where the mechanism via the stock market participation decision 
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can be assumed to be less important. We conclude from this additional analysis, that, if any-
thing, trust has a positive impact on monitoring activities, in particular with respect to the in-
formation acquisition decision. 
[Table 15 about here] 
4 Conclusion 
We document that the monitoring behavior of German individual investors is predomi-
nantly influenced by their educational background in economics or business and their level of 
stock market participation. Our investors show a surprisingly low level of trust. This low level 
of trust seems to be influenced by a lacking educational background in economics or business 
and is associated, in line with prior literature, with lower levels of stock market participation. 
Opposite to what might be expected, after controlling for these factors in a structural equation 
model, there is no direct link between trust and monitoring behavior. For a sub-sample of in-
vestors for which the stock market participation decision tends to be more exogenous 
(Deutsche Post affiliates), we document a positive association of trust and monitoring. 
 Based on these findings, which we consider to be exploratory due to inherent design lim-
itations, we cautiously conclude that, if anything, trust is positively related to monitoring. 
This indicates that a lack of trust is not triggering monitoring activities. Thus, monitoring as a 
potential mechanism to mitigate trust problems is not observable in our data. Instead, untrust-
ing individual investors tend to vote with their feet. Since trust is also suspected to be an im-
portant piece of the stock market participation puzzle, this result is also relevant for regulators 
interested in increasing the level of stock market participation for individual investors. Our 
findings are consistent with increasing trust in capital market participants potentially leading 
to more and also more active individual investors. Based on our findings, a main means to 
increase trust, stock market participation and monitoring activities by individual investors 
might be to increase their financial knowledge via education. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
#FIRMS Number of firms of which stocks are held 
%STOCKS Share of wealth (excluding own residence) that is invested in stocks except mutual funds 
AGE Age 
CATHOLICS 
Number of members of the Roman Catholic Church divided by all mem-
bers of the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in Germa-
ny in the district of residence based on the 2011 census 
CONSERVATIVE 
Share of votes for the five major German political parties that was collect-
ed by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) or Liberals (FDP) in the dis-
trict of residence in the federal elections of 2005 
EAST_GERMANY Dummy for residence in the former German Democratic Republic includ-ing the whole of Berlin 
ECON Dummy for having vocational training or academic education in econom-ics or business 
ECON_EDU Level of general education conditional on having vocational training or academic education in economics or business (ECON * EDU) 
EDU Level of general education 
 0.0 — No high school degree 
 0.2 — Lower high school degree (Hauptschule) 
 0.4 — Intermediate high school degree (Realschule) 
 0.6 — Upper high school degree (Gymnasium) 
 0.8 — Academic education, not completed 
 1.0 — Academic education, completed 
FINACC Principal component representing the intensity of financial accounting information acquisition 
FOREIGNERS Share of inhabitants of the district of residence without German citizen-ship end of 2007 
HORIZON Investment horizon 
 0.0 — Short-term gains 
 0.5 — Regular income from dividends or trading 
 1.0 — Long-term formation of wealth 
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HOUSING Level of the housing situation 
 0.167 — At parents’ residence 
 0.333 — Rented apartment 
 0.500 — Rented house 
 0.667 — Condominium 
 0.833 — Own non-detached house 
 1.000 — Own detached house 
LN_AGE Natural logarithm of age 
LN_PRODUCTIVITY Natural logarithm of gross domestic product in Euro divided by persons in employment of the district of residence for 2007 
LN_YEARS Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years having been invested in stocks except mutual funds 
MALE Dummy for being male 
PARISHIONERS 
Share of inhabitants of the district of residence who are members of the 
Roman Catholic Church or the Evangelical Church in Germany based on 
the 2011 census 
PRODUCTIVITY Gross domestic product in Euro divided by persons in employment of the district of residence for 2007 
TRUST Principal component representing the trust in stakeholders 
TURNOUT Voters turnout in the district of residence for the federal elections of 2005 
UNEMPLOYMENT Average unemployment rate of the district of residence for 2007 
VOTING Past or intended exercise of shareholder voting rights 
 0.00 — Not voted, no intention to do so at the next annual meeting 
 0.25 — Not voted, intention to delegate voting right to a proxy for the next annual meeting 
 0.50 — Not voted, intention to visit the next annual meeting 
 0.75 — Voted by delegation to a proxy 
 1.00 — Voted personally at an annual meeting 
YEARS Number of years having been invested in stocks except mutual funds 
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Appendix B: Principle component analysis of agency risk perception 
Stakeholder PC1 h² 
Management 0.60 0.36 
Majority shareholder 0.82 0.67 
Financial intermediaries 0.67 0.45 
Other large investors 0.85 0.73 
N = 11,260. The principal components analysis uses ones as pri-
or communality estimates and the principal axis method to ex-
tract the components. Column headed h² presents final commu-
nality estimates. Bold values indicate factor loadings of 0.40 or 
greater for the respective component. We multiply the first prin-
cipal component with –1 and label it TRUST. 
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Appendix C: Principal component analysis of financial accounting information 
acquisition 
Financial statements components PC1 h² 
Income statement 0.84 0.70 
Balance sheet 0.81 0.66 
Management report 0.74 0.55 
Statement of changes in equity 0.81 0.65 
Cash flow statement 0.84 0.70 
Segment reporting 0.81 0.66 
Auditor’s opinion 0.68 0.46 
Notes 0.78 0.61 
N = 11,260. The principal components analysis uses ones as prior 
communality estimates and the principal axis method to extract 
the components. Column headed h² presents final communality 
estimates. Bold values indicate factor loadings of 0.40 or greater 
for the respective component. We label the first principal compo-
nent FINACC. 
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Figure 1: Average trust in stakeholder by age class 
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TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders.
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Figure 2: Average trust in stakeholder by economic and general education 
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TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders.
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Figure 3: Average trust in stakeholder by intensity of income statement use 
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TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders.
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Figure 4: Average trust in stakeholder by voting behavior 
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TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders.
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Figure 5: Proposed structural equation model 
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ECON_EDU is the level of general education conditional on having vocational training or academic education in 
economics or business. 
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Figure 6: Standardized structural equation modeling solution 
for financial accounting information acquisition 
Fit
N 11,260
Chi² 5,699
DF 99
AGFI 0.916
CFI 0.918
RMSEA 0.071
R²
Use 0.025
Exposure 0.016
Trust 0.003
ECON_EDU
Financial
accounting information
acquisition
Stock market
exposure
Trust
0.111
(0.013)
***
0.067
(0.014)
***
0.103
(0.012)
***
0.098
(0.010)
***
0.052
(0.010)
***
0.014
(0.011)
 
The maximum-likelihood parameter estimation is used for structural equation modeling. Trust is measured in-
versely by the four questionnaire items for agency risk perception. Financial accounting information acquisition 
is measured by the eight questionnaire items for the intensity of use of financial statements components. 
ECON_EDU is the level of general education conditional on having vocational training or academic education in 
economics or business. Stock market exposure is measured by the share of wealth (excluding own residence) that 
is invested in stocks except mutual funds (%STOCKS), the number of firms of which stocks are held (#FIRMS), 
and the investment strategy by time horizon (HORIZON). DF are the degrees of freedom. AGFI is the Adjusted 
Goodness of Fit Index. CFI is the Comparative Fit Index. RMSEA is the Root Mean Square Error of Approxima-
tion. Standard errors for parameter estimates are provided in braces. */**/*** marks significance at the 10/5/1% 
level. 
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Figure 7: Standardized structural equation modeling solution for voting behavior 
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Trust
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VOTING
Fit
N 11,260
Chi² 706
DF 23
AGFI 0.974
CFI 0.950
RMSEA 0.051
R²
VOTING 0.025
Exposure 0.016
Trust 0.003
 
The maximum-likelihood parameter estimation is used for structural equation modeling. Trust is measured in-
versely by the four questionnaire items for agency risk perception. VOTING represents the extent of previous or 
intended exercise of shareholder voting rights. ECON_EDU is the level of general education conditional on 
having vocational training or academic education in economics or business. Stock market exposure is measured 
by the share of wealth (excluding own residence) that is invested in stocks except mutual funds (%STOCKS), the 
number of firms of which stocks are held (#FIRMS), and the investment strategy by time horizon (HORIZON). 
DF are the degrees of freedom. AGFI is the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index. CFI is the Comparative Fit Index. 
RMSEA is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. Standard errors for parameter estimates are provided 
in braces. */**/*** marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 1: Sample development 
Questionnaires sent to individual shareholders of Deutsche Post 
(natural persons with residence in Germany) 465,321 
Questionnaires returned (Dec 14, 2007—Jan 22, 2008) 44,321 
Questionnaires with missing answers on demographic items –7,924 
Questionnaires with erroneous answers on any relevant item –521 
Shareholders who have delegated their investment decisions –2,165 
Shareholders aged less than 18 years –30 
Current or former employees of Deutsche Post –4,005 
Questionnaires with missing answers on agency risk or monitoring –18,416 
Final sample for main analysis 11,260 
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Table 2: Response pattern for agency risk perception 
Question: How high do you rate the probability of betrayal 
by the following parties, negatively affecting your wealth position? 
Scale: 1 (very low), 2 (low), 3 (moderate), 4 (high), 5 (very high) 
Stakeholder N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Management 11,260 3.520 1.091 1 3 4 4 5 
Majority shareholder 11,260 3.509 1.014 1 3 4 4 5 
Financial intermediaries 11,260 3.301 1.098 1 3 3 4 5 
Other large investors 11,260 3.213 0.982 1 3 3 4 5 
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Table 3: Variable distribution for trust and demographic characteristics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
TRUST 11,260 0.000 1.000 –2.088 –0.763 –0.009 0.631 3.053 
MALE 11,260 0.899       
AGE 11,260 54.033 13.591 18 43 55 65 93 
ECON 11,260 0.376       
EDU 11,260 0.761 0.296 0.000 0.400 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ECON_EDU 11,260 0.311 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800 1.000 
HOUSING 11,260 0.771 0.267 0.167 0.667 0.833 1.000 1.000 
PRODUCTIVITY 11,260 62,618 11,749 38,639 54,763 60,596 68,139 106,159 
UNEMPLOYMENT 11,260 0.082 0.037 0.022 0.052 0.073 0.104 0.220 
FOREIGNERS 11,260 0.100 0.055 0.007 0.057 0.092 0.136 0.235 
TURNOUT 11,260 0.784 0.028 0.684 0.769 0.785 0.804 0.843 
CONSERVATIVE 11,260 0.481 0.101 0.224 0.397 0.490 0.543 0.745 
PARISHIONERS 11,260 0.610 0.180 0.059 0.533 0.647 0.732 0.919 
CATHOLICS 11,260 0.487 0.236 0.050 0.280 0.501 0.703 0.956 
EAST_GERMANY 11,260 0.124       
TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders. MALE is a dummy for being male. AGE 
is the age. ECON is a dummy for having vocational training or academic education in economics or business. 
EDU is the level of general education. ECON_EDU is ECON * EDU. HOUSING is the level of the housing 
situation. PRODUCTIVITY is gross domestic product in Euro divided by persons in employment of the district 
of residence for 2007. UNEMPLOYMENT is the average unemployment rate of the district of residence for 2007. 
FOREIGNERS is the share of inhabitants of the district of residence without German citizenship end of 2007. 
TURNOUT is the voters turnout in the district of residence for the federal elections of 2005. CONSERVATIVE is 
the share of the votes for the five major German political parties that was collected by the Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU) or the Liberals (FDP) in the district of residence in the federal elections of 2005. PARISHIONERS 
is the share of inhabitants of the district of residence who are members of the Roman Catholic Church or the 
Evangelical Church in Germany based on the 2011 census. CATHOLICS is the number of members of the Ro-
man Catholic Church divided by all members of the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in 
Germany in the district of residence based on the 2011 census. EAST_GERMANY is a dummy for residence in 
the former German Democratic Republic including the whole of Berlin. 
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Table 4: Pearson (below) and Spearman (above) correlations for trust and demographic characteristics 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) TRUST X 0.029 –0.014 0.053 0.018 0.052 –0.020 0.027 0.019 0.034 –0.013 –0.025 –0.045 –0.017 0.022 
(2) MALE 0.028 X 0.081 –0.010 0.048 –0.004 0.048 –0.013 –0.033 –0.014 0.023 0.028 0.047 0.013 –0.030 
(3) LN_AGE –0.021 0.076 X –0.086 –0.109 –0.100 0.333 0.033 –0.041 0.034 0.077 0.023 0.041 0.016 –0.092 
(4) ECON 0.047 –0.010 –0.096 X 0.162 0.973 –0.034 0.072 –0.001 0.074 0.020 –0.007 –0.052 0.001 –0.015 
(5) EDU 0.012 0.043 –0.119 0.174 X 0.281 –0.066 0.051 0.073 0.091 –0.018 –0.079 –0.159 –0.029 0.094 
(6) ECON_EDU 0.043 –0.002 –0.117 0.934 0.347 X –0.041 0.075 0.012 0.081 0.015 –0.018 –0.073 –0.001 0.001 
(7) HOUSING –0.020 0.049 0.422 –0.034 –0.079 –0.050 X –0.122 –0.145 –0.227 0.123 0.142 0.245 0.001 –0.119 
(8) LN_PRODUCTIVITY 0.037 –0.018 0.023 0.076 0.055 0.080 –0.092 X –0.202 0.675 0.116 0.123 –0.162 0.239 –0.427 
(9) UNEMPLOYMENT 0.019 –0.035 –0.058 –0.007 0.084 0.018 –0.158 –0.294 X 0.078 –0.558 –0.833 –0.604 –0.460 0.548 
(10) FOREIGNERS 0.037 –0.019 0.011 0.075 0.098 0.087 –0.194 0.687 –0.007 X –0.142 –0.123 –0.368 0.203 –0.262 
(11) TURNOUT –0.005 0.021 0.075 0.027 –0.012 0.018 0.111 0.193 –0.584 –0.116 X 0.368 0.349 0.081 –0.395 
(12) CONSERVATIVE –0.028 0.028 0.025 –0.010 –0.088 –0.030 0.146 0.148 –0.797 –0.107 0.334 X 0.635 0.621 –0.479 
(13) PARISHIONERS –0.039 0.047 0.072 –0.033 –0.156 –0.066 0.220 0.052 –0.724 –0.177 0.420 0.669 X 0.530 –0.567 
(14) CATHOLICS –0.015 0.012 0.019 0.002 –0.029 –0.001 0.018 0.256 –0.454 0.230 0.092 0.621 0.546 X –0.406 
(15) EAST_GERMANY 0.019 –0.030 –0.090 –0.015 0.094 0.011 –0.140 –0.445 0.696 –0.249 –0.417 –0.498 –0.785 –0.412 X 
N = 11,260. TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders. MALE is a dummy for being male. LN_AGE is the natural logarithm of age. ECON is 
a dummy for having vocational training or academic education in economics or business. EDU is the level of general education. ECON_EDU is ECON * EDU. HOUS-
ING is the level of the housing situation. LN_PRODUCTIVITY is the natural logarithm of gross domestic product in Euro divided by persons in employment of the dis-
trict of residence for 2007. UNEMPLOYMENT is the average unemployment rate of the district of residence for 2007. FOREIGNERS is the share of inhabitants of the 
district of residence without German citizenship end of 2007. TURNOUT is the voters turnout in the district of residence for the federal elections of 2005. CONSERVA-
TIVE is the share of the votes for the five major German political parties that was collected by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) or the Liberals (FDP) in the district 
of residence in the federal elections of 2005. PARISHIONERS is the share of inhabitants of the district of residence who are members of the Roman Catholic Church or 
the Evangelical Church in Germany based on the 2011 census. CATHOLICS is the number of members of the Roman Catholic Church divided by all members of the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in Germany in the district of residence based on the 2011 census. EAST_GERMANY is a dummy for residence in 
the former German Democratic Republic including the whole of Berlin. Bold values indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. 
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Table 5: Regression analysis of trust 
Variable TRUST (OLS)  
TRUST 
(OLS)  
TRUST 
(OLS)  
 TRUST 
≥ median 
(logit) 
 
Intercept —  —  —  
 –0.219 
(6.142)  
MALE 0.094 (0.031) *** 
0.103 
(0.031) *** 
0.099 
(0.032) *** 
 0.202 
(0.066) *** 
ECON 0.132 (0.061) ** 
0.131 
(0.061) ** 
0.132 
(0.062) ** 
 0.282 
(0.128) ** 
EDU 0.015 (0.038)  
–0.009 
(0.038)  
–0.09 
(0.039)  
 0.028 
(0.081)  
ECON_EDU –0.051 (0.072)  
–0.057 
(0.072)  
–0.057 
(0.073)  
 –0.071 
(0.151)  
HOUSING –0.030 (0.039)  
0.024 
(0.040)  
0.024 
(0.042)  
 –0.093 
(0.086)  
LN_PRODUCTIVITY —  0.225 (0.086) *** —  
 
—  
UNEMPLOYMENT —  –0.310 (0.597)  —  
 
—  
FOREIGNERS —  0.287 (0.307)  —  
 
—  
TURNOUT —  0.145 (0.449)  —  
 
—  
CONSERVATIVE —  –0.188 (0.197)  —  
 
—  
PARISHIONERS —  –0.008 (0.149)  —  
 
—  
CATHOLICS —  –0.023 (0.066)  —  
 
—  
EAST_GERMANY —  0.123 (0.072) * —  
 
—  
Fixed effects Age class  
Age 
class  
Age 
class 
District 
 
 Age 
class 
District 
 
R² (adjusted) 0.005  0.007  0.018   —  
R² (Nagelkerke) —  —  —   0.061  
Response levels —  —  —   2  
N 11,260  11,260  11,260   11,260  
TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders. MALE is a dummy for being male. 
ECON is a dummy for having vocational training or academic education in economics or business. EDU is the 
level of general education. ECON_EDU is ECON * EDU. HOUSING is the level of the housing situation. 
LN_PRODUCTIVITY is the natural logarithm of gross domestic product in Euro divided by persons in em-
ployment of the district of residence for 2007. UNEMPLOYMENT is the average unemployment rate of the 
district of residence for 2007. FOREIGNERS is the share of inhabitants of the district of residence without 
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German citizenship end of 2007. TURNOUT is the voters turnout in the district of residence for the federal 
elections of 2005. CONSERVATIVE is the share of the votes for the five major German political parties that 
was collected by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) or the Liberals (FDP) in the district of residence in the 
federal elections of 2005. PARISHIONERS is the share of inhabitants of the district of residence who are mem-
bers of the Roman Catholic Church or the Evangelical Church in Germany based on the 2011 census. CATHO-
LICS is the number of members of the Roman Catholic Church divided by all members of the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Evangelical Church in Germany in the district of residence based on the 2011 census. 
EAST_GERMANY is a dummy for residence in the former German Democratic Republic including the whole of 
Berlin. Standard errors for parameter estimates are provided in braces. */**/*** marks significance at the 
10/5/1% level. 
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Table 6: Response pattern for relevance of information sources 
Question: How do you assess the relevance of the following 
information sources for making your investment decisions? 
Scale: 1 (very low), 2 (low), 3 (moderate), 4 (high), 5 (very high) 
Information source N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Media 11,260 3.976 0.849 1 4 4 5 5 
Annual report 11,260 3.191 1.117 1 2 3 4 5 
Banks and brokers 11,260 2.922 1.146 1 2 3 4 5 
Interim report 11,260 2.904 1.139 1 2 3 4 5 
Investor relations 11,260 2.774 1.073 1 2 3 4 5 
Company website 11,260 2.650 1.125 1 2 3 3 5 
Social circle 11,260 2.046 1.027 1 1 2 3 5 
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Table 7: Subsample analysis of relevance of information sources by trust 
Information source 
TRUST 
< median 
(a) 
TRUST 
≥ median 
(b) 
(b) – (a)  
Media 3.947 4.006 0.059 (0.016) *** 
Annual report 3.160 3.223 0.063 (0.021) *** 
Banks and brokers 2.879 2.965 0.086 (0.022) *** 
Interim report 2.869 2.940 0.071 (0.022) *** 
Investor relations 2.757 2.792 0.036 (0.020) * 
Company website 2.634 2.667 0.033 (0.021)  
Social circle 2.065 2.026 –0.039 (0.019) ** 
N 5,633 5,627   
N = 11,260. TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders. 
Bold values indicate a significantly greater value compared to the other subsample. 
Standard errors for parameter estimates are provided in braces. */**/*** marks 
significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 8: Response pattern for intensity of use of the annual report 
Question: How intensively do you use the individual components of the annual report? 
Scale: 1 (very low intensity), 2 (low intensity), 3 (moderate intensity),  
4 (high intensity), 5 (very high intensity) 
Component N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Income statement 11,260 3.452 1.121 1 3 4 4 5 
Balance sheet 11,260 3.364 1.103 1 3 4 4 5 
Management 
discussion and analysis 11,260 3.189 1.081 1 3 3 4 5 
Letter to the 
shareholders 11,260 3.049 1.039 1 2 3 4 5 
Statement of 
changes in equity 11,260 3.018 1.154 1 2 3 4 5 
Remuneration report 11,260 2.959 1.139 1 2 3 4 5 
Cash flow statement 11,260 2.807 1.154 1 2 3 4 5 
Report by the 
supervisory board 11,260 2.752 1.034 1 2 3 3 5 
Segment reporting 11,260 2.720 1.098 1 2 3 3 5 
Corporate governance 
report 11,260 2.473 1.037 1 2 3 3 5 
Auditor’s opinion 11,260 2.408 1.169 1 1 2 3 5 
Notes 11,260 2.360 1.041 1 2 2 3 5 
Bold components indicate financial statements components. 
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Table 9: Subsample analysis of intensity of use of the annual report by trust 
Component 
TRUST 
< median 
(a) 
TRUST 
≥ median 
(b) 
(b) – (a)  
Income statement 3.409 3.496 0.087 (0.021) *** 
Balance sheet 3.331 3.398 0.067 (0.021) *** 
Management 
discussion and analysis 3.107 3.271 
0.164 
(0.020) *** 
Letter to the 
shareholders 3.001 3.098 
0.096 
(0.020) *** 
Statement of 
changes in equity 3.027 3.001 
–0.018 
(0.022)  
Remuneration report 3.013 2.904 –0.109 (0.021) *** 
Cash flow statement 2.781 2.834 0.053 (0.022) ** 
Report by the 
supervisory board 2.718 2.786 
0.068 
(0.020) *** 
Segment reporting 2.664 2.776 0.113 (0.021) *** 
Corporate governance 
report 2.449 2.498 
0.049 
(0.020) ** 
Auditor’s opinion 2.423 2.394 –0.030 (0.022)  
Notes 2.320 2.401 0.081 (0.020) *** 
N 5,633 5,627   
N = 11,260. TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakehold-
ers. Bold components indicate financial statements components. Bold values in-
dicate a significantly greater value compared to the other subsample. Standard er-
rors for parameter estimates are provided in braces. */**/*** marks significance 
at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 10: Variable distribution for monitoring proxies and investor characteristics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
FINACC 11,260 0.000 1.000 –2.186 –0.647 0.106 0.696 2.354 
VOTING 11,260 0.607 0.357 0.000 0.250 0.750 0.750 1.000 
TRUST 11,260 0.000 1.000 –2.088 –0.763 –0.009 0.631 3.053 
ECON_EDU 11,260 0.311 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800 1.000 
%STOCKS 11,260 0.298 0.222 0.010 0.100 0.250 0.400 1.000 
#FIRMS 11,260 11.229 13.058 1 5 8 14 500 
HORIZON 11,260 0.865 0.259 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
YEARS 11,260 17.562 10.761 0 10 15 23 75 
MALE 11,260 0.899       
AGE 11,260 54.033 13.591 18 43 55 65 93 
HOUSING 11,260 0.771 0.267 0.167 0.667 0.833 1.000 1.000 
FINACC is a principal component representing the intensity of financial accounting information acquisition. 
VOTING represents the past or intended exercise of shareholder voting rights. TRUST is a principal component 
representing the trust in stakeholders. ECON_EDU is the level of general education conditional on having vo-
cational training or academic education in economics or business. %STOCKS is the share of wealth (excluding 
own residence) that is invested in stocks except mutual funds. #FIRMS is the number of firms of which stocks 
are held. HORIZON is the investment strategy by time horizon. YEARS is the number of years having been in-
vested in stocks except mutual funds. MALE is a dummy for being male. AGE is the age. HOUSING is the level 
of the housing situation. 
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Table 11: Pearson (below) and Spearman (above) correlations for monitoring proxies and investor characteristics 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) FINACC X 0.195 0.046 0.113 0.063 0.097 –0.036 0.099 0.042 0.150 0.055 
(2) VOTING 0.214 X 0.043 0.090 0.144 0.204 –0.029 0.249 0.058 0.126 0.008 
(3) TRUST 0.043 0.042 X 0.052 0.063 0.062 0.033 0.039 0.029 –0.014 –0.020 
(4) ECON_EDU 0.101 0.077 0.043 X 0.058 0.115 0.024 0.112 –0.004 –0.100 –0.041 
(5) %STOCKS 0.057 0.105 0.055 0.055 X 0.574 0.004 0.279 0.054 0.021 –0.027 
(6) #FIRMS 0.082 0.125 0.030 0.077 0.399 X –0.018 0.381 0.100 0.120 0.088 
(7) HORIZON –0.022 –0.009 0.030 0.026 0.008 –0.009 X –0.040 –0.012 –0.166 –0.035 
(8) LN_YEARS 0.099 0.225 0.041 0.104 0.246 0.262 –0.024 X 0.097 0.430 0.220 
(9) MALE 0.048 0.059 0.028 –0.002 0.045 0.067 –0.014 0.094 X 0.081 0.048 
(10) LN_AGE 0.143 0.109 –0.021 –0.117 0.002 0.095 –0.129 0.442 0.076 X 0.333 
(11) HOUSING 0.062 0.029 –0.020 –0.050 –0.031 0.059 –0.038 0.250 0.049 0.422 X 
N = 11,260. FINACC is a principal component representing the intensity of financial accounting information acquisition. VOTING represents the past or intended ex-
ercise of shareholder voting rights. TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders. ECON_EDU is the level of general education conditional 
on having vocational training or academic education in economics or business. %STOCKS is the share of wealth (excluding own residence) that is invested in stocks 
except mutual funds. #FIRMS is the number of firms of which stocks are held. HORIZON is the investment strategy by time horizon. LN_YEARS is the natural loga-
rithm of one plus the number of years having been invested in stocks except mutual funds. MALE is a dummy for being male. LN_AGE is the natural logarithm of 
age. HOUSING is the level of the housing situation. Bold values indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. 
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Table 12: Regression analysis of monitoring proxies 
Variable FINACC (OLS)  
FINACC 
 (OLS)  
 VOTING 
(logit)  
VOTING 
(logit)  
Intercept –0.072 (0.035) ** —  
 Not 
reported  
Not 
reported  
TRUST 0.040 (0.009) *** 
0.039 
(0.009) *** 
 0.057 
(0.017) *** 
0.042 
(0.018) ** 
ECON_EDU 0.218 (0.022) *** 
0.259 
(0.022) *** 
 0.325 
(0.041) *** 
0.280 
(0.042) *** 
%STOCKS 0.112 (0.046) ** 
0.126 
(0.046) *** 
 0.557 
(0.088) *** 
0.299 
(0.089) *** 
#FIRMS 0.005 (0.001) *** 
0.004 
(0.001) *** 
 0.024 
(0.002) *** 
0.016 
(0.002) *** 
HORIZON –0.096 (0.036) *** 
–0.007 
(0.036)  
 –0.130 
(0.067) * 
–0.033 
(0.068)  
LN_YEARS —  –0.004 (0.019)  
 
—  0.644 (0.037) *** 
MALE —  0.099 (0.031) *** 
 
—  0.188 (0.058) *** 
HOUSING —  0.055 (0.038)  
 
—  –0.269 (0.072) *** 
Fixed effects —  Age class   —  Age class  
R² (adjusted) 0.018  0.044   —  —  
R² (Nagelkerke) —  —   0.041  0.089  
Response levels —  —   5  5  
N 11,260  11,260   11,260  11,260  
FINACC is a principal component representing the intensity of financial accounting information acquisition. 
VOTING represents the past or intended exercise of shareholder voting rights. TRUST is a principal compo-
nent representing the trust in stakeholders. ECON_EDU is the level of general education conditional on hav-
ing vocational training or academic education in economics or business. %STOCKS is the share of wealth 
(excluding own residence) that is invested in stocks except mutual funds. #FIRMS is the number of firms of 
which stocks are held. HORIZON is the investment strategy by time horizon. LN_YEARS is the natural loga-
rithm of one plus the number of years having been invested in stocks except mutual funds. MALE is a dummy 
for being male. HOUSING is the level of the housing situation. Standard errors for parameter estimates are 
provided in braces. Estimates for logit regressions are the natural logarithms of the odds ratios. */**/*** 
marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 13: Summary of structural equation modeling solutions for final and relaxed sample 
Monitoring type Financial accounting information acquisition 
 
VOTING 
Sample Final sample 
Relaxed 
sample 
 Final 
sample 
Relaxed 
sample 
N 11,260 18,987  11,260 25,857 
Chi² 5,699 9,743  706 1,429 
DF 99 99  23 23 
AGFI 0.916 0.915  0.974 0.977 
CFI 0.918 0.919  0.950 0.957 
RMSEA 0.071 0.072  0.051 0.049 
R² for monitoring type 0.025 0.027  0.037 0.036 
Direct significant link 
from trust to monitoring? No (+)** 
 
No (+)** 
The maximum-likelihood parameter estimation is used for structural equation modeling. 
Financial accounting information acquisition is measured by the eight questionnaire items 
for the intensity of use of financial statements components. VOTING represents the past or 
intended exercise of shareholder voting rights. DF are the degrees of freedom. AGFI is the 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index. CFI is the Comparative Fit Index. RMSEA is the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation. Trust is measured inversely by the four question-
naire items for agency risk perception. */**/*** marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 14: Comparison of trust, monitoring, and controls by affiliation with Deutsche Post 
Variable 
Final sample 
(no affiliation with 
Deutsche Post) 
(a) 
Deutsche Post 
affiliates with 
one investment 
(b) 
(b) – (a)  
TRUST 0.000 –0.022 –0.022 (0.075)  
FINACC –0.001 0.083 0.084 (0.075)  
VOTING 0.607 0.443 –0.164 (0.027) *** 
ECON_EDU 0.311 0.198 –0.113 (0.032) *** 
%STOCKS 0.298 0.099 –0.199 (0.017) *** 
#FIRMS 11.229 1.000 –10.229 (0.973) *** 
HORIZON 0.865 0.786 –0.079 (0.020) *** 
YEARS 17.562 9.339 –8.224 (0.805) *** 
MALE 0.899 0.633 –0.266 (0.023) *** 
AGE 54.033 48.539 –5.494 (1.018) *** 
HOUSING 0.771 0.718 –0.054 (0.020) ** 
N 11,260 180   
N = 11,440. TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders. FINACC is a 
principal component representing the intensity of financial accounting information acquisition. 
VOTING represents the past or intended exercise of shareholder voting rights. ECON_EDU is the 
level of general education conditional on having vocational training or academic education in 
economics or business. %STOCKS is the share of wealth (excluding own residence) that is in-
vested in stocks except mutual funds. #FIRMS is the number of firms of which stocks are held. 
HORIZON is the investment strategy by time horizon. YEARS is the number of years having been 
invested in stocks except mutual funds. MALE is a dummy for being male. AGE is the age. 
HOUSING is the level of the housing situation. Bold values indicate a significantly greater value 
compared to the other subsample. Standard errors for parameter estimates are provided in braces. 
*/**/*** marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
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Table 15: Regression analysis of trust and monitoring 
for Deutsche Post affiliates with one investment 
Variable TRUST (OLS)  
 FINACC 
 (OLS)  
 VOTING 
(logit)  
Intercept —  
 
—  
 Not 
reported  
TRUST —  
 0.131 
(0.075) * 
 0.039 
(0.144)  
ECON –0.198 (0.415)  
 
—  
 
—  
EDU 0.483 (0.421)  
 
—  
 
—  
ECON_EDU 0.269 (0.643)  
 0.012 
(0.216)  
 1.092 
(0.426) ** 
%STOCKS —  
 0.328 
(0.592)  
 0.256 
(1.133)  
HORIZON —  
 –0.145 
(0.224)  
 –0.468 
(0.449)  
LN_YEARS —  
 –0.086 
(0.174)  
 –0.078 
(0.337)  
MALE –0.277 (0.162) * 
 0.109 
(0.158)  
 0.382 
(0.305)  
HOUSING 0.281 (0.262)  
 0.179 
(0.257)  
 –0.342 
(0.495)  
Fixed effects Age class   Age class   Age class  
R² (adjusted) 0.011   0.058   —  
R² (Nagelkerke) —   —   0.115  
Response levels —   —   5  
N 180   180   180  
FINACC is a principal component representing the intensity of financial accounting information 
acquisition. VOTING represents the past or intended exercise of shareholder voting rights. 
TRUST is a principal component representing the trust in stakeholders. ECON is a dummy for 
having vocational training or academic education in economics or business. EDU is the level of 
general education. ECON_EDU is ECON * EDU. %STOCKS is the share of wealth (excluding 
own residence) that is invested in stocks except mutual funds. HORIZON is the investment 
strategy by time horizon. LN_YEARS is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years 
having been invested in stocks except mutual funds. MALE is a dummy for being male. HOUS-
ING is the level of the housing situation. Standard errors for parameter estimates are provided in 
braces. Estimates for logit regressions are the natural logarithms of the odds ratios. */**/*** 
marks significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
 
 
